In a recent post on terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, I noted a Pakistani diplomat had claimed India's evidence of Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai attack was fabricated, and the Pakistani government had issued a report concluding the government was not involved in planning the attack, nor was the attack planned on Pakistani territory.
Perhaps in response, the Indian Foreign Minister has now directly accused ISI of complicity. The administration will have to monitor the subcontinent carefully to prevent the diplomatic hostilities from escalating.
Two quick extra notes: Pakistan released nuclear scientist AQ Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, who had been serving house arrest for sharing nuclear technology with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Without reading the order of the Islamabad High Court, it's impossible to know whether this is a standard decision of Pakistani law or a nod to the country's hawks, for whom Khan remains a hero. The United States has expressed concern.
Meanwhile, Tom Ricks has this quick note that while we’ve been successful in targeting Al Qaeda leaders on the Pakistani border, the security situation in Afghanistan has not improved. Ricks infers that Al Qaeda leaders are thus not the “primary drivers” of instability in the region. Of course, eliminating particular high-value targets is just one component of successful counterinsurgency – but if anyone still believed drone strikes on Al Qaeda leaders, by themselves, would restore stability, Ricks provides a useful reminder that an integrated strategy is mandatory.
