Israelis face a far greater price negotiation than merely arguing over the cost of a bushel of tomatoes at the shuk (market) on Friday morning.
The end of this week marked the 1000th day since the abduction of Israeli Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas in a cross-border raid into Israel. With Hamas demanding the release of hundreds of its supporters held in Israeli prisons, the Israeli government insists on deporting approximately 200 of the fugitives to non Hamas-affiliated nations. Reports on the negotiations cast doubt on achieving a deal even though Hamas reaffirmed its desire for a resolution and the Israeli government faces immense internal pressure to secure Shalit’s release. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government, reaching its end in the coming weeks, faces a dilemma: determining the price of this one soldier.
Proponents of acquiescing to Hamas’ demands in order to ensure Shalit’s return argue that the Israeli military apparatus represents a much broader set of national ideals than other defense forces. Due to mandatory military service, Israeli culture hinges on conscription, with the army an integral aspect of family life in nearly every home.
This communal identification with the military results in an atmosphere where Israelis feel that every individual remains tied to the well-being of each soldier. By securing Shalit’s release, the government reaffirms this position and maintains confidence in the population that the IDF will undertake all measures to ensure the safety of every soldier. In fact, some Israelis, including Shalit’s grandfather, declare this posture as an ethical standard established by the military.
Moreover, supporters of negotiations for Shalit’s release cite the upcoming transition of power to a Likud-led government, marking a shift to the right, as incentive to promptly strike a deal. If he neglects to ensure Shalit’s release before leaving office, Olmert would obtain a legacy marred further by failing to return alive another soldier abducted during his tenure in office. Similarly, with Likud Chairman Binyamin Netanyahu taking the reigns of negotiations as the next Prime Minister, his hard-line stances would deter the next administration from sacrifices during negotiations with Hamas. Further, Netanyahu would not face the same urgency for Shalit’s return due to the fact that Olmert’s government remains responsible for the soldier’s abduction. While Netanyahu would obtain political capital from proponents of a Shalit deal, opponents to negotiations would condemn the process, thereby negating any incentive for him to return a soldier abducted in a situation in which he bore no responsibility.
Conversely, opponents to negotiations steadfastly adhere to Olmert ideology he recently announced, citing the government’s refusal to cross any “red lines” with Hamas.
The release of prisoners held in Israeli prisons would reintegrate terrorists and proponents of violence back into Palestinian society. These individuals could resume planning or carrying out attacks against Israel and may spread extremist ideology throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The exchange of prisoners for Shalit would also establish a standard for negotiations between Israel and terrorist groups. Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups would know that they can obtain serious concessions from Israel, such as prisoner release, in exchange for merely one soldier. Hamas even repeatedly threatened this action and Hezbollah attacked an Israeli convoy in 2006 to abduct two soldiers, an action that resulted in the Second Lebanon War. In fact, the war resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,000 deaths and neglected to return the two soldiers, both of which were apparently killed in the initial Hezbollah strike, a fact unknown to Israel until after the bodies’ release in 2008. Further, the soldier abduction tactic would provide terror groups worldwide with another tool in their arsenal of violence to disrupt the activities of a nation.
Critics of negotiations also rebuke the need for a prisoner exchange due to the simple fact that Shalit is a soldier in an army. During any military activity, casualties and prisoners of war are an inevitable sacrifice any country must make. In fact, the 2006 Lebanon war, instigated partially by the need to return to IDF soldiers, resulted in the deaths of 119 Israeli soldiers and 44 Israeli civilians. These figures pale in comparison to the number of Israeli civilians and soldiers injured in the war as well as Lebanese casualties.
Lastly, opponents of the swap cite the fact that no real signs of life from Shalit emerged for approximately one year. The release of prisoners does not guarantee that Shalit would not return to his family in a body bag while Hamas sympathizers enter Gaza to embrace their families.
With both proponents and critics of the prisoner exchange petitioning, protesting, and lobbying the government to adhere to their point of view, the last 1000 left the Shalit family still seeking a reunion with their fallen soldier, but Israeli security remains intact. The ethical need for Israeli to ensure the return of each soldier dwarfs the security consequences of ensuring Shalit’s return. The connection felt by Israelis toward the military does not remotely match the consequences from returning hundreds of terrorists. The deal sought by Hamas would leave the possibility open for dozens more Shalit-style abductions and simultaneously endanger the lives of Israeli civilians. The price tag simply remains too high.
