Foreign Policy Blogs

Tensions with Egypt

Less than two months before the parliamentary elections and things seem relatively calm. Posturing and overt displays of force and support have been absent, as are incidents of confrontation and violence. There has been some engagement of the Lebanese Armed Forces with a drug cartel operating in the south, but that situation seems contained to the area of domestic drug enforcement. Externally, regional and super-regional actors have largely been quiet and, so far, all signs point to smooth balloting in June.

An exception to this is the recent incident of Hizballah operatives being arrested in Egypt. Egyptian authorities claim that the group was plotting armed attacks in the country, particularly against Israeli tourists. Egyptian officials claim that the group’s goal was the destabilization of the government.

Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah addressed those claims last Friday, writing them off as “false and full of imagination and bluffs.” He confirmed that one of people arrested in Egypt, Sami Shihab, is a member of Hizballah, but denied that members of his movement were operating in Egypt with the purpose of destabilization and that their mission was only to smuggle in weapons and supplies to Gaza to aid the Palestinian resistance. He went on to proclaim that “if helping the Palestinians whose land is seized and who are being killed and besieged is an accusation, then I thereby declare that I am guilty of this accusation.”

Egyptian officials then seized upon Nasrallah’s admission condemning Hizballah for causing trouble outside of it’s stated sphere of operations and floated the idea of charging the Secretary General as well. Rhetoric coming out of Cairo has condemned Nasrallah as a “war criminal” that should be tried in the International Criminal Court.

Hizballah has been operating in Gaza for years, and smuggling weapons in from Egypt seems like business as usual. It also seems hard to believe that Cairo would be shocked by such activity, but the reaction so far has been one of total appall.  Hizballah’s response is to say look, as an organization, one of our stated goals is to combat Israel. Our operatives in Egypt were there to help arm the Palestinians, and not to destabilize the Egyptian government.

That seems logical, especially in comparison to the borderline-theatrical accusations coming from Cairo. It shouldn’t come as a shock to anyone that in Hizballah’s mission to help aid Hamas in Gaza, they might have to cross the border into Egypt to do so. Its almost hard to believe that Egyptian intelligence hasn’t been aware of this for some time. So why all the fuss now?

An obvious impulse would be to point to the upcoming parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Surely Cairo is trying to drag Hizballah through the mud in order to give it a poor showing at the polls. But that doesn’t hold up because Hizballah’s regional adventurism probably wouldn’t be a factor to sway voters. The last thing anyone in Lebanon wants is another war, and it is unlikely that Hizballah’s transgressions in Egypt would lead to that. People seem concerned mostly about what is going on inside Lebanon. So as far as influencing the June elections, unless this issue leads to some unforeseen escalation, it probably won’t make that much of a difference.

Part of the reason for Egypt’s reaction is revenge. During Israel’s winter offensive against Hamas and the people of Gaza, Egypt, who has been at peace with Israel since 1979, sealed off it’s border with Gaza in order to prevent the passage of arms to Hamas militants. Israel had already imposed a sea and land blockade of Gaza, so the Egyptian border was the last remaining avenue for which Hamas to rearm and resupply itself. The decision to seal the border was extremely unpopular. Also, Israel had slowed humanitarian relief to a trickle, which made Cairo’s decision that much more of a public relations nightmare. Many, especially in the Arab world, condemned Egypt’s actions as tantamount to collaboration with Israel.

One of Egypt’s most vocal critics was Hizballah, which publicly expressed its disgust of the border closing and held large rallies in protest. Hizballah’s actions are particularly damning due to the group’s high level of popularity and credibility in the region. This made things much more difficult for Egypt and damaged it’s status in the Arab world.

Egypt has not forgotten this and it is using this opportunity to extract its revenge. By making these charges against Hizballah, Egypt is now attempting to damage Hizballah’s status in return. If Hizballah can be portrayed as a destabilizing force in the region people might begin to question its motives and credibility, which would make it more difficult for them to further their agenda in the future. Its doubtful that President Mubarak actually thinks he can haul Nasrallah before the ICC, but even making these claims and accusations could be enough to inflict a chink or two in the armor of Hizballah.

Of course, larger forces are at work here. Iran’s climbing influence in the region is troublesome to Egypt. In the days of  Nasr, Egypt was the preeminent player in the Middle East, but since the 1970’s Egypt’s power has been on the decline. It’s still a very large country with a relatively sizable GDP, and the regime in Cairo is still close with the West, but Egypt has been relegated to the economy class in the Middle East, behind players like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and more recently, Iran.

As Egypt’s star has been falling, Iran’s has been on the rise. For Iran, this transition is even more remarkable considering it was made during a period of intense isolation from the West. And with the change in administrations in Washington, and the conciliatory tone President Obama is now taking with Tehran, Egypt faces the possibility of being shoved aside even more, especially if the U.S. shifts its affections toward the Shiite regime in Iran in a meaningful way.

Egypt is scheduled to receive over 1.5 billion USD in aid from the United states in 2009, but that figure is down from previous years, falling 12% from 2008. The U.S. may have deep pockets, but there is only so much money to go around for influential players in the Middle East. Egypt needs to remain as influential as possible.

Many consider Hizballah as a proxy of Iran. The extent of Iran’s influence on the group’s activities is both unclear and debatable, but that perception persists. So as Egypt takes a swing at Hizballah, it is also taking a swing at Iran. By portraying Hizballah as a destabilizing force, Egypt is attempting to do the same with Iran, which could slow that country’s reconciliation with the West. It seems petty, but in the game of geopolitics, strength and influence are everything.

Cairo is walking a fine line. Admittedly, Hizballah was operating in Egypt and any country would be justifiably upset in a similar situation. But some of the charges being mounted and the statements being made are less than believable, especially the bit about Hizballah plotting to assassinate Israeli tourists.

The situation being manufactured in Cario has the chance to do some damage against Hizballah if it can cause people to reconsider their relationship with the group. British officials have recently met with Hizballah’s “political wing”, and some believe Washington could be contemplating a thaw with the group, depending on the outcome of the June elections.

The other charge of destabilization of the government is more believable. The regime in Cairo has been in power for nearly 30 years now, but it is less than popular (Egypt has been governed under a state of emergency since Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981) and it doesn’t take kindly to the possibility of unrest, especially from an outside force allied with Iran. While its highly unlikely that Hizballah was actively trying to remove the Mubarak regime from power, just having operatives there is bad enough.

So Egypt is using the opportunity to drag Hizballah through the mud a little bit. There will probably be a show trial and some harsh penalties handed out, the anti-Hizballah and anti-Iran people will be given some rhetorical ammunition, and next time Hizballah may think twice about operating outside Lebanon. For Egypt, that may be enough.

 

Author

Patrick Vibert

Patrick Vibert works as a geopolitical consultant focusing on the Middle East. He has a BA in Finance and an MA in International Relations. He has traveled extensively throughout Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He lives in Washington DC and attends lectures at the Middle East Institute whenever he can.

Area of Focus
Geopolitics; International Relations; Middle East

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