Within one week of each other Iran and Lebanon held national elections, the outcomes of which could not be more different.
In volatile Lebanon, the chance for trouble before, during, and after the polling was high. With so many religious sects, ethnicities, and political parties, as well as its recent history of violence between them, it seemed likely that some small event would come along and derail all the timid and cautious hopes of the Lebanese people for peace and prosperity.
In the weeks leading up to Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, there were many events that could have gone badly, such as the release of the four generals, allegations of Hizballah being looked at in the Hariri probe, and the arrests of dozens of alleged Israeli spies. The mood in Beirut was breathlessly tense leading up to June 7 and it seemed that any minute trouble could break out.
Another thing widely speculated on was what the losers would do afterward. In this case the “loser” was the pro-Syrian March 8 coalition, a major part of which is Hizballah. But in the days after the election, there was Hassan Nasrallah accepting defeat, respecting the will of the people, and reaching out to the victors that they might work together in the future.
People celebrated peacefully in the streets and the fervor eventually died down leaving only a sense of relief over what had transpired, how it transpired, and the task ahead of them.
Of course, Lebanon is not “out of the woods” by any stretch and there is still a daunting amount of work ahead of the new government. But that’s okay, because now at least things are peaceful and they look like they might stay that way.
This is a direct contrast of the Iranian presidential election.
If you polled everyone that was closely following the two elections a month ago, the vast majority of people would have said that the Lebanese election would be the more turbulent. Hizballah was prominently involved, and little over a year has passed since they briefly took over West Beirut as a show of force when the government tried to dismantle is communications system. Factor in the dozens of groups and factions who have proved unpredictable in the past. And for good measure, let’s not forget about Israel to the south, a constant source of conflict for the country.
But the Lebanese election went off largely without a hitch, and now it’s Iran that is thrust into turmoil.
It shouldn’t have gone down like this. Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Hussein Mousavi were pitted against each other in a battle framed by the media as a hardliner vs a moderate. Ahmedinejad was the incumbent, and we knew what to expect from him, but Mousavi was seen by some as the underdog ready to topple the status quo and usher in a new era of openness and democracy for the people of Iran.
This hardly would have been the case. The president in Iran only has so much power, most of it on the domestic side. The rest of the power is retained by the Ayatollah and the Revoltionary Guard, especially when it comes to national security, Iran’s nuclear program, and foreign policy. The president has some leeway on international issues, but at the end of the day he must toe the party line. Whoever won would have only been able to do so much, such as in the domestic areas of advancing woman’s rights and fixing the economy.
Mousavi may have been able to make some positive changes in Iran, but he is certainly not a radical. Remember, he was backed by former president’s Khatemi and Rafsanjani, both of which are old guard believers in the Islamic Republic and the revolution. There is no way they would back a horse that would overtly threaten those ideals. Nevertheless, the young and progressive minds of Iran were captivated by Mousavi and the changes he represented.
There were conflicting reports of which candidate had the most support in the weeks before the election. Mousavi may have been popular in certain circles in Tehran, but that is no indication of what the rest of the country was thinking. Ahmedinejad is a populist who appealed to the lower class and rural voters which make up a substantial part of the Iranian people. One of the only surveys conducted before the election had him favored almost 2:1, though the accuracy of that figure questionable at best.
The trouble started almost immediately after the polls closed. Within hours, Ayatollah Khamanei was on television congratulating the winner, Ahmedinejad. This is suspicious because there is supposed to be a three day waiting period before the results can be certified. And the reported figure had Ahmedinejad winning heavily across the board, both in rural areas and in the cities. Then it was said that Mousavi didn’t even win in his own town. Something was not right.
Three possibilities seem likely. The first is that Ahmedinejad just surprised everybody and straight up won the election handily. The second is that Mousavi really won, but the religious rulers didn’t like that so they had to cheat and fudge the results. And the third possibility is that Ahmedinejad really won, but the government cheated anyway even though they didn’t have to.
In this case, if they just let the votes be counted, Ahmedinejad probably would have won. But they weren’t taking any chances so they had to make sure, only they did it in such a way that it was not believable. If this is the case, they rigged an election that they were going to win anyway, which is not only silly, but incredibly foolish because the apperence of cheating undermines the victory.
So why would the Ayatollah cheat? Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute assert that the Ayatollah may have been afraid of his power being undone by a “soft revolution” at the polls and beyond. So he turned to the powerful Revolutionary Guard for protection. And the Revolutionary Guard would want one of their own to remain at the top, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad:
“Encircled by American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, besieged from within by disgruntled citizens, the supreme leader has turned to a bellicose strongman to preserve the system that elevated him. Indeed, Ayatollah Khamenei — who was scorned as a religious lightweight by many more established mullahs when he was chosen for the top post in 1989 — has repeatedly shown himself willing to undercut the “Islamic” in Islamic revolution. In doing so, he has painted himself into a corner — a permanent alliance with Mr. Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards. And this fraudulent election will only push them closer together.”
So whichever the case, five days later there are still massive protests going on in the streets of Tehran. What’s important isn’t that Ahmedinejad won, its that they seemingly cheated to get him in (whether they needed to or not). This is what people are so angry about today in Iran. If the election was free and fair and Ahmedinejad still won, many people would have been disappointed, but they would have accepted the results and life would have went on.
It is still to be seen what all of this will add up to. The protests grow stronger every day and at some point they will reach a critical mass where either the government has to give or the protesters have to go home. Whatever happens, it looks like something has changed in Iran forever. The Ayatollah has lost a lot of face on this, and it will be interesting to see what he gets in return.
