I have to admit I have been a little taken back by the latest developments in the Iranian politics. I thought that the power struggle brewing between President Ahmadinejad and the hard-line politicians was now over with Mr. Mashaii’s resignation from the position of first Vice President. I was wrong. Ahmadinejad has now appointed Mashaii as his chief adviser, setting up a potential controversy. Mashaii has been severely criticized by the hard-line clerics and politicians for stating that Iranians were “friends of all people in the world — even Israelis”.
In another bold move, Ahmadinejad fired two key members of the cabinet, but backtracked on one of the firing to avoid facing a vote of confidence. According to the Iranian constitution, any government that changes half its ministers must be subjected to a parliamentary vote of confidence. During his presidency, Ahmadinejad has replaced nine cabinet members. Firing two more would have made that number more than half the total. As reported in this Christian Science Monitor’s article, the dismissal of the Intelligence Minister, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeie, can be examined through the prism of power struggle between the clerical regime and the military establishment:
“Ezheie’s dismissal was another blow to clerical participation in government. Ahmadinejad is one of only three elected Iranian leaders since the 1979 revolution that were not clerics. His opponents allege that his first presidency installed a devout military and technocratic elite that drastically reduced the influence of mullahs in government. Emboldened by four years in power, the theory goes, this clique carried out a soft coup that solidified its grip on power in the June 12 election.
The Iranian constitution stipulates that a cleric always hold the post of Intelligence Minister.”
Iran’s military structure is divided into three branches: Islamic Republic of Iran Army (the Artesh), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij Resistance Force. The IRGC was established in 1979 as a result of the Islamic Revolution. The leaders of the revolution believed that the Shah’s military would not be loyal to them, so they established their own military. Originally, IRGC was to enforce the Islamic code, but it has evolved to protect the regime as a whole. As discussed in this article by the Associated Press, it is the IRGC’s influence that has become more prominent since Ahmadinejad’s presidency:
“Service in the Guard has become a stepping stone to national politics. Ahmadinejad and at least five members of his first term Cabinet are thought to be former Guard officers — including defense, energy, justice and interior. The parliament speaker, many parliament members, Tehran’s mayor and the head of the state radio and TV network also are thought to have served in the Guard.
‘They are the breeding ground of a second generation of Islamic leaders who seek to preserve, if not radicalize, the revolution’s ideals, master advanced technology such as nuclear energy, ensure Iran emerges as a regional power and acquire greater financial and political assets within the system,’ said Tellier (Iran expert Frederic Tellier).”
While the relationship between the IRGC and the clerical regime has always been more symbiotic than competitive, the recent controversy with Ahmadinejad does show that cracks might be appearing in this relationship.
