As Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is officially inaugurated as the President, the question on everyone’s mind is what does the future hold for Iran. The one thing that is confirmed is the election crisis is far from being over. Ahmadinejad’s reformist opponents, along with the two former presidents and notable members of the family of Ayatollah Khomeini, refused to attend any of the inauguration ceremonies. Moreover, the recent trials of the protesters had no effect in stopping people from going to the street. The Economist reported:
Hardly had the ceremony closed before street protests erupted anew across Tehran. Bonfires were set alight, slogans chanted, horns tooted and pitched battles with police ran far into the night, when cries of Allahu Akbar (“God is great!”) echoed as loud as ever from rooftops, as they have done nightly since the election that millions of Iranians still believe was stolen. Though far smaller in numbers than the mass demonstrations in the poll’s immediate aftermath, the protests have continued sporadically, despite campaigns of sweeping arrests and intimidation, as well as increasingly Orwellian efforts to brand dissidents as agents of an enemy plot.
A prediction that can be made is that the relationship between President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is cooling down. The awkward body language of Ayatollah Khamenei during Ahmadinejad’s endorsement ceremony has only added to the speculation. The Guardian reported, “Ahmadinejad was permitted only a peck on the shoulder of Khamenei, and the supreme leader did not embrace the president as he did four years ago.”
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The rift between the President and the Supreme Leader can be blamed on the two recent controversies: 1) Appointment of Mr. Mashaii as the vice-president and the delay in his firing 2) Firing of Ejehei, the Minister of Intelligence. Some analysts see the recent controversies as a sign of a split between the clerics and the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Muhammad Sahimi wrote in the Tehran Bureau:
A reliable source in Tehran told the author that both episodes were meant to be signals by the IRGC’s high command to Ayatollah Khamenei that they were in control, and that he should toe the line — their line. According to the source, Ayatollah’s Khamenei’s order to fire Mashaei was delivered to the Voice and Visage (VaV) of the Islamic Republic (Iran’s national radio and television network) on the day Mashaei was appointed by Ahmadinejad. The VaV was asked to announce the order on national television and radio, but Ezzatollah Zarghami, the director of VaV and a former officer in the IRGC, refused to do so.
As if to make sure that the Ayatollah got the message loud and clear, it took Ahmadinejad one week to relent and go along with the order. And it was only then that the VaV broadcast the Ayatollah’s order. When he did accept the order, Ahmadinejad sent the Supreme Leader a terse and very formal letter, devoid of the usual praises that his past letters to Ayatollah Khamenei have carried. The letter was considered by many supporters of the Ayatollah as a total insult; but also a clear signal. In order to further demonstrate his defiance, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashaei, a close relative and friend, as his chief of staff and special adviser.
According to the source, Ejehei was fired because he was reporting to the Supreme Leader without first letting Ahmadinejad know. He had reportedly said that the Intelligence Ministry had concluded that the accusations by the IRGC high command, that the demonstrations after the election were linked to foreign powers and represented a “velvet revolution,” were baseless. He had also reportedly said that the demonstrations had neither been planned in advance, nor could they have been predicted. Finally, the Intelligence Ministry is said to have reported that Mashaei, as well as Hossein Taeb, a cleric who is the commander of the Basij militia, represented security risks. The report apparently countered all the accusations made by the IRGC high command.
The split could lead to a limited role of the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei is already suffering from lack of legitimacy due to his endorsement of Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections. As Akbar Ganji stated:
The events of the past few days reveal the June 12 electoral coup’s chickens coming home to roost. The regime handed Ahmedinejad a landslide victory–and he wasted no time in exercising his power accordingly, even against those that manufactured his win. It seems that, like the rest of the nation, he sees the nearing end of Khamenei’s days as an absolutist ruler, and is trying to establish an independent turf of his own.
If Ahmedinejad is able to limit the power of the Supreme Leader, this will be a big step for the Iranian democracy.
