Aussie PM Kevin Rudd
Asia Times Online is running an article that touches on Australian PM Kevin Rudd’s desire for a Asia-Pacific Union similar to the European Union by 2020. This union would include all of ASEAN, China, Japan, India, and the United States. As fantastic as the proposal is, he is not the first Australian PM to dream this dream. Being a fluent Mandarin speaker, who is close to China, might give him more credibility than his predecessors though. Then again, the fact he is seen as too close to China by many of his electorate, might only mean his government is viewed even more critically by many ASEAN members, who still engage China reticently. Australia might run the risk of being perceived as the regions universal sycophant, caught in the middle of an American and Chinese power struggle, not necessarily the best place to be if you are interested in bolstering ties with ASEAN.
ASEANs relationship with Australia has always been uneasy, even before Minister Mentor Lee Kuan-Yew warned Australia not to become the “poor white trash of Asia“. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad strongly believed that Australia was not a true Asian nation, due to its predominately white Anglo-Saxon population, and blocked it from joining various regional summits. For example, in the 1990’s, Mohamad called for a greater East Asian forum, which would exclude the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand. Many in the region genially termed the proposed forum as “the caucus without Caucasians”, something Washington was eventually successful in nixing, to only see it rebooted a decade later as ASEAN+3.
At the time, the exclusion of Western nations reflected the regional vogue of “Asian Values”, an ideology trumpeted by Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, along with some political thinkers in Japan. Those who adhered to this ideology espoused that all Asians share distinctive cultural traits that make them fundamentally different from Westerners; therefore, Western political and social norms were not entirely appropriate for Asian societies. Some of these shared Asian values are the preferences for social harmony, government paternalism, collectivism over the rights of individuals, respect toward authority, and a greater concern for socio-economic stability over human rights.
By the turn of the century, the deeply pragmatic ASEAN states came to the realization that it was impossible to push Western powers out of the region, so it began what was termed, “constructive engagement”. Under this policy, ASEAN intends to hedge its relationship with the larger powers (China, India, America, and Australia) as an intermediary, reaping the benefits for its member states. Singapore Minister of Foreign Affairs George Yeo, speaking for ASEAN to the press in November 2007, described the importance of this policy to Southeast Asia, especially in regard to the United States:
“In short, no major strategic issue in Asia can be resolved without the active participation of the U.S” (Marciel 2008).
As mentioned before, most ASEAN member states are uninterested in a showdown between any of the large powers over access to their region, but ASEAN is interested in being able to play major powers off of each other for the benefit of their member-states. Rudd is likely trying to take advantage of this and seeks to overcome the oft held belief that Australia is an imperialist arm of Western hegemony in the Pacific. Over the last 10 years, these views might have tapered off some, but they are still fairly strong in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Australia’s signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (non-aggression pact) in 2005 went a long way toward facilitating a constructive relationship between ASEAN and Australia, because it alleviated fears of preemptive anti-terror military strikes by Australia and reduced criticism of internal political issues of pact members, a major irritant for many of the regimes. This pact is important, because it allowed Australia to attend ASEAN regional summits. This initial step to further integrate into Southeast Asia was followed by the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA), signed in February 2009.
Rudd might manage to make Australia a bigger player, but it is not likely his dream will be realized in the lifetime. Lets forget East Asia for a minute, lets just look at Southeast Asia and Australia. Any relationship Australia has will be an extension of the type already seen with ASEAN, a non-binding, consensus based, economically focused body. All states will have equal input, criticism and firm commitments, especially treaties will be avoided where possible.
Currently, this is the only type of framework possible due to the extreme divergence in average living standards and political structures. What he proposes is like pre-WWII Europe creating a European Union that includes Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, fascist Italy, Imperial France, the UK, etc. That would not have been possible then and is not possible in Asia now. Rudd is not completely Pollyannaish, he has backed away from calling for new institutions to be created, seeking to work in the current framework. Some might think he is admitting defeat, but it is more likely that he recognizes the difficulties ahead and is “feeling for rocks“:
“Our special challenge is that we face a region with greater diversity in political systems and economic structures, levels of development, religious beliefs, languages and cultures, than did our counterparts in Europe…”
50 years from now, could Rudd be held as a Asian-Pacific Robert Schuman-like visionary? Highly unlikely, but his efforts may help to facilitate further, more realistic and beneficial integration measures, even if they fall far short of his audacious goal.
