It’s simple to say that the surge fixed Iraq. John McCain basically ran for President on that notion. But it’s also overly simplified, with the biggest caveat being, frankly, that Iraq isn’t “fixed.” It’s perhaps the quintessential transitional state, emerging from a decades-long brutal dictatorship, torn asunder by the chaos of the American invasion (and attempted complete rewiring of the country) and the resulting aftermath from a botched post-conflict job. Adding 20,000 troops for a limited period of time was not going to reverse this series of catastrophes on its own.
So why did the security situation improve in Iraq? It’s largely a product of three factors, of which the surge is one—but the least important of the three. The first is the much heralded Anbar Awakening, which turned the native Sunni insurgency against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This resulted largely because of the butchery of AQI, and some astute observations from a few military commanders in the area. But were it not for the hubris of AQI, the conditions for the Awakening would likely not have existed. We’re lucky that Zarqawi and his ilk were so despicable that they completely alienated the Sunni insurgency.
Second is that Baghdad had already been cleansed by the time the surge rolled around. There were no longer any mixed neighborhoods (or minority neighborhoods in majority enclaves, i.e. a small, contiguous Sunni area bordered by larger Shiite populations), which largely ended the horrific scenes of forced flight and sectarian murders—but because all that had already been accomplished. This is hardly a testament to our policy in Iraq—just because we lucked into a more stable situation doesn’t excuse the fact that hundreds of thousands were forced from their homes at gunpoint, or murdered, while we did nothing.
But we should give the surge some credit. The security situation in 2006-2007 Iraq was untenable, and had it continued, would have resulted in the United States withdrawing in a poor position. Inserting more troops into the country was the right idea (personally, I would have argued for an even bigger ‘surge’, but that wasn’t exactly possible) at the time. The goal, political reconciliation, has moved rather slowly, and has more often than not been forgotten that it was the whole purpose behind the surge.
It’s unfair to point to two massive suicide bombings, and claim that the surge failed. (It should also be noted that the bombings may have shaken the Iraqi political sphere out if its complacency.) Because the triumvirate of factors that I’ve listed above have done a great deal to stabilize Iraq. But there’s a long, long way to go.
It worries me that most pundits have taken as face value that the ‘surge worked’. A confluence of local factors that were already in motion by the time of the surge helped create an environment in which a temporary enlargement of forces was received positively. Were it not for the Anbar Awakening, or ethnic cleansing largely already finished in Baghdad, the security situation would not have benefited from such a meager increase in forces. Maybe it’s time our media pundits started realizing that foreign policy isn’t just for American consumption, and that local events in the places where we’re at war matter just as much as America’s actions.
