In the flood of commemorative comment on both sides of the Atlantic marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, one clear impression stands out. There is still no agreement on what the historic moment meant, or even why it happened.
This is perhaps surprising, given that the Wall’s fall is one of the most dramatically symbolic moments in human history – embodying in the most graphic possible manner the victory of light over darkness, freedom over oppression, and the dawn of unity for a war worn continent.
But while such an obvious interpretation was clear to those who joyously celebrated the opening of the floodgates dividing East and West Berlin in November, 1989, today’s observers find much to carp about in the two decades that have followed, as well as many unanswered questions about the actual event.
In a report from Paris in The New York Times, The Legacy of 1989 Is Still Up for Debate, Steven Erlanger pays tribute to the historic legacy for Europe of the Wall’s fall, but adds, “1989 also created new divisions and fierce nationalisms that hobble the European Union today, between East and West, France and Germany, Europe and Russia.”
Some of the intensity of those divisions is evident in the tug of war, in both Europe and the United States, over whether the achievements of 1989 owe more to the resolute anti-Communism of President Ronald Reagan or its inverse, the white-glove embrace of the East by many in Western Europe, Erlanger writes.
It is a tribute to 1989, not unlike the French Revolution 200 years before it, that its meaning is hotly contested. Different groups in different countries see the anniversary differently, usually from their own ideological points of view.
Erlanger cites the verdict of Robert Kagan, a historian with the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, that conservatives won the debate in the United States. “The standard narrative is Reagan,” Kagan says. This is not the case in Europe. According to Kagan, “if 90 percent of Americans say it was the U.S. being firm, 99 percent of Europeans think it was they being soft – that the wall fell through Ostpolitik and West German TV.”
In The Washington Post, columnist Anne Applebaum writes from Berlin that Central Europe’s success since the Wall fell deserves more attention. In November, 1989, nobody knew what the future held for Europe, she states correctly. Now she is bothered by the tone of the commemorations.
Too many of them treat too much of the past two decades as a foregone conclusion, focusing on what didn’t happen rather than what did. Too many have taken the achievements for granted. Too many of us forget that there are few historical precedents for the past two decades.
On the other hand, Slavoj Zizek, an op-ed contributor to the New York Times, remarks that anti-Communism is now resurgent in the region, and dismisses the nostalgia for Communist times apparent in some quarters today.
Far from expressing an actual wish to return to the gray Socialist reality, [this nostalgia] is more a form of mourning, of gently getting rid of the past. As for the rise of the rightist populism, it is not an Eastern European specialty, but a common feature of all countries caught in the vortex of globalization.
Much more interesting is the recent resurgence of anti-Communism from Hungary to Slovenia. During the autumn of 2006, large protests against the ruling Socialist Party paralyzed Hungary for weeks. Protesters linked the country’s economic crisis to its rule by successors of the Communist party.
They denied the very legitimacy of the government, although it came to power through democratic elections. When the police went in to restore civil order, comparisons were drawn with the Soviet Army crushing the 1956 anti-Communist rebellion.
In the Financial Times, however, Klaus Zimmermann tries to extract ideology from recent developments altogether and belittles Eastern Germany’s Communist heritage as the reason why the region has been so slow to change since the Wall’s fall.
The most interesting – and overlooked – insight of east Germany’s transformation is that its difficulty in catching up with the west ultimately proves to be not so much a reflection of its communist past than of its rural, low-density population structure. Simply put, economic value increases with population density. The more companies swap ideas and the closer they cooperate, the better it is for productivity – and incomes.
This holds true not just in Germany, but across the board. Companies locate headquarters in densely populated areas because they offer a better habitat for decision-making in disciplines ranging from sales and marketing to research and development and overall strategy. It is in these regions that highly skilled service-sector jobs, such as software developers, finance managers, advertising specialists, business consultants and trade facilitators, are created.
This analysis suggests the real distinction is not so much between “east” and “west” as between low-density and high-density regions, no matter where they are in Germany.
Not many who have known the region before and after 1989 are likely to fall for this simplistic armchair depiction of the complex cultural, social, historical and economic map of Europe.
Many journalists understandably look for distinctive, if sometimes opposing, angles. Deborah Seward of the Associated Press describes a Franco-German role reversal over the past 20 years in an analysis from Paris:
Throughout the Cold War, Germany was the steadfast trans-Atlantic ally – and France the perpetual skeptic. Paris snubbed NATO, booted allied soldiers off its soil and sought a privileged relationship with Moscow. Then one night the Berlin Wall fell – and 20 years later, the roles subtly have shifted. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is seeking to be a NATO stalwart, winning two commands by returning to the alliance earlier this year. At the same time, German Chancellor Angela Merkel – while reaching out to the United States – is pursuing closer ties with Russia that have left Washington unsettled.
Writing for Le Figaro, Yves Thréard nevertheless hopes that while the history of the Wall’s fall is still being written – and rewritten – today’s French and German leaders will understand that they won’t break down any of the world’s other walls unless they work together. That may be too much to hope for.
In the hand-wringing department, Pierre Rousselin uses a blog post for Le Figaro to deplore the absence of President Barack Obama at the anniversary celebrations in Berlin on November 9. Any other U.S. president would have been there, he writes.
The absence of Barack Obama from the group of leaders of countries that have made our history is an eloquent confirmation of his lukewarm approach to a continent that is no longer a priority for the United States.
In a blog for The Daily Telegraph of the UK, Nile Gardiner, a conservative Washington-based foreign affairs analyst and political commentator, berates U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for writing Reagan out of the history of the Wall’s fall.
It’s bad enough that President Obama could not be bothered to attend the celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. But Hillary Clinton’s refusal to even acknowledge the role played by Ronald Reagan in the Wall’s demise as well as the downfall of Communism was highly insulting towards one of the greatest figures of our time, and reeked of petty and partisan mean-spiritedness.
The secretary of state’s remarks in Berlin completely erased from history the huge contribution played not only by President Reagan but also by the United States in confronting the Soviet Empire. In her speech she applauded half of Europe, but could not bring herself to thank those Americans who bravely served their country and in many cases laid down their lives in defeating Communism, under Reagan’s leadership.
Perhaps by the time of the 50th anniversary we will have got the story straight. But then again, maybe not.
