This week it was announced, to the surprise of many, that the U.S. will indeed commit to a greenhouse gas reduction target, in time for the Copenhagen summit. There is much speculation that the target will be consistent with the proposed 17-20% reduction targets (from 2005 levels, by 2020), contained in the climate legislation currently before the Senate.
To be sure, a target at or below a 20% reduction is modest but not wholly out of line with what other countries are putting forth. EU leaders agreed to cut emissions by 20% below 1990 levels, by 2020, and by 30% if other developed nations participate. Japan is committing to cutting its emissions by 25% below 1990 levels by 2020 if there is an international agreement in Copenhagen. Brazil is planning to cut its emissions by between 36 and 38% from projected 2020 levels, representing a 20% cut below 2005 levels. Back in the United States, administration officials have indicated that targets are being discussed to ensure that the Senate will support whatever the President presents in Copenhagen.
These emerging climate targets are going to be dissected from a number of angles. What year should be used as the base year for reductions? What about emissions per unit of GDP? Should special treatment be granted to developing countries? Shouldn’t the U.S. and China be the leaders in reductions? As we’re leading up to Copenhagen, the granular speculation is necessary but it’s not where I’m placing my focus.
I’m taking the broad-optimist approach where the Copenhagen summit is a worthy first step, not the final act. I am remembering that it was only in 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol came in to force and the United States’ participation was merely symbolic and non-binding. In just this past year however, the United States has been sending a very different message. In July, President Obama chaired the 17-nation G8 meeting on climate change, clearly pledging to prevent world temperatures increasing. Just last week, the U.S. and China laid out a comprehensive, 7-part plan to mutually address the energy issues facing both nations. And this week, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be in Washington, where he and Obama plan to work through previously unresolved issues on emissions targets. From a global perspective, I would argue that a U.S.-India or U.S.-China strategic partnership has the opportunity to be more valuable than an agreement in Copenhagen, even if it is viewed as just that—a strategic partnership.
Barbara Finamore, China program director for the Natural Resources Defense Council rightly notes:
“It is important to put things in perspective and realize just how far we’ve come in one year, particularly that both the U.S. and China have elevated cooperation on climate change to the very highest levels of government.”
Stepping back from the hair-splitting examination of global climate discussions is useful, in order to recognize that the U.S. participation we’ve seen in 2009 alone, signals a newly convincing commitment to greenhouse gas reductions and a meaningful departure from recent record.
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My fellow U.S. FPA blogger, Bill Hewitt also takes the optimist’s approach to Copenhagen
