I am concerned with the effect of intra-party democracy and candidate selection on the quality of democratic policy making in Bangladesh. Though not as well-studied in politics as other more “titillating” topics like justice, candidate selection is the dominant issue in any practical study of a functioning democracy. To that end, it may serve us well to glance at classical democratic theory for some thoughts that may be relevant to the study at hand.
To begin, allow me to marshal, Adam Smith, who in his justly famous Wealth of Nations wrote:
“According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to…first, the duty of protecting the society form the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, so far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice of oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice, and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain.” Smith (1776, 1976) Book IV Chapter IX)
Consider that as a practical matter, the most recent sovereigns in Bangladesh would not be able to meet Smith’s prescription. The battling Begums have acted from a purely partisan ground where each party aligned with one or the other contested the election and promised to erase the immediately receding history and then netted a set of policies that served only to negate the policies of the previous government. Perhaps the fault lies in the system of representative government? Perhaps these two sovereigns have brought about publicly valued policies? This argument would have legs, if it were at all coherent to list any set of policies that might be thought to be in accord with “the public’s interest.” Indeed, representative government though far reaching in action and consequences presupposes very little coherent institutional design. Representative government only requires that agents represent the interests of their principals, the people. Usually this is done by holding elections that are timed according to a predetermined schedule. Of course, this is a principle that politicians in Bangladesh have failed to maintain.
In a representative system of government the sovereign is chosen by competitive elections and his incentives are structured so that it is rational for him to rule and still pursue as his main objective the interests of the citizenry, however understood. Hence, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote extensively about the design and experience of democracy in America,:
“The President is chosen for four years, and he may be re-elected so that the chances of a future adminstration may inspire him with hopeful undertakings for the public good and give him the means to carry them into execution.” de Tocqueville, 1835, pg. 121.
It is clear then that if politics is coordinated through party formation, and parties are interested in winning elections and governing, then they have to institute procedure that will help them select the best candidates who can offer them cyclical return to power. Indeed, the same objective, viewed through the perspective of public spiritedness is the principal function of the design of government: the selection of principled candidates who are able to rule in favor of the interest of citizens. James Madison argues that,
“The aim of every constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they contune to hold their public trust.” Madison (The Federalist papers, LVII).
It should be clear that during their sequential turns in power, neither the Awami League or the BNP have served the needs of their citizens or have maintained policies that might be said to have bettered the lives of their people to a measurable degree. The BNP, indeed has allowed in foreign agitators to deflect attention from its own fundamentalist power base. Moreover, it is not apparent to me, whether either party is seriously interested in governing for the long term; like in Pakistan, it may be that each candidate in office views his tenure as one that will collapse through predictably unpredictable shocks: what is the use then to govern in in publicly disinterested manner?
Finally consider that it may be that politicians in Bangladesh do not suppose that a career in politics in remuneratively worthwhile. As a result, politicians in Bangladesh have no choice but to select their favorite cronies. This analysis may be true for individual politicians, but here the fallacy of composition is at work and it is not likely to be the case that the story holds for all politicians. After all Carthage had its Hannibal; declining Rome had its Marcus Aurelius. Rather it is more likely the case that because the pie to be distributed is so small, incumbent politicians have skewed the incentive structure to reward agreeable cronies and have instituted large costs to entry in politics. To maintain bias in institutional design and governance mid-level party functionaries have gone along with their superiors and have repeatedly acquiesced to the leadership of the battling Begums.
The whole design of party politics might collapse if it should come to pass that one of the Begums were assassinated or– as in their fondest wish– passed on quietly into the night. If only to avoid that kind of catastrophe, both parties might do well to introduce greater intra-party democracy into its rough political milieu.
