Foreign Policy Blogs

The Battle Over Preconditions

In terms of U.S.-North Korean relations, the year began auspiciously, mysteriously, or even inauspiciously, depending on how one interpreted North Korea’s New Year’s state-run media editorial.  The full text can be found here.  The passage most frequently quoted in the Western press seemed promising.  The editorial stated:

The fundamental problem arising in guaranteeing the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region today is putting an end to the hostile relationship between the DPRK and the United States. Our position to provide a solid peace regime on the Korean peninsula and realize denuclearization through dialogue and negotiations remains consistent. Our party and the Republic’s Government will develop good-neighborly and friendly relations among countries with the banner of independence, peace, and friendship held up high and vigorously struggle to make the world independent.

However, other less frequently quoted passages indicate additional North Korean objectives that may or may not be congruent with U.S. objectives.  For example, the emphasis on reunification of the Korean peninsula:

The entire nation’s unity is a decisive guarantee for the fatherland’s reunification. All the brethren of the North, South, and overseas should strengthen solidarity and unity to develop the fatherland’s reunification movement. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the announcement of the 15 June Joint Declaration and the 30th anniversary of the proposal for founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo’, [we] should further heighten on a nationwide scale an atmosphere of independent reunification, reconciliation and cooperation, and unity.

The flames of the struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification should be vigorously kindled in South Korea. [We] should hold high the banner of independent reunification and the anti-war, pro-peace flag for a world of reunified people where there are no outside forces.

The entire Korean nation should beat back all types of challenges from the anti-reunification forces through united strength and, by accelerating a nationwide grand reunification march, brilliantly decorate the year 2010 as a year of opening a new phase of independent reunification.

The Wall Street Journal summed up the realities of the unification dilemma in an article last year:

Officially, the governments in both Koreas say they want to unite but both also want to lead the united country. Despite two summits and numerous lower-level interactions, the two governments have made no serious attempt to reconcile their conflicting desires. For now, most analysts believe the only likely trigger for change is the prospective economic collapse of North Korea, one of the world’s poorest countries.

The North Korean vision of reunification is unlikely to be congruent with that of the U.S.  Also, if the editorial is any indication, North Korea’s economic concerns are more severe than in the past.  The bulk of the editorial focuses on economic progress the North Korean government hopes to make in 2010.  As one observer noted, the editorial was titled “Let us accomplish a decisive turnabout in people’s living standards by accelerating light industry and agriculture,” while previous year’s editorial titles didn’t address any specific goals, such as 2008’s  “Let us make a glorious year of historical turnabouts,” and 2009’s “Let us make 2009 a glorious year of new revolutionary rise.”

Last week, the world learned where things actually stand for the Korean denuclearization.  The U.S. wants to restart the Six Party Talks.  This was the goal of U.S. ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens’ North Korean visit in December.  North Korea had left the Six Party Talks last year after the UN Security Council condemned North Korea’s April 2009 missile test.  However, last week North Korea laid down some preconditions for re-engagement.  North Korea says it will return to the Six Party process if the U.S. concludes a formal treaty ending the Korean War and if the UN Security Council lifts the sanctions authorized by resolution 1874, passed after North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test.  The U.S. rejected these preconditions and proposed the exact opposite: denuclearization negotiations in the Six Party context as a precondition to lifting sanctions and concluding the formal war-ending treaty.

Today we heard more firm language from North Korea, such as the assertion that “The dignity of the DPRK [North Korea] will never allow” the talks to resume until the Security Council lifts its sanctions.  Those who interpreted North Korea’s New Year’s editorial positively were apparently incorrect.