Henry Hoyle, the China Blogger here at FPA, has a great post up about a grand rapprochement between Japan and China in 2010. He is certainly not alone in wondering what might come of a more robust bilateral relationship. Speculation of a so-called “grand rapprochement” is pervasive, as many are eager determine how, and by when, both countries will be able to overcome the historical animus that has long beset stronger ties.
Evidence of this trend has been widely reported, albeit in a variety of often-contradictory reports. Some point to the Japanese government’s newfound regional agenda – the effort, according to its Manifesto, to “re-assert Japan as members of the Asian community.” Others, like Xinhua, highlight the now belueagured DPJ capo di tutti capi Ozawa Izhiro’s visit to China last month (147 DPJ lawmakers in tow) as evidence of growing regional ties. Still others point to Japan’s diplomatic deference to China in recent months in regards to North Korea and other regional security concerns.
The most sensational story of late, however, is the talk of a quid pro quo being reported by a number of reputable sources. According to the French paper, Figaro, and corroborated by the Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun, Japanese PM Prime Minister is considering offering an apology for Japanese wartime behavior at Nanjing in exchange for a visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial by Chinese Premier Hu Jintao. This would no doubt be a milestone development, and would run against the powerful currents of public sentiment and nationalism that have mired bilateral relations for decades.
While contrition of this nature is welcome, it by no means signals an opening of the floodgates of goodwill. A number of obstacles remain, and will no doubt persist throughout the foreseeable future.
Thorniest among them is the Yasukuni Shrine, a site in the heart of Tokyo that commemorates Japan’s war dead (including, controversially, a number of Class A war criminals). Visitations to the site by the Japanese Prime Minister have long stoked the flames of public resentment throughout Asia (particularly in China, but also in South Korea and Taiwan). Some PM’s, like Koizumi Jun’ichiro, visited brazenly in their official capacity as the PM – or what Joel Rathus has dubbed the “mourner-in-chief” – which added fuel to flames. Others, like former-PM Fukuda Yasuo, visited in a private capacity on their own personal time, which helped mitigate the damage, but nevertheless prompted condemnation from many lawmakers throughout the region.
Whatever the pageantry, Yasukuni is here to stay (despite talks of building an alternative, secular site), and has come to symbolize for many conservative Japanese, especially the balooning ranks of the elderly, Japan’s right to interpret the war on their own terms. Public opinion regarding Yasukuni suggests that a majority of Japanese support the shrine, and the PM’s right to visit. When asked “Should the PM visit the Yasukuni shrine on August 15 [Remembrance Day],” more than 50% of the respondents to the poll in the Japanese political monthly Voice (Japanese only, for English language analysis see here) strongly agreed that he should. Notably, PM Hatoyama has stated off the record that he will not visit in a public manner, which signals a shrewd awareness of the sensitivity regarding the issue. But he will visit eventually, and it will no doubt stir the regional pot of historical woes.
Another major hurdle is the territorial disputes in the East China Sea. The dispute centers on access to reserves of natural gas buried beneath the sea bed, which both China and Japan stake a claim to. Previous high-level summits, including the Hu-Fukuda Summit of 2008, bore little fruit. Little has been done since then, save for throw-away statements on both sides, which leaves interests deeply entrenched. It will take some serious diplomacy to reach an agreement, and while I remain hopeful for general progress in Sino-Chinese relations, I see this as the thorniest snafu in the making. When asked in the same Voice poll, “Do you agree with the new Administration’s China policy – East Asian community, and East Sea Joint Development, and so forth?” around 50% of the respondents said they agreed while 35% disagreed. This is polling data is hard to unpack, but it does suggest a general rift in public sentiment regarding the government’s policies vis-a-vis China.
(Those that can read Chinese and are interested in polling data in China should visit here.)
More recent political events – namely, the hullabaloo that became Chinese Vice President Xi Jiaping’s audience with Emperor Akihito – indicate that a grand rapprochement won’t come without hiccups. Spurred on by a conservative press and a well-lubricated machine of right-wing special interest groups, many Japanese will continue to look to China’s rise with a skeptical eye. Gestures like Ozawa Ichiro’s mission to China (with 147 DPJ lawmakers in tow) are welcome, and will do much to amend these jaded opinions. But until Japanese citizens are given a clear-cut, tangible sense of how they can benefit from partnering closer with China, history and rigidly entrenched beliefs regarding guilt and responsibility will persist.
This is not to say that rapprochement is impossible or that we won’t see a general trend towards good will and cooperation. We will. No doubt about it. But those who point to a rumored swap of contrite gestures, need to look beyond high-level politicking and account for the litany of other, more deep-seated points of dispute that will continue to simmer in the wake of the symbolic apologies.
Of course, predicting the course of historical disputes, especially those regarding Japan’s actions in the Asia-Pacific War, is better left to the sage. It is frankly too early to tell whether or not both governments will act on this goodwill. Reporting on the historic Hiroshima-for-Nanjing swap is rife with anonymous quotes from bureacrats, and could lose momentum as special interests on both sides stymie the apologies.
Put simply, a rapprochement is likely, but it probably wont be so grand.
