With this weekend’s spat over U.S. arm sales, yet another dispute has come to roil the U.S.-China relationship. The “world’s most important bilateral relationship,” already frayed by tense disagreements over Internet freedom, cyber-security, Iran, trade, and currency policies, has now been further burdened with the Obama administration’s sale to Taiwan of USD 6.4 billion in military equipment, the second tranche of a USD 12 billion arms package approved under the Bush administration.
The announcement last Friday elicited greater outrage from the Chinese than their usual fierce condemnations of such sales, and they threatened to end cooperation on a wide range of issues and warned the move “will lead to repercussions that neither side wishes to see.” U.S. officials, meanwhile, have calmly urged the Chinese to not let the move upset the broader relationship, despite the fact the Chinese government has been signaling their vehement opposition to the sale since it was first reported in mid-December.
The strong whiff of acrimony in the Sino-U.S. relationship is startling for how rapidly it has followed the apparent good will during Obama’s visit to China in mid- November. China analysts have noted that in the intervening months, the rising nation has displayed a new stridency on the world stage, whether in trade and currency disputes, playing the spoiler at Copenhagen and on Iran sanctions, or in a litany of diplomatic snubs aimed at Western nations.
It appears then that the Obama administration intended the announcement of the arm sales to mark a tough new approach to relations with China, according to U.S. officials quoted in the NYT:
…administration officials suggested privately that the timing of the arms sales and the tougher language on Iran was calculated to send a message to Beijing to avoid assumptions that President Obama would be deferential to China over American security concerns and existing agreements.
The Obama administration apparently wants to indicate that its hitherto conciliatory and constructive approach to China doesn’t mean the U.S. will be “deferential” in all future negotiations.
Later in the same article, a senior U.S. official said the announcement was “not designed to send a gratuitous message to China, but to demonstrate the firmness of our position.” To the extent that China’s somewhat aggressive behavior on the world stage of late had not received any real pushback up until now, signaling “firmness” was probably necessary. But whatever the professed intentions of the U.S. officials, this diplomatic message will almost certainly be interpreted as “gratuitous” to the Chinese. This is regrettable.
The problem is not that Obama has pushed back; it’s that the pushback was achieved with a kick to the groin, where a firm shove might have been more productive. While the timing of the arms sales certainly signals that the U.S. won’t be deterred by diplomatic hyperventilating from China, it also serves as an unapologetic reminder that the U.S. believes its hegemonic prerogatives trump China’s sovereignty and “core interests” (the U.S. maintains that it recognizes only one China, awkwardly enough).
Ending weapon sales to Taiwan may not be a viable policy option, as signaling withdrawal of our military support risks destabilizing the fragile balance of cross-strait relations. But accentuating U.S. commitment to this openly realpolitik strategy will likely chasten less than it will provoke lasting, righteous anger. If the U.S. is going to poke China in the eye, it may as well do so over Internet freedom, or something else that the government will have to counter by coming up with an amusingly disingenuous propaganda campaign (“information imperialism,” anyone?).
The collateral damage of using Taiwan arms sale to demonstrate U.S. resolve will probably not be appreciated in the short term, when U.S-China economic interdependence constrains drastic action. It will materialize later, when we reap the bitterness and animosity sowed amongst China’s leadership class, who largely see our alliance with Taiwan, not unfairly, as a strategy to geopolitically contain China (“Cold War thinking,” Chinese state media recently charged in a front page headline). The U.S., whose relative power is set to decline over the coming decades, debases its moral standing with its giant, rising rival at great risk to its own future interests.
