What do some in the halls of power in Beijing make of U.S.-China relations? A recent op-ed penned for the China Daily by a scholar at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, an influential government think tank that often sets the Party’s ideological bearings, suggests the emerging view that the U.S. has adopted a strategy of “soft containment,” aimed at limiting the Chinese government’s soft power at home and abroad. The article gives a sense of just how seriously China’s theory-inclined strategists are taking the ideological dimensions of strategic competition with United States.
a recent meeting of the Central Compilation & Translation Bureau
According to op-ed author Wang Wanzheng, “soft containment” essentially entails engaging China in “soft conflicts” over Internet freedom, human rights issues, development and so on. In the words of one Chinese general quoted in the article who calls it “smart war,” such skirmishes “softly offend China while strongly defend[ing] the U.S.” Soft containment, in Wang’s reading, is ultimately about maintaining the “Western truth hegemony,” which is to say, the nearly universal acceptance of Western ideas about human rights, free markets, democracy, etc. This truth hegemony has acted as a key pillar of the West’s supremacy in the last several hundred years, according to Wang.
The recent “soft power revival” of the U.S. – i.e. Obama’s humbler approach to foreign affairs – is in conflict with China’s own recently debuted soft power initiative, Wang then explains. Such soft competition between the two nations will necessarily be a zero sum game because China’s goal is to overturn the globally accepted idea (or “monopoly of truth”) that Western political rights are essentially ‘universal,’ i.e. inalienable from all human beings. Put simply, the dilemma for Chinese soft power strategists is that China’s authoritarian model will always reek of illegitimacy as long as people believe that liberal institutions are the right of all mankind. (Wang modestly suggests the U.S. avert this brewing ideological confrontation by “releas[ing] the hegemony of the monopoly of truth and sincerely promot[ing] dialogue between different civilizations”).
Along with the vast resources devoted to external soft power initiatives and internal censorship, Wang’s article is further evidence that China’s leaders view themselves as ideologically under siege by the U.S. and Europe. Perhaps for good reason – current U.S. policy quietly undercuts the regime’s repressive information policies, either through financial aid to Internet freedom software, outreach to Chinese Internet activists, or actively encouraging social networking and media programs to empower liberal activism in repressive countries. The U.S. generally does a good job of keeping China on the ideological defensive, as it seems to factor in Beijing’s preoccupation with ideology as it devises rhetorical and ideological tactics for dealing with its giant rival.
A good recent illustration of this dynamic occurred in Obama’s town hall with college students on his recent state visit to China. Several of Obama’s references to how Americans believe in “universal” concepts and values – he did not even suggest that these values are or ought be shared by Chinese – were wiped from the official Chinese transcript (h/t to Chinese blogger Si Ning, who broke down just what was censored from the event here). This purposefully non-didactic assertion of values probably succeeded in needling Chinese government ideologues because it gave no basis to complain of U.S. arrogance, yet still left censors worried about Obama’s possible moral attraction. (This is corroborated by revelations that the main propaganda imperative for coverage of the November state visit was for people to become “enthused about China-U.S. relations rather than…Obama”). Just like Obama’s inauguration speech, the live broadcast of which in China had to be unexpectedly diverted away at the mention of communism, the town hall event put the Chinese in the awkward and embarrassing position of having to actively censor the words of a foreign head of state.
But what do U.S. policymakers ultimately hope to accomplish with this policy of “soft containment” or “smart war” against China? It obviously serves U.S. interests to maintain or increase the favorability of its national values among Chinese. But to the extent it fosters a bunker mentality among the Beijing leadership, such “smart” policy might actually have worked against its aim by directly and indirectly inducing the recent tightening of Internet controls and political repression in China.
