Israel seems to be facing something that it might not have expected in its war of words with its neighbors: unity. And it looks like some nations of the Middle East are hanging together in the face of Israeli aggression instead of hanging alone, which has often been the tradition in the past.
Falling far short of a Middle Eastern Warsaw Pact, multiple parties have nevertheless come forth to voice their concern for Lebanon’s safety. Iran, Syria, the Arab League, and others have publicly expressed “support” for Lebanon.
While several nations face the the prospect of an IDF attack, Lebanon is in a particularly difficult position. Israel has threatened military action against all of Lebanon in the case of another Hizballah attack. At the same time many think it’s likely that Israel would preemptively attack Hizballah if Israel decides to strike Iran’s nuclear energy installations. This means that Lebanon has at least two items to worry about with regards to Israel. And while Hizballah is unlikely to provide Israel with a provocation, Lebanon has no control over the actions of Iran, which means that Lebanon doesn’t have complete control over its own destiny.
This must be disheartening for the Lebanese to some degree, who had worked so hard to rebuild after the Civil War (1975-1990) only to have it all destroyed during the 2006 War (both of which Israel was prominently involved). If Israel strikes Hizballah ahead of an attack on Iran, the result would be more of the same, because such a strike on Hizballah would have to be thorough, swift, and devastating- devastating for Hizballah and devastating for Lebanon- because the goal of such a move would be to neutralize the threat of Hizballah as Israel deals with the expected response from Iran.
Internally, within Lebanon, there also seems to be a growing atmosphere of unity and shared destiny. Late last year, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri declared that Hizballah was a legitimate defender of Lebanon. The move smoothed over any worries Hizballah might have had about the government trying to take its weapons, and it also removed the prospect of Israel driving a wedge between Hizballah and the Lebanese government, which was one of the goals of the 2006 War. This time around, the chances of turning Lebanese public sentiment against Hizballah are not as great, and they will be zero if Israel strikes Lebanon preemptively.
Israel is no stranger to living in hostile territory, but it arguably hasn’t seen its enemies appear this united since 1967. While that situation may have turned out to be a boon for Israel in terms of territorial expansion, this time around things are different. What worked in ’67 was a surprise attacks against the Egyptian and Syrian air forces, but now guerrilla proxies are the weapon of choice, and they are nearly impossible to disrupt with one quick strike.
Hizballah’s military support for Iran must not be taken for granted. The resistance group often refers to the regime as a guide, but assuming that an Israeli attack on Iran equals a Hizballah attack on Israel would be a mistake. It’s possible that Hizballah would just stay out of it, and in that case Israel would be stirring up the hornet’s nest for no reason. Iran did not come to the aid of Hizballah during the 2006 War*, why should Hizballah act any different?
*Iran has a history of this type of pragmatism. Iran did little to support the Iraqi Shia during the brutal Saddam Hussein regime and, though Iran did supply weapons and money before-hand, it did not come to the aid of Hizballah in 2006 with military support, as mentioned. This may be due to the historic cultural divide between Arabs and Persians, or it may have to do with Iran not being willing to take such a risk for one of its proxies. Either way, it’s hard to forget who helped you during a war and who did not. For all intents and purposes, the Lebanese and Iraqis were on their own.
Of course, all this will be moot if Israel attacks Hizballah and Iran at the same time, in which case the two will be rendered de facto brothers-in-arms. The same goes for Syria, which is the most likely to “sit this one out”. Recently, some Israeli analysts recommended that IDF strike Syria and Hizballah at the same time in order to cut off Hizballah’s resupply lines. Leaving aside the fact that Hizballah would likely need no immediate resupply in another war with Israel (as Hizballah has been preparing and stockpiling for another go-round with Israel since the last one ended over three years ago), it seems that the people recommending this course of action are not concerned with opening up a war on three fronts with Iran, Syria and Hizballah. Is Israel that confident in its military and its ability to shield its people from the response such a plan would bring? Or is Israel practicing the Art of War, by acting strong when it is weak?
Other key questions at this point are as follows: Is it truly impossible for Israel to live with a nuclear armed Iran? Would Israel strike Iran without prior American approval (which it is very unlikely to get)? Would Israel also strike Hizballah and Syria as a preemptive measure? And if Israel does decide to take on Hizballah, Iran, and Syria all at once, can it live with the consequences? Only Israel can answer these questions.
Every week the stakes are raised higher and the rhetoric grows more apocalyptic. Israel claims that it will destroy Lebanon if Israel is attacked. Iran claims that this will be the end of Israel if Iran is attacked. Israel says the Assad regime will be be destroyed if Syria helps Hizballah. As many have written, it’s better that these are wars of words and not bullets, and that they are being fought in the press and not on the battlefield. As long as there is talk, however aggressive, it’s still just talk. It’s when the parties go silent that we must really worry, because if Israel was really going to attack Iran or Hizballah or Syria, it would just do so without talk and without warning.
Right now and for what it’s worth, Lebanon is expressing its support for Hizballah, while Syria, Iran, and the Arab League are “expressing their support” for Lebanon. Perhaps this is a case of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts, and maybe that will be enough to deter any violence.
