While Lebanon worries about another attack from Israel, two other issues have been consistently popping up on the radar: the question of Hizballah’s arms, and the prospect of ending sectarianism. Not surprisingly, the three are closely related.
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During the run-up to the 2009 parliamentary elections in Lebanon, a cloud of anxiety blanketed the country. Lebanese in Beirut were plotting how they were going to get home that weekend; “home” meaning wherever they were registered to vote. But there was another purpose to the plans, because getting back to your village to vote meant that you would likely be amongst people in your sect that you could turn to if there was trouble.
My Shia friends in the city were urged to come back to the South, and a Druze friend spent the weekend in the mountains. While I was living in Lebanon, most of my friends were university students, and it’s telling that while their parents urged them to come home to the safety of the village where they could be protected, the young people themselves resisted the notion and most of them stayed in Beirut. This may represent a better reading of the stability of Lebanon on the part of the students compared to their parents, but perhaps it also represents a shift in thinking between the generations, with one coming of age in total war and the other in relative peace*.
“Relative” is the key word here. Most of these young people were born after the Civil War had ended and therefore were not subjected to the sectarian violence that plagued their parents’ generation. In their lifetimes, Lebanon hasn’t exactly been peaceful, but most of the violence that they have been exposed to has been political (such as assassinations) or external (from Israel) in nature. The closest thing to sectarian violence that today’s generation has witnessed is the events of May 2008, but that occasion cannot hold a candle to what went on in Lebanon in the 1980’s.
The Civil War (1975-1990) magnified sectarianism in Lebanon in a way that wasn’t present before. For years, Beirut was known as the Paris of the Middle East, where people of different backgrounds and beliefs could party and do business. But when the violence started, people turned to their fellow Shia or Druze or Sunni for protection, because people from your sect were the only ones you could trust. It’s no wonder that this mentality amongst older Lebanese is still so strong today.
Disarming
For such a small country, Lebanon is remarkably diverse. There are at least 17 recognized religious sects, and dozens of competing political parties. The largest sectarian groups are the Shia, Sunni, Christian, and Druze sects. When Lebanon gained independence in 1943, the Christians were the largest group, but due to factors such as emigration and birthrates, that has changed significantly. Today the Shia are the largest group.
In the Arab world, the Shia have historically existed on the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, and it was no different in Lebanon. For years, the Christians and Sunnis dominated the political and business landscape in Lebanon, while the Shia were pushed to the margins. State funding for Shia regions always represented an absurdly small portion of government spending, despite their undeniable demographic significance.
Now the Shia of Lebanon have more power than ever before, and most of it is due to the efforts of Hizballah and Amal. over the years. That change didn’t happen over night and it didn’t happen peacefully. Today, the power of the Shia is drawn from Hizballah and is backed by force, as Hizballah is the only militia to retain its weapons after the end of the civil war. There are at least three reasons for this. One, the group acts as the resistance to Israel. Two, they are too insecure in their position in Lebanon to give up their weapons. Three, the group is beholden to some degree to Syria and Iran, both of whom use Hizballah as a bargaining chip and a deterrent to Israel.
*With its high investment in the Lebanese political system and in the wake of the 2006 War, it is unlikely that Hizballah, despite a heated and public war of words with Israeli officials, would provide a solid reason for an IDF attack. Right now, the biggest threat Lebanon faces comes from a preemptive strike on Lebanon if it Israel decides to strike Iran.
So the situation is complicated. Israel would have no reason to destroy Lebanon if it were not for the actions of Hizballah. But that is not to say that Lebanon would not have to worry about Israeli territorial expansion. Israel has been expanding ever since it first appeared on a map, and it continues to this day. Every week, settlements continue to be approved by the Israeli government in occupied territories. It is not hard to imagine a similar situation in Lebanon if it were not for someone guarding the border.
To date, Hizballah is the only group to expel Israel by force. It is part of the groups identity and it appears on both their manifestos. Asking them to give up their arms means asking them to give up the resistance. It is here where some commentators would say that this is what the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are for, and that is their responsibility to defend Lebanon, not Hizballah’s. This statement makes sense in principle, but the LAF is just not capable of defending Lebanon against Israel.
The weapons the LAF possesses now are inadequate and outdated, laughably so when compared to the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Part of this is due to Israel itself, as the Israeli government puts pressure on other governments not to sell Lebanon any highly sophisticated weaponry. The reason given for this is that the Israelis do not want such weapons falling into the hands of Hizballah, but if the LAF is not allowed to grow in its capabilities, how is the government controlled military ever supposed to replace the resistance?
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There seem to be two sets of voices calling for Hizballah to disarm: internal and external. The external voices are Israel and the United States who want Hizballah to disarm because Israel is threatened by their presence. But outside of a situation where the United States wages direct war in Lebanon, it’s highly unlikely that the group poses much of a threat to America. The US probably makes so much noise about Hizballah due the threat the group poses to Israel and because of the influence that Israel has on US policy makers.
Israel wants the group to disarm because the group poses a threat to Israel. It’s understandable, and while that reasoning doesn’t hold much water in Lebanon, it doesn’t change the fact that a large part of the Lebanese government wants the same thing.
The Lebanese want Hizballah to disarm because having an unaccountable sub-state army operating is simply not good for the stability of the country- any country. And the Lebanese know better than anyone else of the consequences of domestic instability.
Today, there is a National Dialogue going on where the leaders of Lebanon get together and discuss the important issues facing Lebanon and address how to deal with them in the future. However, one thing is not up for discussion: Hizballah’s arms. The groups is simply not ready for it. Hizballah is not ready to hand the resistance over to the LAF, they are not secure enough of their position in Lebanon, and the group is under pressure by Iran and Syria to remain a threat to Israel (Iran needs Hizballah to act as a deterrent to an Israeli attack on Tehran’s nuclear facilities, and Syria needs Hizballah to stay threatening during Damascus’ endless negotiation for the return of the Golan Heights).
Sectarianism
In the past month, President Michel Suleiman (Christian) and House Speaker Nabih Berri (Shiite) have expressed their wish to abolish institutionalized sectarianism in Lebanon, and Prime Minister Saad Hariri (Sunni) has voiced his support for the idea. With such influential men behind the notion, it is not hard to imagine the end of sectarianism in the future.
In order to maintain a balance between the sects, a system was developed in Lebanon to dole out the power. Seats in parliament were allocated, and various government positions were given to the various groups*. The president had to be a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker a Shiite, etc. These requirement established that power would be shared between the sects and that no one sect would ever come to dominate the others.
At first, this system was only a verbal agreement between the sects as part of the National Pact, but since the 1989 Taif Accord that ended the Civil War, the system has been formalized. However, the Taif Accord does stipulate that the system must eventually be abolished using the National Dialogue process.
While a balance of power has been maintained, sectarianism and its requirements have also been blamed for the stagnation that has plagued the government over the years. Just this past summer, it took Mr. Hariri five months to form a cabinet after he was chosen as Prime Minister because he had to accommodate a system that didn’t always allow for cabinet members to be selected on merit. Some feel that this type of governance is what keeps Lebanon together, as decisions must be made based on consensus. But others argue that ending sectarianism in favor of a system that better reflected the wishes of the voters would be a more equitable way to govern the country.
Abolishing sectarianism would mean a more realistic representation for the Lebanese, but one group would clearly benefit more than the others. Today, the Shia make up the largest group and therefore have the most to gain. (The group with the most to lose is the Christians, who have seen their number dwindle over the years. Neddless to say, some of the biggest critics of ending sectarianism are Maronites, particularly Cardinal Sfeir, who said that “sectarianism must be stricken from the souls of the Lebanese before it can be stricken from the law.”)
Many people agree that ending sectarianism is the fairest way forward for Lebanon, but it is a step that must be taken with great caution and planning. Lebanon is experiencing stability right now, and significant economic gains along with it. But the country has only been at peace for about a year now and nothing guarantees that it will stay that way. The current system, while at times frustratingly inefficient, works in its own way and it would be a shame to upset that prematurely. It is good that the topic is under discussion in both the media and the government, but perhaps it is best to wait for a more stable time (regionally speaking) to institute such a drastic change in Lebanon.
Conclusion
Lebanon is evolving. Right now the country is somewhat of an anomaly, with an outdated political system that somehow works in its own weird way, and with a sub-state militia that refuses to disarm operating within its borders. The two issues are closely related. If the Shia of Lebanon had not been marginalized politically and economically for so long and had been sharing a larger piece of the pie during the days when Beirut was known as the “Paris of the Middle East” , there might have never been a genesis for a group like Hizballah.
While one may argue that sectarianism, at least right now, is a force for stability in Lebanon, it is hard to argue the same about a heavily armed Hizballah. The group may be a potent protector of Lebanon’s southern border, but the group also exposes all of Lebanon to Israeli attacks. Regardless of the criminality of it, when Israel strikes, it strikes the whole country and everyone is affected. The 2006 War claimed over 1200 Lebanese lives, mostly civilian, and caused billions of dollars in damages. When Hizballah provoked Israel, Lebanon paid the price, and it is simply not fair for the whole country to be held hostage like that. Sooner or later, the power to declare war must be transferred to a government which is accountable to the people.
But that change must come with great caution as well, because the force that is left to defend Lebanon must be strong enough to thwart Israeli territorial expansion. And right now Hizballah is the only force in Lebanon capable of the task.
The same goes for ending sectarianism, which has held the country together for over sixty years. Any attempt to dismantle it must be done with great care and should happen around the same time as Hizballah’s armed wing eventually begins the process of disarming or integrating into the LAF. If the two are not done concurrently, Lebanon faces the prospect of one group (the Shia) having control over the government and as well as having its own militia, which could be the recipe for disaster.
Ending sectarianism and disarming Hizballah are necessary changes, but such a transition should not be rushed and should only be undertaken when the country is ready. Luckily for Lebanon, the current political structure seems to be well equipped for establishing the high level of consensus necessary for such a significant transition. Lebanon’s government might move painfully slow at times, but there is a reason for that.
