As the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference draws to a close in New York, what’s remarkable is how little attention the meeting has got in the world press. Except for fleeting attention to the idea of making the Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free-zone, which Egypt has been promoting as leader of the “group of 77” nonaligned countries, the review has received hardly a mention. In part that reflects the positive fact that nonproliferation is no longer a deeply controversial issue that deeply divides North and South, cold warriors and nonaligned. Except for four hold-outs, the NPT has achieved universal membership, and its safeguards regime is being steadily strengthened.
Of course there’s always room for improvement. The Arms Control Association, on the eve of the conference, put out a release calling on all nations to join in the NPT’s “additional protocol,” which gives the IAEA the right to conduct challenge on-site inspections when cheating is suspected, and to penalize “breakout” countries like North Korea that suddenly withdraw from the treaty and conduct weapons tests. The ACA also calls for accelerated nuclear disarmament, endorses a Middle East nuclear-free zone, and says the remaining holdouts should be rigorously held to NPT standards.
Those are all sound suggestions, but arguably the bullets leave out the single most important thing that could strengthen the NPT: Obtaining universal membership in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Surely it’s no coincidence that in the United Nations entry to the NPT review conference, there’s a small, high-caliber exhibit explaining the CTBT and the organization that’s been set up in Vienna to monitor and enforce it.
“The CTBT makes it almost impossible for countries that do not yet have nuclear weapons to develop them. And it makes it almost impossible for countries that have nuclear weapons to develop new or more advanced weapons,” says an exhibit factsheet, with just a touch of over-statement.
An all-embracing comprehensive test ban treaty would be a major impediment to an NPT member wishing to break out of the treaty and test. And, if ever we can find a way of abolishing nuclear weapons altogether, the NPT and CTBT together will have to guarantee that no country would have a chance of cheating and secretly building atomic bombs, escaping early detection
Since being opened for ratification in September 1996, the CTBT has obtained wide membership: 171 countries have signed it, and 112 have ratified it. But all 44 countries with substantial nuclear technology are required to ratify the treaty for it to take force. Nine have not done so: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States.
Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made building the CTBT’s infrastructure. 130 test monitoring stations have been set up in a global verification system that ultimately is to include 337 stations that use seismic, hydroacoustic, or infrared techniques, or that test for radionuclides emitted in tests. That system is coordinated by an International Data Centre in Vienna, part of the proto-organization for test ban monitoring that’s been colocated with the IAEA at a United Nations complex.
According to the New York exhibit, the monitoring system got its trial run with the North Korean nuclear test of Oct. 9, 2006. Though well below a kiloton in yield, it was detected with confidence by 22 stations, even though three would have sufficed. Two weeks later, a telltale xenon-133 signature was picked up by Canada’s Yellowknife station, providing definitive confirmation of the test.
Arguably, the system got an even earlier try-out with the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998. Despite press reports at the time that the system had detected only one of the first three devices India tested, and neither of the second two, I got quite a different impression when I talked with top U.S. seismologists (see IEEE Spectrum magazine, July 1998, “Indian and Pakistani tests–verification breakdown or startling success?”). They said the first triplet of tests were simultaneous and produced a single signal, which was clearly detected. As for the second pair, though the yields were very small, seismologists felt sure they should have been detected. Their startling conclusion: The tests either didn’t take place, contrary to Indian claims, or the tests were of implosion packages only, without nuclear material.
Looking ahead, there are obvious opportunities for the United States to use its diplomatic influence constructively. It could make its support for Egypt’s Middle East initiative partly contingent on Egypt’s ratifying the CTBT. It could make recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear-weapons-states depend on their ratifying the CTBT. It could and should make CTBT membership a condition of any denuclearization and normalization agreement involving a pariah state like North Korea.
But to do any of that effectively, the United States will have to ratify the CTBT itself. That is the first and top priority in nonproliferation.
POSTSCRIPT (May 15, 2010): I regret it if this post inadvertently leaves the impression that ACA does not strongly support the CTBT or consider U.S. ratification of the treaty a top priority. My only point, and it’s a small one not to be worried over, is that Daryl Kimball did not put the CTBT at the top of the six bulleted points in his pre-conference essay, summarized and linked above, “Strengthen the Nonproliferation Bargain.” He includes CTBT ratification under his fourth point, “Accelerating Progress on Nuclear Disarmament.” as a sub-point. I would have made it the lead bulleted point, as the most important single thing we can do to strengthen nonproliferation verification and enforcement.
Please note that the Arms Control Association has a document detailing the current status of the test ban verification regime, part of its Project for the CTBT. For a conceptual description of the system done when it was in an early stage of construction, see my “Better Networks for Test Ban Monitoring,” IEEE Spectrum magazine, February 1996, pp. 24-33.
