The annual Global Attitudes Survey conducted by the well-regarded Pew Research Center was released last week. The survey, which was conducted in April, gauged public opinion in 22 select countries on a wide range of questions, with India one of six Asian countries included in the study.
Among the survey’s findings, media coverage has focused mainly on the increasing antipathy in the Muslim world toward President Barack Obama’s foreign policy, and the growing divergence between Mr. Obama’s rock star image in Western Europe and his decreasing popularity at home. But the survey also contains a few intriguing – even startling – nuggets regarding India and its relations with the United States and China. (By the way, Indian respondents were overwhelmingly drawn from urban areas and the polling data discussed below has a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.)
The first set of nuggets offers a mixed message about the state of U.S.-India affairs. The Pew survey confirms the findings of the Globescan survey released two months ago that America’s favorability rating in India has fallen rather significantly over the past year. Although a solid majority (66 percent) of the Indian public expresses a positive opinion of the United States, this is down from the 76 percent who held this view in 2009. The ten-percentage point drop is the largest in any non-Muslim country included in the survey. Support for Mr. Obama’s international policies has also decreased by the same margin – from 67 percent in 2009 to 57 percent today. And support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts dropped a whopping 17 percentage points – from 82 percent to 65 percent, the largest fall among the 22 countries surveyed.
Yet despite these arresting figures, President Obama retains a substantial level of personal popularity in India, much higher than his predecessor. Three-quarters of the Indian public express confidence in Obama’s overall approach to world affairs (versus 55 percent for George W. Bush in 2008). And 83 percent believe Obama takes Indian interests into account when he makes foreign policy decisions – again a figure that is much higher than in the Bush years when the U.S.-India partnership is widely believed to have reached its apogee. These specific findings suggest that the elite-level angst regarding Obama’s approach toward New Delhi is not shared by the general public.
But the survey also raises an important red flag for bilateral affairs. New Delhi’s relationship with Tehran is a long-standing source of friction with Washington. (Three years ago, for example, senior members of the U.S. Congress even sent a toughly-worded letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, linking final approval of the nuclear cooperation agreement to New Delhi’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program.) But by a two-to-one margin, the Indian public disapproves of the way the Obama administration is handling the Iran issue, this despite the relatively more accommodating line Obama has pursued compared to his predecessor.
Even more striking is that public support for Iran’s nuclear weapons program has actually increased by a significant margin. In 2007, two-thirds of Indians were opposed to Iranian nuclear efforts, while only 21 percent expressed approval. This year less than half (48 percent) voiced opposition, while a full one-third are in support. In no other country included in the survey have opinions of the Iranian nuclear program swung so dramatically. Indeed, while Beijing is often criticized for being Tehran’s diplomatic enabler, the Chinese public remains firmly opposed (65 percent to 20 percent) to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.
A second noteworthy nugget is the finding that Indians, of all the publics surveyed, remain the most negative in their view of China. While China is now India’s top trading partner and officials in both countries speak of taking economic relations to the next level, the Indian people are growing increasingly wary of Beijing. Forty-four percent now regard China as an enemy – a much higher level than even in U.S. public opinion – while only a third (32 percent) see it as a partner. More than half (56 percent) are worried about the growth of Chinese economic power, and two-thirds express concern about China’s increasing military might. Overall, the Indian assessment of China has undergone a significant decline over the past year.
A last set of fascinating data points concerns India’s own approach to the world. India is frequently criticized for being a “soft state,” full of pusillanimous leaders and gripped by a Gandhian tradition that prevents decisive action in international affairs. But the Pew survey reports that an eye-popping 92 percent of Indians support the use of military force to maintain world order. This is an off-the-chart figure – no other country surveyed even approaches this level. For all the accusations about U.S. unilateralism and militarism, only 77 percent of Americans hold this view; the level in China is just 60 percent.
And despite talk about the exponential growth of China’s “soft power” appeal, Indians remain confident of their country’s global popularity. Eighty-seven percent believe that India is held in high esteem by people abroad, the highest level among the BRIC countries.
To be sure, the Pew survey presents a broad but shallow set of findings. Intriguing data points are not dissected and no explanation is given for why Indians subscribe to various views. So care needs to be taken in drawing meaningful conclusions based on such limited data. Nonetheless, the findings do offer a fascinating snapshot of how Indians presently see their place in the world and their dealings with other leading countries.
