Michael Hastings’ article published in Rolling Stone magazine has claimed more than Gen. McChrystal’s career. Seemingly taking the U.S. leadership hostage, the article seems now to have extended its long tendrils and has squarely, elastically exploded onto U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The New York Times published a stunning article this morning that suggests that Pakistan’s military leadership is actively taking the reins of Afghanistan’s internal politics.
Combatting facile comprehension, in this morass, requires that I quote the article by Perlez, Schmitt and Gall at length:
“Pakistan is presenting itself as the new viable partner for Afghanistan to President Hamid Karzai, who has soured on the Americans. Pakistani officials say they can deliver the network of Sirajuddin Haqqani, an ally of Al Qaeda who runs a major part of the insurgency in Afghanistan, into a power-sharing arrangement.”
“In addition, Afghan officials say, the Pakistanis are pushing various other proxies, with General Kayani personally offering to broker a deal with the Taliban leadership.”
“Washington has watched with some nervousness as General Kayani and Pakistan’s spy chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, shuttle between Islamabad and Kabul, telling Mr. Karzai that they agree with his assessment that the United States cannot win in Afghanistan, and that a postwar Afghanistan should incorporate the Haqqani network, a longtime Pakistani asset. In a sign of the shift in momentum, the two Pakistani officials were next scheduled to visit Kabul on Monday, according to Afghan TV.”
“Despite General McChrystal’s 11 visits to General Kayani in Islamabad in the past year, the Pakistanis have not been altogether forthcoming on details of the conversations in the last two months, making the Pakistani moves even more worrisome for the United States, said an American official involved in the administration’s Afghanistan and Pakistan deliberations.”
By brokering a separate piece between the Haqqani network, the leaders of the coalition that constitute the Taliban and Afghanistan, Pakistan has become the king-maker. This turn, categorically, makes Pakistan the puppet-master; the American leadership is being routed to go along with its pulled strings.
To wit:
“It also provides another indication of how Pakistan, ostensibly an American ally, has worked many opposing sides in the war to safeguard its ultimate interest in having an Afghanistan that is pliable and free of the influence of its main strategic obsession, its more powerful neighbor, India.”
“The Haqqani network has long been Pakistan’s crucial anti-India asset and has remained virtually untouched by Pakistani forces in their redoubt inside Pakistan, in the tribal areas on the Afghan border, even as the Americans have pressed Pakistan for an offensive against it.”
Indeed:
“On repeated occasions, Pakistan has used the Haqqani fighters to hit Indian targets inside Afghanistan, according to American intelligence officials. The Haqqanis have also hit American ones, a possible signal from the Pakistanis to the Americans that it is in their interest, too, to embrace a deal.”
The only passably sensible argument that might concede U.S. resignation to the deal would have to include that 1) the U.S. is after Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; the Taliban is simply a hindrance to reliable governance in Afghanistan 2) any peace deal that secures an end to the Taliban insurgency is acceptable on pragmatic grounds. This argument falls to the realistic possibility that the Taliban now presents a greater to U.S. interests and stability in the region than Al Qaeda. Indeed, it falls to the prior argument that, at least in Afghanistan, it may no longer be possible to separate out the Taliban and Al Qaeda. If this all turns out to be the case, then allowing the Taliban a safe haven is tantamount to declaring retreat, untrenched and unrepentant.
