Foreign Policy Blogs

General Petraeus' Strategic Vision: Agreement, then Implementation

It is not too much to think that in the last few weeks the ground beneath their feet has shifted for the military and political teams charged with delivering U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. General Stanley McChrystal’s hasty, and ill-becoming dismissal from office has given cause  for recrimination that only a few weeks ago seemed groundless.  Now tumult; now what?

General Petraeus is the new commander in Afghanistan after being hurriedly confirmed by the Senate.  The question on everyone’s lips is: Can the hero of Iraq patch together a respectable outcome, barring outright defeat, in Afghanistan?

Thomas Ricks recently argued in a Washington Post Op-ed piece that Gen. Petraeus’s contribution while in command in Iraq stemmed principally from his leadership.  He moved swiftly to corral together one structurally competent, though rickety, machine whose main purpose was to show that the U.S  was interested in protecting Iraqi citizens.  This demonstration offered a wedge to Iraqis and showed the ways in which the U.S. agenda was categorically different than that of the extremists in and out of power.   Protect the Iraqis and they will come to understand that extremism (secular, religious) is greater threat to their streets than a troop patrol around the corner.

Ricks argues argues that achieving this, a prospect of a hardened peace in Iraq, required relentless coaxing all the way down to the street-level command.   General Petraeus had help in this effort: his civilian counterpart Ambassador Ryan Crocker worked with him in lock-step, every step of the way, through a coordinated and yes, relentlessly energetic effort to smooth out the differences between military and political goals.  In so doing, they showed a united front to U.S. and local leaders.  Iraqi leaders knew then that the local U.S. leadership in the Green Zone had achieved consensus and there was no drawing out conflicts, fissures within that team.

That can hardly be thought true of the local leadership in Afghanistan.  Gen. McChrystal’s most stinging insults were directed at his civilian counterparts and their seniors.  In the Rolling Stone article, Ambassador Holbrooke was portrayed in clown stripes.  The General Jones, the National Security Advisor was dressed in a harlequin suit.  Indeed, Ambassador Holbrooke, sat through more than raft of obviously embarrassing interviews and defended in his run in office as the point man on Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Speaking with Gwen Iffil, on the PBS Newshour, he argued that yes, in fact, Ambassador Holbrooke had a good working relationship with his military counterparts; and that only just recently, the senior team charged with fixing policy in Afghanistan had agreed that before the U.S. military worked its way through Kandahar, the U.S aid agencies must make sure that Kandaharis no longer suffer power outages and are able to enjoy the fruits of an electrical grid sourced to capacity.

It is well-known that General Eikenberry, the U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, fought General McChrystal’s military and political assessments on the plausibility of defeat without an immediate troop surge.  Ambassador Holbrooke seems to have achieved little during his time in office.  Consensus on the way forward in Afghanistan, is hardly assured.

So it is little surprise that as soon as he took command in Afghanistan, General Petraeus reassured the political and military leadership in the U.S and in Afghanistan and Pakistan that he would seek consensus of the sort that helps deliver uneasy coalition victories.   A recent New York Times piece paints a sobering picture:

“Civilian and military, Afghanistan and international, we are part of one team with one mission,” General Petraeus told about 1,700 guests, including Afghan government and military and police officials, gathered at the United States Embassy for a pre-Fourth of July celebration. His message to the Afghans in the audience was, “Your success is our success.”

So the mantra is: “Agree and then implement”.  This seems a pragmatic way forward.  But it turns on the following question: Are the Afghan leaders done fighting amongst themselves?  And, as importantly: Are local  U.S leaders tired of their own petty squabbles?

 

Author

Faheem Haider

Faheem Haider is a political analyst, writer and artist. He holds advanced research degrees in political economy, political theory and the political economy of development from the London School of Economics and Political Science and New York University. He also studied political psychology at Columbia University. During long stints away from his beloved Washington Square Park, he studied peace and conflict resolution and French history and European politics at the American University in Washington DC and the University of Paris, respectively.

Faheem has research expertise in democratic theory and the political economy of democracy in South Asia. In whatever time he has to spare, Faheem paints, writes, and edits his own blog on the photographic image and its relationship to the political narrative of fascist, liberal and progressivist art.

That work and associated writing can be found at the following link: http://blackandwhiteandthings.wordpress.com