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GailForce: How Many of the Media Types Reporting About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Have Actually Read the Counterinsurgency Manual?

I had one of the best 4th of July weekends ever. I got to go on long scenic bike rides with friends, hang out at barbeques, and top off the weekend experience by watching a fireworks show which for reasons unknown to me was paid for by BP. Go figure. In spite of the fun, my thoughts kept drifting off to Afghanistan and the task facing General Petraeus as he assumed command of U.S. and International Security Forces (ISAF) in the region. During the weekend the media covered the remarks he made on his assumption of command like “we are in this to win”. They also reiterated that he was the co-author of the Counterinsurgency Strategy (COIN). During the next week most coverage of Afghanistan continued to focus only on the number of people killed. There were very few details provided.

Yesterday an ABC news report quoted a NATO official stating the insurgents were not gaining the upper hand and there was no need to postpone elections scheduled for September. In the next sentence the report goes on to state: “Saturday was a particularly bloody day, with six U.S. soldiers killed in separate incidents and more than a dozen civilians –including 12 gunned down in a bus near Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan.” I’m not beating up on ABC news; in fact they’re one of my favorite news sources but where is the context? What is U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? Since this is going to be one of the major issues in our upcoming elections shouldn’t we try to gain a more thorough understanding of the issues and strategy before voting?

In all of the recent coverage I’ve not seen any description in the media of exactly what the COIN is other than to “win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people” and less than subtle hints that the strategy in Afghanistan won’t succeed. I believe this is too important an issue to be covered in “sound bites”; consequently, I thought it might be useful to review the document. It was published in December 2006 and is named Counterinsurgency Field Manuel No. 3-24. I plan on devoting at least two blogs on this topic.

I first read the manual in the fall of 2006 when it was being circulated in rough draft form. My thoughts at the time were it was one of the best and most informative documents I’d ever read on the subject. I reread it this weekend, all 282 pages of it. It’s actually a pretty easy read. When I did my graduate work in International Studies, one of my major complaints was most of the books they had us read for our courses took hundreds of pages to make points that could have been made in 50 pages or less. In spite of the length its concise but thorough.

The COIN manual has seven chapters:
– Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
– Unity of Effort
– Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations
– Executing Counterinsurgency Operations
– Developing Host Nation Security Forces
– Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency
– Sustainment

There were several points that jumped out at me. The first is definitions, what are we talking about? The manual defines insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

The second point of interest: “One common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occurring. Insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength and gather support. Thus, counterinsurgents often have to ‘come from behind’ when fighting an insurgency. Another common feature is that forces conducting COIN operations usually begin poorly. Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.”

This is particularly relevant when considering the debate over the restricted use of close air support to ground troops in Afghanistan. There have been reports that some of the troops were unhappy with the rules of engagement. Initial reports indicate General Petraeus will keep the current rules in place. It is worth noting that throughout the COIN Manual repeatedly stresses the importance of constantly checking and revising strategy.

A third item of interest: “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow the existing authority. This authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. Counterinsurgents, in turn, use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. This can include eliminating those extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners
should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.”

This to me addresses the “unity of effort” point being made by General Petraeus in his speeches. It’s not just a military problem. It also explains the importance being placed on training Afghanistan security forces. A major problem will be whether the Afghanistan people consider their current government “legitimate” or an impotent figurehead thing.

Think I’ll stop here. As always my views are my own. I’m just a retired Baby Boomer trying to live happily ever after in the Colorado Rockies. Guess I’ll go for a bike ride but will probably never be able to forget my time as part of the Central Command Staff. I was assigned to the Naval component in the ‘90’s. We were in a constant crisis mode because of Saddam. I know from first hand experience how hard the men are woman are working and can’t help but feel a little guilty of being able to relax in a safe, secure environment while they are in harms way. My body may be in the Rockies but my heart is with the troops. This does not mean I blindly accept our security strategy only that I hope to bring clarity to the issues for interested readers.

 

Author

Gail Harris

Gail Harris’ 28 year career in intelligence included hands-on leadership during every major conflict from the Cold War to El Salvador to Desert Storm to Kosovo and at the forefront of one of the Department of Defense’s newest challenges, Cyber Warfare. A Senior Fellow for The Truman National Security Project, her memoir, A Woman’s War, published by Scarecrow Press is available on Amazon.com.