If the status quo continues, as is likely, and the Pakistani government remains mired in its own incompetence and impotence, the militants in Pakistan will have become more popular and will have built up their ranks in a way, so far, unforeseen.
Today’s New York Times lays out the strategic issue in very stark terms:
“With Pakistan’s economy suffering a grievous blow, the [Obama] administration could be forced to redirect parts of its $7.5 billion economic aid package for Pakistan to urgent needs like rebuilding bridges, rather than more ambitious goals like upgrading the rickety electricity grid.
Beyond that, the United States will be dealing with a crippled Pakistani government and a military that, for now, has switched its focus from rooting out insurgents to plucking people from the floodwaters. The Pakistani authorities, a senior American official said, have been “stretched to the breaking point” by the crisis. Their ragged response has fueled fears that the Taliban will make gains by stepping in to provide emergency meals and shelter.”
Going forward, as the Pakistani military spends more time and expends more effort in rescue and relief operations, the Tehrik-e-Taliban will be left alone to re-align its recruitment strategy to fit its own relief effort and local public outreach program. In the short-term, this is likely to have commendable benefits for public safety and security. In the long term, however, as the Islamists become more involved in relief operations it will appear as if Islamabad has not left a sizable footprint in the North, in Sindh and Punjab. In that case the Taliban will have won the allegiance of the many millions who will have received help or will have known those who received help from charities aligned with Islamists, who have so far out-run government efforts to reach the broader population left to their own devices.
