Earlier this year the government began to formulate plans to set up a separate police force to monitor the four separate industrial zones in Bangladesh. The plan was put into play this month with somber fanfare.
The Industrial police force, (an unfortunately titled cadre of security officers; one imagines police officers kitted out in metallic gear and outfitted in chest plates, cogs and wheels as their weapons) will aid the Bangladesh police and the group of localized (and quite possibly, ill-trained) militia members called the Ansar Bahini, charged with nation-wide, internal security.
Ostensibly to maintain law, order and security the Industrial police drew out nearly 1,500 officers from Bangladesh Police to patrol the four zones in Bangladesh where the main garments factories are located. 1, 400 more officers will join later to patrol the Dhaka and Chittagong, Gazipur and Naranganj industrial centers. They will report directly to the Home Ministry led by Sahara Khatun.
The Industrial police are yet another paramilitary force that together with the Rapid Action Battalion, and Ansar aid the Bangladesh Police to maintain the internal security of the country. No doubt, it’s an important move especially since the ratio of population to the police force tasked to protect it is so glaring large.
Nevertheless, the move to institute a separate Industrial Police force is not one that has obviously–and only–positive benefits. The force has been designed and established to quell labor unrest in the garments sector. This is a direct response to the term of widespread public and social unrest, in the aftermath of which garment workers were offered and accepted a raise in their minimum wage.
Asking a minimum wage of 5000 taka, laborers protested the committed refusal of asset owners to admit into their pay rolls such a large increase in wages. Eventually garments workers accepted a hike of 3000, double the their minimum wage to be phased in over time. Since that round of protests and violence, NGO’s have accused the government of torturing labor leaders. The tit for tat has offended industrialists who have claimed–with reason–that in order to maintain its industrial strength the current government has to figure out a way to control the next round of labor protests.
The garments workers also have a morally compelling argument in their favor-perhaps more that is morally superior to the claims of industrialists since it hinges on a version of claim to subversion of worker’s human rights. There is widespread evidence of corporate exploitation of workers, overly long work hours and compensation that categorically does not match the surplus profits generated from their industry. Furthermore, with real estate and food prices sky-rocketing garment workers have a legitimate claim to higher compensation, perhaps even higher than the accepted rate of 3000 taka.
In their turn, asset owners have a righteous argument that if the government raises wages too high, most firms will be priced out by the larger garments firms. In other words, such a move would quelch competition.
Through all the arguments for and against labor strife, unrest and security protection, I cannot think putting out more police officers to scare labor into acquiescence is a stable long-term strategy. As with the RAB, there is little cause to think that the Industrial police will be accountable to public scrutiny. This security force seems to have been designed to be accountable to industrialists and the profits they generate; to some extent that is legitimate. But the counter-point to this is that they seem explicitly designed to crush labor unrest. As such, there is ample room for the rule of law to fall victim to short-term security interests.
