Geert Wilders is without a doubt the most important proponent of this modernized version of right-wing populism, his Freedom Party (PVV) came in third in June’s national elections in the Netherlands with 16% and is now tolerating a minority center-right coalition government. Wilders’ model of right-wing populism differs significantly from historic predecessors and the Hungarian version enlarged upon above in that it poses as the defense of a Western post-1968 acquis that includes women’s and homosexuals’ rights as well as a sort of philo-semitism based on a strong current of islamophobie. His popularity and success has even allowed Wilders’ to export his brand to the USA (where he spoke at an event commemorating the 9th anniversary of 9/11 while protesting against an Islamic cultural center in the vicinity of the former World Trade Center) and Germany (where he gave a speech at the urging of a local politician’s newly-founded Freedom party).
In Sweden an extreme right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, for the first time ever (!) entered parliament in September, while Viennese elections lead to the resurgence of the Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ) coming in second at 26% and easily surpassing its conservative, center-right competitor (the ÖVP). Exceptions of moderate parties increasing their stature exist (Slovakia comes to mind or the Polish presidential elections), but at least two EU member states now boast governments comparable to the infamous Austrian center-/far right coalition of 2000 involving Jörg Haider, which back then had led the other EU members to badly executed but widely publicized sanctions against Austria. These kinds of measures against the Hungarian or Italian government (where the Lega Nord has been part of Berlusconi’s coalition since 2008) or the Dutch PVV-tolerated government are unimaginable today.
The importance of this spectre does not reside exclusively with the electoral successes of these parties and politicians but also in their impact on the different national discourses. Center-right governments, fearing the ascent or return to prominence of a competitor on their right and fighting their declining popularity related to economic difficulties or other issues, absorb these populists’ anti-immigration and islamophobic rhetoric and make it their own. The French government thus – aside from its well publicized measures against Romanian Roma – took action against a minuscule minority (between 400 and 2,000 according to the Ministry of the Interior) in banning the burqa in any public setting and is now proposing a law that were to make it possible for recently nationalized (10 years) French citizens to lose their citizenship when sentenced for murder of a public official. In both cases of course the actual policy-relevance of these laws is dubious, while its symbolism and target is clear. Note that in the first place, as alluded to earlier, a conservative government effectively declares itself a proponent of – coerced – feminism a belief which its conservative forefathers fought impetuously.
In Germany, propelled by the extremely successful book (or should I say diatribe?) written by a – now former – member of the German Central Bank’s directorate railing against Germany disposing of itself due to the divergence of birth rates between Germans of immigration background and those without (and a bit of eugenics thrown in for good measure) Merkel has declared multiculturalism a failure and a prominent member of her party union (Horst Seehofer) has demanded an end to immigration stemming from foreign cultural areas. Again, the target of these statements – Turkish, Muslim immigrants and their descendants – are clear, even when they make little sense (there has actually been a net outflow of migrants to Turkey in 2009; see an interesting discussion of multiculturalism in Germany here) and are of course purely symbolic. The government only now has entered into a discussion of what measures could be taken against immigrants and their descendants who refuse to integrate. Reality menaces to interfere though as obligatory integration classes are overbooked and a punishment for the refusal to participate in them exists at the state level already.
There is a discernible common thread then tying together right-wing populist leaders electoral successes and the symbolic policies brought about by – mostly – center-right governments trying to countervail perceived or actual losses at the urns. This comes at a time when (with the exception of France) European nations generally speaking are (or will be) in dire need of immigration to sustain their work force because of low birth rates. It also serves as a placebo replacing the much needed discussion of what nationality still means when more and more citizens in Europe have a migration background. Yet, with Merkel facing a potential upset in important regional elections in the spring, Sarkozy railing from his extremely low popularity numbers and the strong opposition against his pensions reform, and economic difficulties likely to resurge in a climate of harsh austerity measures, it seems certain that these populist leaders and their – supposedly – easy solutions will flourish.
