At a lecture at the Middle Ease Institute several weeks ago, Dr. Thomas O’Donnell described the modern relationship between the United States and Iran. He characterized the struggle between the two as a battle for the hegemony in the Middle East. America is still heavily reliant on petroleum and the Middle East is still the number one supplier. The world’s largest exporter of oil is Saudi Arabia, which is strongly under American influence. The Saudis keep the oil flowing, are not overly hostile to Israel, and they help America execute its War on Terror.
The only state in the Middle East that rivals Saudi Arabia in terms of fossil fuel potential is Iran and, according to Dr. O’Donnell, America’s goal concerning the Islamic Republic is to isolate the regime and halt any Iranian industrial progress through sanctions. Washington wants to make sure that a nation as hostile to American interests as Iran never reaches is full energy-producing potential and all that comes with it in terms of power projection.
When seen through this prism of isolation, American interactions with Iran are easier to understand. Iran was powerless to halt the UN Security Council sanctions that were championed by the United States. America made strong demands from Iran, then when it seemed that sanctions were inevitable, Iran relented with a last minute nuclear fuel-swap deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil.
The event seemed to be the breakthrough that the Obama administration was pushing for, but Washington rejected the offer as being too little, too late. It’s not clear whether Iran was sincere in its offer, or if it was just trying to buy time, but it is certain that all the bad blood between the two and all the get-tough rhetoric on both sides has sullied any hope for negotiation.
Flash forward to President Ahmedinejad’s first visit to Beirut since taking office. The fiery former Revolutionary Guardsman was met with a hero’s (or more accurately, a rock star’s) welcome, presumably from Lebanon’s Hizballah supporters. He spoke of his nation’s support for Lebanon against its enemies and used the opportunity to plant his flag on Lebanon, stating to the West that “this is ours, and we can make a mess here for you.”
It was the physical embodiment of this seemingly new-aged proxy warfare: one power (Iran) saying to the other (America), “we will not fight you, but our friends can make trouble for your friends (Israel and March 14)”. Washington dismissed Ahmedinejad’s performance as “provocative”. Of course it was, but that misses the point. Ahmedinejad’s visit to Beirut also represents Iran’s successful attempt at circumventing America’s attempt at isolation.
For the last thirty years, the world’s lone superpower has waged diplomatic, economic, and proxy-fought war on the Islamic Republic. Helping Saddam, arming Israel and Saudi Arabia, parking a naval fleet in the Persian Gulf, aggressively perusing sanctions, trying desperately to entice Iran’s lone ally to turn against them, allegedly arming Sunni Muslim insurgents, freezing Persian assets…all in an attempt to limit the influence of Iran in the Middle East. But is it working?
Ostensibly, no, it is not. Iran is still close with Syria; its proxy Hizballah is stronger than ever in Lebanon; the IRGC’s influence with Hamas holds strong; Turkey, Brazil, and other second-tier powers are opening up to Iran; and the Chinese are ready to invest big to increase Iranian oil production.
It’s hard to argue against Tehran making the best of a bad hand, but its unclear whether this Machiavellian foreign policy will pay off. While Iran may be more influential in the world than ever before, domestically the Islamic Republic is struggling. Years of sanctions have crippled Iran’s oil production capacity and its refining capabilities. Amazingly, today Iran must import 40% of its gasoline, mostly from Russia. The country has been forced to enact austerity measures (such as cutting the gasoline subsidy) as a result of relentless economic pressures.
Last year, frustration with the government boiled over into violent public protests. The unrest was triggered by alleged foul play in the 2009 presidential election, but the public’s frustration with the government seemed to have been building for a long time. It’s a strange dichotomy: the regime projects an amazing level of power and confidence abroad, but seems to be in a rapid state of decay at home. Make no mistake, the Ayatollah and the IRGC are still in complete control of the Persian state, but what good is it when Iran seems to be rotting from the inside?
So who is winning this in the great struggle between the United States and Iran? No one. Iran is strong abroad, but weak at home. America has Iran struggling at home, but is facing all kinds of trouble from the them abroad (see Lebanon and Iraq). In the meantime, the world economy thirsts for energy, while it remains under the Persian sands.
The net result for Lebanon is the centuries-old status quo: the tiny nation on the Mediterranean sea is only a pawn for the great powers to use as they wish. Today, it is the Persians.
