With the Cold War a thing of the past and the limits of US unilateralism clearly demonstrated, the EU must be experiencing perfect conditions for their key competencies; soft power and diplomatic dexterity – right? European nations have after all been conditioned by the continent’s tumultuous history in the necessity of taking other points of view into consideration, when plotting a diplomatic course. Or perhaps there is more to it than that. Perhaps Europe is not as well equipped to deal with the challenges of a multipolar world as one might think. Now that the end of the Cold War and its accompanying unipolar moment is ancient history, the liberal democratic vision of Europe is being challenged by competing agendas. The competing visions of Europe’s future have proven more than the present European security arrangements can cope with, resulting in the potential for instability growing.
A recent European Council on Foreign Relations report has some interesting conclusions on the subject. It points out that the institutions of the liberal European order, the EU and NATO, are not geared toward handling the security issues of post-Cold War Europe, and that the shortcomings of Europe’s security arrangements have been demonstrated on several occasions. For example, the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99 Russia cutting the EU’s gas supply in 2008, the Russo-Georgian war and the recent troubles in Kyrgyzstan.
In a nut shell, the ECFR points to the existence of competing European agendas that the EU must invent methods of dealing effectively with. The EU now has to deal with a resurgent Russia – never thrilled about the EU’s eastward expansion; the growing power of Turkey – annoyed at the EU’s reluctance to let them into the club; and the newly independent ex-Soviet and Yugoslavian states. As these agendas have not been accommodated through existing institutions (e.g. the EU refused to conclude a security treaty with Russia; Turkish admission running, amongst other things, afoul on Cypress, which in turn has made a mess of NATO/EU cooperation; and the varying opinions on whether to recognize Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) the ECFR suggests working around these institutions and formalizing other security arrangements. Indeed, the report suggests that Medvedev’s 2008 proposal for a European security treaty should be seriously considered, albeit in a different form than that proposed by Medvedev. By formalizing the EU’s role as a security actor, instead of pickling the proposal in the OSCE as is the case at present, the EU could begin to define its own role as a security actor, instead of sticking to institutions that increasingly are proving to be poorly suited for the needs of regional European security.
As for Turkey, its interest in integrating with Europe should be positively reinforced. As things stand now, Turkey seems tempted by the prospect of becoming a first-rate regional nation rather than a second-rate European one. The Cypress stalemate must somehow be solved and domestic European Turkey-skepticism must be overcome in order to open more of the 35 “chapters” the country is required to fulfill before joining the club. Finally, the new nations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe make up the contested neighborhood. To ensure that this neighborhood does not become an ill-defined area where spheres of interest clash, it is equally important that the EU, Russia and Turkey formalize a security arrangement which clearly defines the rules of the road.
In particular, this blogger thinks it is imperative to enhance the prospects of democracy in the one place that would enable Europe to strengthen its voice in many other parts of the world: Turkey. Being in hailing distance of many of the world’s crisis centers, while simultaneously having a foot in both camps, this country has experienced a diplomatic boom. Furthermore, Turkey boasts an economic growth that is the envy of the stagnating EU economies and the second largest conventional military force in NATO. The benefits of a European Turkey seem obvious. In a world some have described as “post-Western” it is vital that Europe is flexible and re-learns a diplomatic lesson it learnt long ago: Different worldviews – be they religiously or politically motivated – are not necessarily grounds for non-cooperation.
