It has been eight years since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCPs) first peaceful transfer of power, an act which heralded Hu Jintao’s ascension to China’s highest positions of power.
Once again China embarks on a change of helmsmen. On October 18th of this year, Mr. Xi Jingping (习近平)was selected for the position of vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, a organization run by his benefactor Mr. Hu. Historically, having held such positions is a key signal that the 57 year-old Vice-President Xi has been selected as Mr. Hu’s heir apparent. As such, he appears to be scheduled to become CCP party chief in 2012 and the president of China in 2013.
Although he is little known in the West, his rising profile over the last couple of years has included state visits to various nations, including Belgium, Columbia, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Romania.
So who is this shadowy figure who will run soon run the world’s 2nd largest economy, most populous state, and fastest growing military power? Mr. Xi attended Tsinghua University, China’s MIT, and according to some sources majored in “Marxism and Political Ideology Education” and chemical engineering, although the order is not consistent, neither is the completion of a Master’s degree. However, he has completed a Phd in “Chinese Rural Economy”. In regard to his career, Mr. Xi has held very high profile leadership positions in the most modern and dynamic areas of China, to include the Eastern coastal provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai.
There are many in the CCP who resent Mr. Xi’s rise, and will seek to test his growing grip on power over his two year odyssey toward final control. How he holds up will largely be determined by how well he can lead the party back toward a unified ideology. Quite a few in the CCP want a more open process of succession, which party elites have given some lip service too. However, Mr. Xi’s fate seemed to have been decided in a secretive meeting , during a 4 day annual meeting of the 370 member Central Committee. It seems nothing was left to chance, and this is reflective of the divisive organizational culture, that can no longer guarantee a flawless public succession.
Xi is often described as a “princeling” due to the position of his father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), a former party elite who originally fought with Mao against the Japanese during World War II. Many of these early party members, of which Xi’s father is sometimes included, are known as the “8 Immortals”. This type of lineage carries weight among many Chinese in the party, but it is not clear that his rise is primarily or partially due to nepotism. His father, although a former Governor of Guangdong province, had fell out of favor with the party elite more than once. First during the Cultural Revolution, he was purged, and Xi the younger was “sent down” to the countryside to do manual labor. Then his father ran afoul of the government again over the Tienanmen Square incident. He died in 2002. Unlike his father, Xi the younger does not appear to be a reformer, or maybe as some are hoping, he is waiting in silence until he can consolidate power. These are the unknown, which can only be speculated about.
Xi the elder is not the only prominent member of the Xi clan that may have (had) an affect on his political fortunes. Being a family man, Xi Jingping has a wife (his 2nd) and a daughter. Not since Mao Zedong, has Chinese leader’s wife held positions of overt power, and likely for good reason. This is why eyes are already focused on Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛). Ms. Peng currently holds a high ranking positions in the People’s Liberation Army and a government advisory body. She is also a popular singer. Some think Mr. Xi’s rising power will cause conflicts in the the Xi household, as Ms. Peng might have her own agenda, using the guanxi (关系) generated by her husbands status to push things. Time will tell.
What is for certain, is that the CCP is at a critical juncture as there is no consensus in the party ranks on how to proceed with modernization, economically, socially, or politically. This is complicated by growing social pressure for change, especially in areas of party corruption and rule of law. There are have already been approximately 90,000 “mass incidents” (anything from large protests to riots) a year over the last four years, a number that has seen a study increase since 1993. Can Xi craft a a grand new modern platform for the party and rally the cadre behind him?
An obvious, but no less challenging obstacle for Xi Jingping is that the CCP, like all elite oligarchies, wishes to preserve the status quo of the current elite. This instinctive conservatism dampens support for change, unless it directly goes to the elite’s personal gain. The selection of leaders and the choices that leader makes fall within the same ideological range as a result. Eventually the CCP will reach a ceiling where the marginal return on its reforms, as it relates to its own power, declines. Reforms will cease, as a result. At the same time, inversely, public pressure for greater reforms will continue to rise. For things to go back to equilibrium, the CCP will either “bite the bullet” or be removed from power (peacefully or otherwise). I’m guessing Xi hopes this does not happen on his watch.
Here is some speculation from various pundits as to how they think Xi might run things when in power.
