Foreign Policy Blogs

Anxious Tiger, Leering Dragon: The Indian and Chinese Border Part III – Conclusion

The Future

This dispute could be settled with a classic “land swap”, such as China’s Western claim  for India’s eastern one;  which is already the international accepted status quo.  In fact China has already proposed this twice, once in the the 1950s and again in the early 1980s.   Russia struck a similar deal with China on its border in the Russian Far-east in 2008.  The problem is that India is a true liberal democracy, so current public opinion would not support such a deal.   If anything,  paranoia over China is on the upswing. New Delhi has been responding by promoting itself  in South and Southeast Asia as a counter to Chinese influence as part of its “Look East” policy. Delphi is also actively seeking stronger ties with Washington, specifically on security issues, hoping to beef up its military capability:

Mr. Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India are expected to sign a landmark deal for American military transport aircraft and are discussing the possible sale of jet fighters, which would escalate the Pentagon’s defense partnership with India to new heights. Japan and India are courting Southeast Asian nations with trade agreements and talk of a “circle of democracy.”

China’s primary objective in holding these areas is to link the wayward provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet (Xizang), giving Beijing the ability easily move troops in case of major uprisings.  They also want to control any potential invasion or smuggling activity, especially from Pakistan and Central Asia, by Islamic extremist ,  and Tibetan and Uyghur nationalists.   Lastly, China wishes to secure trade route for oil supplies as an option to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.  This would be critical to sustaining any conflict with the United States and its allies, who control the shipping lanes.

India’s concerns have primarily been primarily nationalistic, secondarily security related.  The security concerns are not simply preventing China from having access to the Indian plains, in the event of invasion,  but also having to do with Pakistan.  China has long been an ally of Pakistan, but there support has been wavering since the 1990’s.  This is likely due to China’s growing concern over Islamic extremism in South and Central Asia.  China is well aware of the Pakistani intelligences’  penchant for using highly volatile  Islamic extremists as proxies in it’s struggle with India.  Still, China does work with Pakistan  on military and missile development, and major infrastructure projects, such as deep-water ports.    Further, China is continuing to expand roads and rail in the region (e.g. new train line to Nepal).  These trend will likely continue as it is strategically important for China.

The worst case scenario is that China becomes increasingly aggressive in its territorial claims as it becomes more fearful of potential conflict with the United States in the East and South China Seas.  This will lead to China being more concerned over the Indian – U.S. relationship and the safety of its oil supplies, which will make it more aggressive toward it’s territorial claims in the Himalayas.

India, in turn, will continue to be forced by increasing domestic nationalist pressure to respond by taking a more aggressive posture on it’s border. Due to the fact it is at a clear military disadvantage, it will probably rely more on its nuclear deterrent. and relationship with Washington.  If China responds in kind, the ramifications could cause a domino effect  effecting every nation from Pakistan to Japan.  This is unlikely, but nationalistic sentiment can create irrational actors.

The key to stopping escalation, is for both sides to recognize the status quo for the interim, and focus on confidence building projects and trade relations.  It is unlikely that New Dehlia and Beijing will stop seeing each other as potential military threats, but the history of this conflict, speaks of two nations whom have often misread each other due to lack of informal communication links at various levels of government.   Perhaps in the future, after forming a better working relationship, India and China can sit down and discuss these issues, just as China has with Russia, it is not in either nations long term interest to have a cold war with a large nuclear armed nation on their border, especially when both nations are in the process of developing their economies to industrialized levels.