In international relations theory, there’s a lot of talk about the offensive advantage, that being the advantage a country gains by striking first in a military conflict. There’s comparatively less written about the defensive advantage. When a country is attacked, the victim population is galvanized against the attacker and neutral states may also turn against the attacking state. This is not a new or novel concept. In fact, it’s as old as war history itself. As Thucydides recounts, when the Athenians contemplated an attack on the neutral island of Melos, the Melians argued:
Is it not certain that you will make enemies of all states who are at present neutral, when they see what is happening here and naturally conclude that in course of time you will attack them too? Does not this mean that you are strengthening the enemies you have already and are forcing others to become your enemies even against their intentions and their inclinations?
The authors of NSC-68, the so-called blueprint of the Cold War, levied similar arguments against preventive war against the Soviet Union:
…[A] surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that it was a “just war” and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, proportionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory international order among nations. Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict.
And two recent events demonstrate the exact same thing. The latest Wikileaks documents include a quote from Robert Gates that an attack on Iran would “[unify] the Iranian people to be forever embittered against the attacker.” And the international uproar over North Korea’s recent attack further elucidates the point. On a case by case basis, analysts understand this phenomenon very well. But, as far as I know, it’s a relatively underexplored area and hasn’t really been developed into a coherent theory.
