Been a busy week on the Afghanistan issue. Earlier this week, the press was filled with reports of the release of two new National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), one on Afghanistan and the second on Pakistan. Yesterday, the White House released the Afghanistan and Pakistan review. I’ll address the NIE’s first.
Classified Intelligence Reports Leaked to the Press by Government Officials
I find it interesting that with all of the controversy surrounding the Wikileaks scandal no one seems to find it strange that the general public found out about the new intelligence estimates via leaks of classified information by government officials to the press. Perhaps it’s because it happens so routinely (examples: Books like Bob Woodward’s Obama’s War) it doesn’t raise any red flags but why is it allowed? I’m referring to rules government employees who have security clearances agree to abide by not the First Amendment rights of the press. The New York Times article says the reports findings “were described by a number of American officials who read the reports’ executive summaries”. The LA Times article stated: “The officials declined to be named because they were discussing classified data.”
During my time working for the government, I avoided Washington DC assignments like the plague so perhaps these are “tacitly approved controlled leaks” and a routine way of doing business. All I know is for those of us who operated at military commands outside of DC if you lost or couldn’t account for even a single piece of classified paper you risked being brought up on charges and thrown in jail. If it’s illegal for the person or persons who leaked classified information to Wikileaks then it would seem to me it’s also wrong for “officials” to leak classified information to the press. I’m just saying. Just my thoughts and perhaps the “officials” had been given approval to talk to the press.
That said, it’s interesting that both reports suggest the intelligence community has a more negative view of how things are going in the Afghan war in direct contrast with Pentagon officials who believe the administration’s strategy is “turning around the Afghanistan war.” According to the New York Times, the intelligence reports “…say there is a limited chance of success unless Pakistan hunts down insurgents operating from havens on its Afghan border…American military commanders and senior Pentagon officials have already criticized the reports as out of date and say that the cut-off date for the Afghanistan report, Oct. 1, does not allow it to take into account what the military cites as tactical gains in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces in the south in the six weeks since. Pentagon and military officials also say the reports were written by desk-bound Washington analysts who have spent limited time, if any, in Afghanistan and have no feel for the war.”
The news article quotes one defense official saying “You are missing at least 2 1/2 months of intensive operations with the full complement of surge forces,’ said a senior defense official, who added that intelligence analysts lack the “‘proximity and perspective that our forces have who are on the ground living this every single day.'” In response the article quotes “A senior intelligence official refuted’ that claim, saying, ‘The notion that intelligence officers aren’t on the ground in Afghanistan and on the front lines in the fight against terrorism is preposterous. Our people are working side by side with the United States military and our foreign partners to thwart our common enemies’.” Another press reports quote intelligence officials saying they were monitoring and reporting on recent developments but saw nothing that made them change their conclusions.
The question I would ask the intelligence community is who actually wrote the NIE? As I understand and experienced the process it’s usually written by someone in the CIA DC crowd who then sends it out to the other intelligence agencies for coordination. If there are dissenting views they’re added as a footnote at the bottom of the page in print so small you need a magnifying glass to read it.
It would appear to me that the most qualified person to write the NIE and staff it among the 16 intelligence agencies would be someone from the Intelligence Staff of US Central Command, the organization responsible for running the war. As the intelligence community officials reportedly said there are large numbers of intelligence personnel assigned to the war zone but were any of them given a chance to edit and comment on the NIE? I don’t know but if they weren’t I would not put much stock in the report. Because of the way NIE’s are done, oftentimes the most qualified analysts don’t get a chance to participate in the process. I experienced a lot of “Washington DC Intelligence Analysts Know Best” situations during my time working for the government. Sometimes depending on the analysis topic, that’s true; but not always. It is also worth noting that I also received a lot of tremendous support from the DC crowd over the years. How to ensure that the best analysts are included in this process is a thorny problem and one that I’m sure is being looked at by the intelligence community.
I’ve read the unclassified version of the Afghanistan and Pakistan war review and saw no surprises. I was disappointed to see that the Obama administration is sticking to the July 2011 timeline to start drawing down U.S. troops. I’d hoped for a different conclusion after a 2014 deadline for handing the effort over to the Afghan government was discussed and agreed upon at the recent NATO meeting in Lisbon. It’s obvious; President Obama is doing a balancing act between the falling support for the conflict by the American public and the necessary cost of bringing the Afghan conflict to a successful conclusion. I do not envy his task.
The report opened by reiterating the overall goal of U.S. strategy in the region: “The core goal…remains to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qa’ida in the region and to prevent its return to either country….While the strategy is showing progress across all three assessed areas of al-Qa’ida, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the challenge remains to make our gains durable and sustainable.”
Looking first at Al-Qa’ida, the report repeated a quote from a talk the President gave at West Point last year: “Our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al-Qa’ida. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak.”
The reports cites gains: “There has been significant progress in disrupting and dismantling the Pakistan-based leadership and cadre of al-Qa’ida over the past year…senior leadership has been depleted, the group’s safe haven is smaller and less secure, and its ability to prepare and conduct terrorist operations has been degraded in important ways.”
The report go on to signal caution: “The losses…have diminished – but not halted – the group’s ability advance operations…or to support and inspire regional affiliates…eventual strategic defeat will be most effectively achieved through the denial of sanctuaries in the region and the elimination of the group’s remaining leadership cadre…Even achieving these goals…will not completely eliminate the terrorist threat to U.S. interest.”
Addressing Pakistan the report began by stating that country was central to our efforts “to defeat al-Qa’ida and prevent its return to the region….Progress in our relationship with Pakistan over the last year has been substantial, but also uneven…Pakistan has made progress against extremist safe haven, taking action in six of seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. These gains came at great cost, as Pakistan has endured thousands of casualties in their military ranks and among their civilian population.”
Addressing the safe haven issue, “the denial of extremist safe havens will require greater cooperation with Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan. Furthermore, the denial of extremist safe havens cannot be achieved through military means alone, but must continue to be advanced by effective development strategies.”
The last part of the review addressed Afghanistan. The key part stated: “As a result of our integrated efforts in 2010, we are setting the conditions to begin transition to Afghan security lead in early 2011 and to begin a responsible, conditions-based U.S. troop reduction in July 2011. Moreover, at the recent NATO Lisbon Summit, we forged a broad Afghan and international consensus, agreeing on a path to complete the transition by the end of 2014.”
Think I’ll end here. Getting ready to go back to Alabama to spend Christmas with my Mom. Don’t know if I’ll have much time to blog until the New Year but at a minimum will put out and end of year assessment. I continue to watch the Korean situation closely. I also participated in a Department of Defense Bloggers Round table on Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan. Those women are doing great things and I will find time to file a blog on their efforts.
