Armenia
I’ve already written at length on the wreckage of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process, surely the biggest story of 2010 for Armenia and perhaps the entire Caucasus. So let’s turn to a few less-reported issues from Armenia, including the prosecution of journalists and activists.
On 28 December, Davit Kiramijian, 19, and Sargis Gevorgian, 18, received two-year suspended sentences for “violent conduct” and “hooliganism” related to a demonstration that turned nasty on 31 May in Yerevan.
Gevorgian’s sister Ani, a journalist with the pro-opposition “Haykakan Zhamanak” newspaper, was arrested and subsequently released, although her legal status at publication time was unclear.
In November, opposition journalist Nikol Pashnian, already serving a four-year prison term for organizing riots that followed the flawed 2008 presidential election, was reportedly assaulted by masked men in his cell. He has since been moved to the high-security Artik prison. His lawyer says that the attack was likely motivated by editorials that Pashnian had written (while serving his sentence) on the topic of corruption in Armenia’s prison system.
Independent television had a rough time in Armenia in 2010, with GALA TV having its assets frozen and new equipment seized by the government, which accused GALA of being in arrears on its taxes. Both GALA and A1+ TV, known for its staunch independence when it was pulled off the air in 2002, lost bids for digital licensure this month.
Perhaps the most stunning revelation was the released Wikileaks cables detailing the alleged transfer of weapons from Armenia to Iran, where they were used to kill US troops in Iraq, according to the document.
There are now at least two relevant documents on the Wikileaks site: the cable written in December of 2008, which caused the stir in the press, and a follow-up cable written in January of 2009. The former cable contained the text of a secret letter from Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte to President Serge Sargsyan outlining the “deep concerns about Armenia’s transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.” The letter went on to threaten sanctions if the arms transfers continued: “Notwithstanding the close relationship between our countries, neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this case.”
The president’s office and foreign ministry have declined to comment “on secret documents of other countries,” and there has been a high level of indignation from the president’s party (the Republican Party of Armenia) and from the rival Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun).
However, the denials and reluctance to comment have focused on the first of the Wikileaks document. The second cable reveals that despite initial denials, President Sargsyan “acknowledged the weapons purchase” the following month.
The relevant text is here:
“Sargsian acknowledged the weapons purchase from Bulgaria, and neither he nor the NSS Chairman challenged our information that these weapons were then transferred to Iran/Iraq. Both men indicated that there would be an investigation into how the weapons went from Armenia to Iran/Iraq. Hakobian seemed to indicate that the blame most probably lay with the Bulgarians and perhaps unauthorized Armenians acting on their own. Probably in an attempt to minimize U.S. demands, they also noted that there have been significant reforms and personnel changes since the incident. The President reiterated that cooperation with the U.S., including on security and export control, was an Armenian priority, and that the GOAM, with the NSS as the lead, would discuss the proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the expert team on January 15.
“…Somewhat surprisingly, the President has reversed the mantra he has repeated for the last four months that the weapons transfer “did not happen and could not have happened.” It’s not clear what has prompted this abrupt climb down, but it is probably some combination of solid evidence, a compelling presentation, an understanding of the consequences non- cooperation could bring, a desire to get off on the right foot with the new administration — and a Soviet-style calculation that they can sign the MOU, but probably won’t really have to implement it.”
Georgia
I’ve devoted a lot of attention to Georgia on this blog, and am thus reluctant to rehash what I’ve already covered.
All in all, I think that Georgia will remain relatively stable until the next presidential election and probably beyond. There is little chance of a renewed Russian invasion since they have what they want: a large chunk of Georgian territory adjacent to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the perhaps-never-to-be-built Nabucco pipeline.
I visited the South Ossetia-Georgia boundary line in November of this year, and can attest that the situation is more peaceful than ever, with Russian snipers having withdrawn from their previous fortified position near the village of Ergneti, although I was told that Russian army units are situated on a hillside roughly eight kilometers from the boundary line. If true, this is a clear violation of the 2008 French-brokered peace agreement.
(See my pictures taken at the front below.)
Irakli Alasania, former Georgian ambassador to the UN, is probably the politician to watch now that opposition leader Nino Burjanadze has managed to convince her fellow Georgians that she is too radical to govern and a tool of the Kremlin. Alasania has his own image problems, including a perception amongst some Georgians that he is tainted due to his post at the National Security Council during the Eduard Shevardnaze era. Some Georgians I talk to dismiss Alasania as a “former KGB apparatchik,” and while this may not be fair, Alasania will face some harsh questions if he does decide to run.
That’s about it for now. Will keep updating, and I expect to return once again to the South Caucasus in 2011.
Best wishes in the new year –
Karl Rahder
