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The Government Collapses

On Wednesday, January 12th,  Hizballah and its allies withdrew 11 of their ministers, causing Lebanon’s  government to collapse. Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri is now a caretaker, and it is unclear what his role will be in the formation of a new government, if any.  At the heart of the dispute is the UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which is investigating the murder of Saad Hariri’s father, Rafik Hariri. The STL is rumored to suspect members of Hizballah in the case.

After attempts by Saudi Arabia and Syria (each highly influential in Lebanon) to resolve the conflict failed, Hizballah took matters into its own hands and collapsed the government. Saudi Arabia reportedly ended its efforts to negotiate a solution, but high-level representatives from Turkey and Qatar were in Beirut this week trying one last ditch effort to stave of a crisis.

On February 14th, 2005, Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others were killed in an explosion near the Beirut seaside.  Over the years in Lebanon, particularly throughout the last decade, there have been dozens of assassinations of people who would be considered  critics of Syria. So when Hariri was killed, blame was quickly placed on Syria.

The circumstantial case against Syria is strong. Rafik Hariri was a Saudi-backed, Sunni rival for power in Lebanon.  Syria’s President, Bashar Assad, had reportedly threatened Hariri just before his death. At the time, Lebanon was under Syrian occupation. Damascus had thousands of troops in Lebanon, as well as an extensive intelligence apparatus, and control over multiple Palestinian militias. Essentially, Syria had motive and opportunity, as well as a history of violence. Most everyone suspected the Syrian’s to be named in any STL indictment.

Over the course of 2010, however, Hizballah became convinced that some of its members would be indicted by the STL.  This was unwelcomed news to the Party of God, who dismissed the charges as an Israeli plot to discredit the Resistance. Hizballah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah claimed he had evidence of Israeli involvement in Hariri’s death. From summer to winter, pressure mounted on the organization to find a way out.

Prime Minister Hariri assured Hizballah that its position in Lebanon was safe, that the group’s weapons were not up for discussion, and that if Hizballah members were named, they would be considered “rogue elements” only. But what Hizballah really wanted was for Hariri to publicly denounce the Tribunal which, again, was investigating his father’s murder. This he would not do. The Saudis and the Syrians had been meeting to broker a deal that would be acceptable to both Hariri and Hizballah. When those efforts failed, Hizballah’s coalition withdrew their ministers and the government collapsed.

In Lebanon, the mood seems to be that of anxious indifference. On one hand, Lebanon has been without a functioning government for over thirty years and people still go about their lives. Even when Lebanon does have a government, nothing much ever gets accomplished. So for the Lebanese, while not having a government is unfortunate, life must go on.

On the other hand, Lebanon is also entering familiar-but-uncharted waters. Two of the major power brokers could not find a solution to the problem and the situation is now entirely in the hands of Hizballah, which gives every non-Shiite a cause for concern.

Hizballah seems to be painting itself into a corner with its actions.  Collapsing the government does nothing to prevent the indictments, and it makes the group look guilty.  They still have to worry about how it is going to look when the United Nations Tribunal indicts the most popular Shiite group in the world for killing a prominent Sunni politician, which would greatly complicate maters for Hizballah in Lebanon going forward. Concerned with this, Nasrallah stated last Friday that “there will never be a war between the Sunnis and Shiites” in Lebanon. Maybe not an intentional one, but the possibility exists.

Hizballah also faces the challenge of installing  a new, more favroable prime minister. In Lebanon’s confessional system, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim.  If Hizballah puts forth a pro-Hizballah Sunni (of which there are only a handful) for the role, it risks alienating a major portion of Lebanese Sunnis who view Hariri as their leader. If the group does manage to install a pro-Hizballah politician, it would be of little use  for the new Prime Minister  to condemn the STL, as the only person who can truly discredit the Tribunal is Saad Hariri himself. Now Hariri can’t condemn the Tribunal even if he wanted to, as it would appear to all that he was forced into it.

It’s unclear what Hizballah’s move is here.  By collapsing the government, they have essentially played their hand. There is nothing anyone in Lebanon can do to halt what is happening in the UN tribunal. Hizballah could take to the streets, but who would they clash with? They know they cannot take charge of Lebanon without causing a civil war. The danger comes if Hizballah attempts to form a new government that alienates the Sunnis, whose March 14 coalition had a majority in government just last week.

Lebanon is no stranger to sudden shows of force from Hizballah (see May 2008), but any long term plan by the group to try and dominate the country would mean trouble. The Lebanese would fight back, and in the absolute worst case scenario, we could see regional jihadis pouring into Lebanon fighting to defend Sunni from Shia. While unlikely, the thought of such a turn of events is enough to worry Nasrallah , as well as concerned parties in Washington, Paris, Riyadh, Ankara, and Doha.

Regionally, this is another round in the battle between Syria and Iran on one side, and the United States and its allies on the other. Syria and Iran back Hizballah’s  March 8 coalition, the US and company back Hariri’s March 14. Washington wants to see the STL through to the end, and it is rumored that the US had a hand in scuttling the the Saudi-Syrian initiative.

Syria’s position in all of this is noteworthy. First, they were attempting to broker a deal between March 8 and March 14 that would see their position in Lebanon strengthen, by default at the expense of Hizballah. Second, whether or not “rogue elements” of Hizballah participated in the Hariri hit, it is still likely that Damascus  gave the order. Hizballah was critical of the STL back when Syria was the focus, but when Hizballah itself apparently became the target of investigators, that is when the wheels came off. The Party of  God was outraged at the possibility of being held accountable for allegedly participating in an assassination which they did not order. For Syria, it appears that Hizballah’s position (or at least its reputation) in Lebanon will be weakened while the group is being blamed for something that Syria allegedly ordered. It will be interesting to see what affect this will have on the relationship between Hizballah and Syria, as well as Syria and Iran.

There are three things to watch for going forward. First  is the position Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt will take on the issue. Jumblatt had distanced himself from March 14 after it became clear that Syria would be returning to Lebanon in nearly-full force, but it will be interesting to see if he stands by Hariri through this crisis. Jumblatt was a friend of Hariri Senior and was angered and saddened his death. Second,  are the negotiations involving Qatar and Turkey. Their foreign ministers have been meeting with Hariri and Nasrallah to find a way out. Third,  Judge Daniel Fransen of the STL now has six to ten weeks to decide from the evidence presented in the indictments whether or not to issue arrest warrants. On that time frame, we should  see an announcement by early March at the latest.

For now, Lebanon is in a holding pattern as it waits for the Judges decision to be made public. Rafik Hariri was killed on Valentine’s Day six years ago. It will be interesting to see what happens on the anniversary.

 

Author

Patrick Vibert

Patrick Vibert works as a geopolitical consultant focusing on the Middle East. He has a BA in Finance and an MA in International Relations. He has traveled extensively throughout Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He lives in Washington DC and attends lectures at the Middle East Institute whenever he can.

Area of Focus
Geopolitics; International Relations; Middle East

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