Asia’s two most prominent regional bodies, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), were formed with similar objectives that include accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development among their members. Despite being around for decades, both have been far from successful, while simultaneously proving unhelpful to America’s security strategy in Asia.
AEI Resident Scholar, Michael Auslin, recently released a report titled “Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy” in which he offers recommendations for the foreign and defense policy that the United States should adopt in the Indo-Pacific region. His three pronged strategy consists of “an enhanced, superior, forward-based U.S. presence in the region; an innovative new approach to allies and partners; and a political goal of helping create a more liberal Indo-Pacific region.” I believe that these proposals provide the opportunity to not only tackle America’s security concerns in Asia but concurrently address the growth and development challenges of ASEAN and SAARC member nations.
The key to Auslin’s strategy is a move away by the United States from the traditional “hub-and-spoke” model of alliances to a set of “concentric triangles” as shown in the figure above.
The outer triangle links Japan, South Korea, India and Australia. All these nations, with the exception of India, have bilateral alliances with the United States. Explicitly involving India in the anchor group of nations for security cooperation will help facilitate the growth of the United States and India’s relationship beyond one of trade partners to defense allies, an important and urgent step from a U.S. perspective given the unabated growth of Chinese influence in the region. It is also important to note that none of the outer triangle nations, except India, are members of the ASEAN or SAARC. It is imperative that the above security alliance does not replace the existing regional bodies in Asia but rather uses them to promote democracy and liberty. In fact, India’s security alliance with the United States and other Asian powers might be just the vote of confidence that it needs to put its acrimonious relations with Pakistan aside and embrace its position as the economic powerhouse in the SAARC responsible for taking the lead in raising the living standards of the poverty-stricken people in the region. Another dynamic that the United States can capitalize on is India’s opposition to the inclusion of China to the list of SAARC’s observor nations. By taking a more active observor role, the United States can integrate other SAARC member countries with geographic proximity to China into the larger American network. This might have limited immediate benefits but potentially significant long-term advantages of having strategically well-positioned allies. From the perspective of the SAARC member nations, the assistance of the United States in transforming the body from a group of infighting nations that represent a timid attempt at regional cooperation to a European Union style organization with mutual trade and freer visa regimes will help the members utilize their competitive advantages of proximity and ease of transportation to compete globally as an economic bloc.
Auslin’s inner triangle connects Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. While all these nations are members of the ASEAN, a couple of large and prominent U.S. allies, Philippines and Thailand, as well as smaller member nations like Brunei, Burma, Cambodia and Laos are excluded. The reasons for the inclusion of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are obvious while Auslin justifies Vietnam’s addition due to its “strategic location and security differences with China.” Philippines and Thailand’s exclusion is based on the reasoning that “Philippines has been tilting closer to China in recent years, while Thailand continues to suffer from domestic political instability.” As in the case of SAARC, Auslin’s security-motivated recommendation provides a potential solution to the inability of the ASEAN to follow through on its ambitious projects to meet the growth and development challenges of its member nations. The reasons for ASEAN’s failures include lopsided membership – a wide spectrum of development among member nations – and an inordinate desire to latch onto Chinese growth rather than generate internal dynamism. Connecting the leading ASEAN nations as part of Auslin’s inner triangle will not only serve U.S. military interests but also provide a separate forum for these four countries to strengthen relationships among themselves, with the United States and the outer triangle nations. The growth and development that these partnerships will foster will help these countries take a leadership role in the ASEAN and provide incentives to the excluded members to embrace economic liberalization and democracy.
Michael Auslin has drawn up a regional strategy that will go a long way in ensuring security in the Indo-Pacific region. Executed well and with a strong emphasis on the political goal of creating a more liberal Indo-Pacific region, the United States can also help facilitate unprecedented economic growth and social development through a setting where the ASEAN and SAARC are workshops, and not just talkshops.
