Though the ultimate outcome of Egypt’s revolution remains uncertain (it’s still possible that it might wind up not being a revolution at all), it is worth asking: what factors make security forces more likely to decide to side with protesters?
Michael Auslin flirts with this question in relation to China at the National Review. He finds success in China unlikely because, among other reasons:
Perhaps the Egyptian military decided it could hang on to its perquisites best by nudging Mubarak out the door, but the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] must deal not just with one man but with an entire party that can’t be dismissed from power as easily. That could change, but for now, the Chinese military seems, if anything, to have identified itself more fully than ever with the legitimacy of the current regime, even as younger and more nationalistic elements in the PLA look to expand the military’s power relative to the party.
Ethnic divisions and recruiting patterns make it unlikely that Bahrain’s military will side with the protesters, notes MSNBC:
That’s in part because ranks of the Egyptian army are filled by universal conscription, meaning most Egyptians have close relatives serving in the military, said Pintak [of Washington State University]. It also had a history of staying out of domestic conflicts, leaving it to the police to deal with those considered threats to the Mubarak regime.
The Bahraini army, on the other hand, is in large part composed of Sunni recruits from countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Jordan, who are essentially nothing more than paid mercenaries, said Jones. It also has a long history of suppressing the opposition.
“In Egypt, the army rolled in and kind of saved the day,” said Jones [professor at Rutgers]. “There is no possibility that the Bahraini army would behave in the same way. They are completely bound up with the regime and will do its bidding, no matter what.”
And in Libya,the country’s tribalism (and the fact that tribes are coming out against Qadaffi) has made it easier for Qadaffi to lose control of his security forces:
So we have a couple models for potential success: Egypt (where the army as a unit decided to side with the protesters, perhaps to better “hang on to its perquisites,” as Michael Auslin surmises) and Libya (where tribalism has made it easier for the army’s unity to splinter). And a couple models for likely failure: China (where power is more dispersed and thus more difficult to displace) and Bahrain (where religious identity binds the military to the ruling elite). This is, of course, not an exhaustive analysis, as there’s also Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, even Wisconsin… but it is in the interest of protesters, rulers, and observers like ourselves to try to categorize these things so we can better predict and understand how each situation will pan out. How can we best do it in a way that is both accurate and simple to understand?
