The debate about whether the United States should use military force in Libya (and if so in what capacity) is on. Here’s one version of the debate from the PBS Newshour. It’s between two former State Department Directors of Policy Planning: Richard Haas (who served under George W. Bush) and Ann-Marie Slaughter (who just left the Obama administration):
Haas offers some standard arguments against intervention: Libya isn’t in our strategic interest, we could get stuck in a quagmire, we don’t really know who the rebels are, etc. Slaughter offers some more unconventional arguments (and by that I mean, I’ve heard these arguments offered less frequently so far). She argues that Libya is in the United States’ national interest because anti-Americanism is fueled by the perception that the U.S. supports Middle Eastern dictatorships. Thus, taking decisive action to topple a dictatorship would serve as a blow to radical anti-Americanists.
If we’re talking about the strategic value of political effects of intervention, there are a few other things we should consider. First, Gadhafi would use foreign intervention to try to discredit the Libyan opposition. He is already doing this. As the Newshour reports, Gadhafi recently said of the potential foreign intervention:
It appears that it is a plot against Libya. In the end, it means a determination to take control of Libya and to steal their oil. Then the Libyan people will take up arms against them.
Though there may be material benefits to, say, implementing a no-fly zone, there will be political effects that will make an ultimate resolution more difficult.
Second, it will be difficult to acquire UN Security Council authorization for a no-fly zone, or any other forceful intervention in Libya. Thus, intervention would be illegal under international law. Now this might not play a major role in how Libya unfolds, but it will certainly play a role in how future situations unfold. When NATO took action in Kosovo in 1999, an illegal operation deemed “legitimate” by many in the West,” it opened the door for Russia to undertake a similarly justified operation in Georgia in 2008. Similarly, intervention in Libya could be a bit of a time-consistency dilemma. Just like negotiating with pirates risks encouraging future acts of piracy, violating international law in this instance could give a stronger hand to future violators that the U.S. opposes.
Third, Slaughter asserts that there is widespread support for intervention. The rebels have asked for a no-fly zone, she notes, as has the Organization of the Islamic Conference. But does she overstate the multilateral support for intervention? The Arab League has come out against Western intervention, though they continue to discuss the issue. And the African Union, though it hasn’t come out on the issue either way, is unlikely to publicly endorse the idea. So while there is multilateral support for a no-fly zone, it remains a controversial option on the international stage.
As far as I’m concerned, these points don’t definitively mean that the West should not intervene, but they should be considered as part of the debate.
