FITNA IN IRAN, BUT NO REVOLUTION
The following piece was written by Brandon Friedman, a research fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University (TAU). It was first published by TAU’s Iran Pulse website.
In the last six to eight months several important Iranian newspapers such as Javan, which is associated with President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Khabar, which is associated with the Speaker of Majlis, ‘Ali Larijani, have featured front page headlines using the term fitna. Fitna is a term often used to refer to sedition within the Islamic umma.
More recently, government and religious officials in Iran have been using the term to label and condemn political opponents within the regime. In autumn 2010, columnists called for an end to fitna within the ruling “principlist” camp in reference to serious disputes between supporters of President Ahmadinejad and those close to Larijani. Some say this dispute reached its climax with Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of Foreign Minister Mottaki in December 2010. The term fitna was also used in the debate leading up to President Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reform program this past winter. Clerics who were opposed to removing subsidies called for an end to those sowing economic fitna, alluding to Ahmadinejad. The repeated use of the term fitna in the Iranian political discourse suggests internal political battles within the ruling camp may be intensifying in response to the regime’s perception that it is under siege and lacks popular legitimacy following the 2009 post-election unrest.
Fitna has also been used to refer to the regime’s opponents, such as the symbolic leaders of the 2009 post-election Green Movement, Mir Hossein Musavi and Medhi Karrubi. However, powerful clerics such as Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Khatami have gone beyond fitna and condemned members of the Green Movement and those participating in the ongoing protests against the regime as committing the Islamic crime of moharebeh, which means waging war against society and God. Moharebeh is punishable by death in Iran. Indeed, following the renewed protests in the streets of Tehran two weeks ago on 25 Bahman, some members of the Majlis even called for Musavi and Karrubi’s execution.
The emergence of fitna in the recent mainstream political discourse in Iran may reflect a growing sense of threat among principlists who fear that the opposition is actively trying to undermine the Islamic Republic’s leadership since 2009. In other words, those denouncing the regime’s critics as committing fitna seem to be attempting to silence dissent and opposition in the public sphere. Further, not only has the substance of political rhetoric escalated but the current political leadership’s response to the opposition has changed in practice and taken on a new character.
Since his appointment in August 2009, Iran’s Minister of Intelligence, Hojjat-al-Islam Heydar Moslehi, has taken an increasingly prominent role in domestic politics and public diplomacy, and may be leading the regime’s response to internal dissent. Prior to becoming Intelligence Minister, Moslehi was Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i’s representative in the Basij paramilitary force. The Basij have had an increasingly important role in the regime’s effort to violently confront and suppress protesters who have taken to the streets since 2009.
Unlike the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the regime in Iran has increasingly perceived itself as being under attack in a soft war since the mass post-election protests began in June 2009. Intelligence Minister Moslehi’s prominent public profile may reflect a new emphasis on using the intelligence apparatus to confront domestic opponents.
In a speech in Qom in early December 2010, Moslehi explained that there were at least 80 institutions, associations, foundations, and companies that had almost $2 billion annually to use to subvert the regime. Recently, Moslehi accused Musavi’s foreign spokesman who is based in France, Amir Arjomand, and Karrubi’s spokesman, who is based in Washington D.C., Mojtaba Vahedi, of being agents of foreign powers who receive their orders from foreign intelligence agencies.
In addition to Moslehi’s verbal attacks against spokespersons associated with the opposition, both Musavi and Karrubi were arrested after weeks of house arrest. As symbols of the Green Movement, Musavi and Karrubi represent the opposition; however, during the past two weeks their significance to the Green Movement has been debated among protesters who are discussing how the movement can move forward despite their detention.
These social media debates reflect real questions for the Green Movement and Iran’s broader political opposition: Is there a common goal shared by the regime’s opponents? Is there a leadership structure capable of sustaining a mass movement and surviving the regime’s determined, institutional efforts to penetrate and suppress the opposition?
There have been reports that the Green Movement will continue to organize protests across Iran every Tuesday. Two weeks ago there were reports of clashes between protesters and security forces in Tehran, Mashad, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz. There have also been reports that the opposition is preparing itself for renewed action during Iran’s Norouz celebration at the end of March. Yet despite the protesters ongoing efforts to defy the regime and take to the streets, presently there seems to be stagnant quality to the demonstrations that does not yet suggest an increasing momentum or forward progress. Perhaps more importantly, the Green Movement has not yet created broad alliances for action with important segments of Iranian society, such as the bazaar merchants or the labor unions. This may be due to the regime’s effectiveness at combating dissent and squeezing civil society.
It is hard to say what the future holds for Iran, but it is clear that the regime presently holds the upper hand. It has successfully prevented most foreign media from covering the ongoing demonstrations and there has been little domestic reporting on the opposition during the past month. As the regime’s instruments of repression become more sophisticated and ruthless, civil society moves further underground making it very difficult to follow new developments within the Green Movement. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see how the opposition responds to the regime’s new tactics, and if it has the ability to adjust and build coalitions with other segments of society during the Norouz holiday.
