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Libya's 'No Fly Zone': Dangers and Future Policy of Entering Human Rights Wars

Libya's 'No Fly Zone': Dangers and Future Policy of Entering Human Rights WarsThe international community with support from The Arab League have finally decided yesterday to establish a “no-fly zone” over Gadhafi’s forces in Libya. Whether or not any meaningful actions will take place remains to be seen, but it is claimed by Gadhafi’s generals that they will be assaulting the rebel stronghold of Benghazi on Sunday. The greater importance of assisting Arab democratic movements will likely be defined in Libya as factional fighting in Bahrain brings Saudi forces and Iranian interests into a growing conflict in the region between democracy and dictatorships, between Sunni and Shi’a and a resulting nuclear region being claimed by Iran. The methods and manner in which innocent citizens are protected in Libya and the degree of physical and coercive involvement by the international community will form the basis of international action to protect human rights in the Middle East as a whole past Libya and towards other fallen regimes. In this case and with support of Libya’s neighbours, the international community has finally committed to action in Libya, but the security challenge of Gadhafi’s anti-aircraft network might determine the degree of protection that can be provided in Libya and all future regimes.

Libya possesses a number of ex-Soviet and French aircraft, that while stylish, are mostly from the 70s and early 80s generation of combat aircraft with the exception of SU-27s. The Russian SU-27 could pose a great threat to British, French, NATO and American aircraft that will likely fly cap over Libya’s airspace, but most of Libya’s aircraft are older MiG models which NATO aircraft were specifically designed to counter. The real threat from Libya is the series of Russian and French anti-aircraft missiles which have claimed one US plane in 1986 and might pose a threat to the UN mission to help Libya’s rebels. The reality is that the technology of Libya’s anti-aircraft missiles lack modern capabilities and might be at the same level as Iraq’s air defences in the 1990s. Modern long range systems like the S-300/SA-10 Grumble which use phased radar arrays are not possessed by Libya and systems to shoot down low flying aircraft like the TOR-M1/SA-15 Gauntlet and the BUK-M1/SA-11 Gadfly are not in Gadhafi’s inventory. Anti-aircraft guns such as the ZSU-23-2 and ZPU-4 have been seen on film being used by rebels in various versions and were proven most useful a generation ago.

Libya’s main air defence and what should worry the UN Security Council the most is the SA-7 portable anti-aircraft missile. Like the shoulder launched Stinger, this Russian version is possessed by both sides of the conflict in Libya and can become a dangerous threat and are hard to detect. Beyond the SA-7s, Libya’s air defence is made up of mostly dated anti-aircraft missiles. Much of Libya’s defence is made up of S-75/SA-2 missiles, that are best known for their effectiveness in the Vietnam war, and the S-125/SA-3 Goa missiles which claimed one victory in knocking out one US jet in 1986. The greatest threats to UN forces might come from the mobile French Crotale anti-aircraft missile system. Likely one of the older versions of the Crotale such as the Crotale 4000 or 5000 series, these missiles could pose a significant threat to low flying aircraft and are likely used in line with Gadafi’s tank forces in order to protect his T-62s and T-72 and very old T-55 variants which are pushing into rebel strongholds as you read this. The greatest threat and the least amount of missiles are the S-200/SA-5 Gammon long range anti-aircraft system that could pose a significant threat to Allied aircraft. Despite these relatively advanced missiles, generations of countermeasures and methods to destroy AA missiles and radars have been developed specifically to counterbalance such systems.

A likely strike on Libya might show how difficult it could be to affect such a UN Resolution on Iran if similar human rights abuses appear or if the nuclear issues turns into a hot conflict. Unlike Libya, Iran does possess the TOR-M1/SA-15 Gauntlet system which claims to be able to shoot down cruise missiles as well as other low flying aircraft, but in a move to limit Iran’s long range AA capability, Russia stopped a sale of S-300/SA-10 Grumble missiles in the last few months.

It is likely the case that such weapon systems create a great reluctance by the international community to get involved in situations like Libya, but with Darfur and Rwanda still staining the UN and its lack of action in Africa the action by European nations, the US and perhaps even members of the Arab League will form the nature and method of how to approach internal conflict in nations for years to come.

 

Author

Richard Basas

Richard Basas, a Canadian Masters Level Law student educated in Spain, England, and Canada (U of London MA 2003 LL.M., 2007), has worked researching for CSIS and as a Reporter for the Latin America Advisor. He went on to study his MA in Latin American Political Economy in London with the University of London and LSE. Subsequently, Rich followed his career into Law focusing mostly on International Commerce and EU-Americas issues. He has worked for many commercial and legal organisations as well as within the Refugee Protection Community in Toronto, Canada, representing detained non-status indivduals residing in Canada. Rich will go on to study his PhD in International Law.

Areas of Focus:
Law; Economics and Commerce; Americas; Europe; Refugees; Immigration

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