EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, is not unaccustomed to criticism. A fresh wave of critique was recently dished out by the Belgium foreign minister Steven Vanackere. Ashton was attacked for her “silence” on important issues. Vanackere added that Ashton’s silence would be filled by other players (Germany, France), who Belgium would be obliged to cooperate with. British foreign minister William Hague certainly didn’t endorse the EU’s diplomatic corps, the EEAS, when he in early May announced that Britain would favor bilateral diplomacy over the fledgling European foreign policy. Of course, Europe in general terms has been slammed repeatedly in the past months over its hesitant and divisive stance in Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt etc, etc.
At a glance, it would seem that Europe’s common foreign policy ambitions have been on a consistent disappointment since the introduction in 2010 of Lisbon Treaty and the much anticipated Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is some truth to this. However, in spite of the EU’s obvious foreign policy shortcomings, there are nuances to be added to the story of EU diplomacy.
A recent notable success was the EU securing full speaking rights in the UN. As co-blogger Maxime Larive points out, the EU will now be able to address the international community as an entity within its own rights, and enhance its image as an international actor. Aside from the UN victory, there are other, less talked about, foreign policy accomplishments.
A “Foreign Policy Scorecard” produced by the European Council on Foreign Relation paints a somewhat positive picture of the EU’s diplomatic achievements. Among other positive results, the scorecard points to the EU’s relationship with the US (for example, the EU – in the shape of the European Parliament – stood united when negotiating with the US on bank- and airline information sharing), on negotiations with Iran, and nonproliferation.
Regardless of whether or not the ECFR’s scorecard is guilty of grade inflation, it contains the most worthy point; that the Great Recession and concurrent euro crisis have downgraded the importance of foreign policy in general, and a common foreign policy in particular. The leaders of today are more introverted, and are focused on economics rather than expensive foreign adventures. Before one disregards the EU as a serious foreign policy actor in the future, it should be pointed out that the euro crisis won’t last forever. In the meantime, the EEAS will have time to set itself up and define its role in the EU’s plethoric foreign policy process.
European foreign policy is of course more than the European Council, Catherine Ashton, and the EEAS. It is the sum total of foreign policy produced by EU institutions and member states. In this sense, one should not judge Europe’s foreign policy on what EU institutions produce, but instead on the ability of Europe to promote its common interests using any of the methods it has at its disposal. For example, using smaller coalitions grouped around core member states, as was the case with Germany, France, and the UK (the EU3) in negotiations with Iran.
Although it is possible to point to some achievements it is certainly not hard to find instances where the EU has performed poorly. For example, its reluctance to intervene in Libya, or its handling of Turkish accession. Unsurprisingly, the EU is strongest when national capitols are in basic agreement. With this in mind, a centralized foreign policy process is too much to ask for – and to be honest – not something that a majority of Europeans are interested in. A judgment of the EU’s foreign policy should take into account what the EU wants to be, rather than what it ought to be.
Taking this into consideration, the EU cannot be expected to single-mindedly pursue a set of clearly defined “national interests”. Instead we can hope that the EU gradually develops a “body of policy” (in the words of the ECFR scholars an acquis diplomatique) which embodies a core set of European values and interests. In this light, it is more worrying that European capitals have acted so hesitantly in their support of democracy in the Arab states, rather than worrying that the EU’s crisis management mechanisms have proven to be inadequate. For Europe, the Arab Spring has been an immigration issue, rather than a question of democracy and liberalization. Perhaps the greatest problem for European diplomacy is the introversion of the continent, rather than its consensus seeking foreign policy chief?
