I wrote in a previous post that the IAEA Board of Governors was preparing to finally make a decision regarding referral of Syria to the UN Security Council for continuing to stonewall the IAEA and preventing safeguards inspectors from having a look at Dair Alzour. You will recall that this was the site of an alleged DPRK-built plutonium production reactor which Israeli defense forces blasted to smithereens several years ago.
Well, the BOG ponied up the bar and did it. Sort of. Technically. But, as man on the scene Mark Hibbs wrote in his Arms Control Wonk post circa June 11th, something was rotten in the State of Austria. Vienna, to be exact.
In a post entitled “A Bridge Too Far? Syria & GOV/40”, Hibbs noted that the IAEA Board’s referral of Syria to the UNSC (the text of the resolution is here) should have been an open and shut case. To wit: “The bottom line is right there in operative paragraph 1.: Syria’s construction of a covert nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and its clear breach of its Code 3.1 obligation in not submitting the design information to the IAEA in advance of that fact “constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute”. Mais non. This was not the case.
Eleven countries abstained from the final vote, including two members of the P5 – Russia and China. Fewer than half of the 35 BOG members voted for the resolution. No surprise on the first bit. The NAM strikes again on the second.
But, here ‘s the part that really bothers me. Hibbs correctly states that “The resolution reported Syria to the UNSC without the benefit of a firm judgment from the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the DG that that thing at Dair Alzour was a reactor. [Note: Because the inspectors were only able to sample the area outside of Dair Alzour, all they had to go on was some anthropogenic uranium particles “of a type not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material” but which, because of Damascus’ stonewalling, they were unable to confirm as being material which came from the alleged Pu production reactor.] Amano told the board it was ‘very likely’ a reactor, but to some people in NAM delegations, that ain’t the same as saying you know its a reactor.” Indeed.
Not only that, but, as Hibbs also notes, Amano didn’t bother to request a special inspection at Dair Alzour which, if Damascus refused, would have strengthened the IAEA’s hand in referring them to the UNSC. James Acton, former State Department nukie Mark Fitzpatrick and former IAEA DDG for Safeguards Pierre Goldschmidt suggested as such in a February 26, 2009 Carnegie Proliferation Analysis. Hence, the determination that there “very likely” was a reactor at Dair Alzour, something the IAEA safeguards inspectors were unable to confirm on the ground. What Amano did do was use intelligence information provided to the Agency by the U.S. and via some unclassified French origin satellite radar data.
Some would wonder about Amano’s tactics. I fear that the way he came to the mushy conclusion contained in GOV/2011/40 about the Dair Alzour site undercuts what is supposed to be the authoritative nature of the safeguards implementation process, and once again calls into question the definition of “noncompliance”. Having the IAEA use intelligence information so centrally in its safeguards determinations has made folks skittish for some time. Here, it played a central role, prompting some NAM countries to cry foul, arguing that the determination was made in secret and in a non-transparent way. And finally, the Russian and Chinese “no” votes are the final nails in the UNSC coffin. They will be unable to do anything without all P5 on board to sanction Syria. To my mind, the IAEA BOG resolution is an empty victory.
