Trita Parsi is the President of National Iranian-American Council (NIAC) based in Washington D.C. and author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel
RA: Two years have passed since the controversial presidential elections in Iran and their bloody aftermath. What is your current assessment of the state of opposition forces in Iran and do you see it evolving into a possible next phase?
TP: From the outset, the Green Movement was a vehicle that the population used to be able to advance their demands and address their frustrations. It was arguably one of the best vehicles that had emerged since 1979, but it fell short in many ways. There were problems with both communication within the movement, as well as outside, and an ability to reinvent its methodology. But the frustrations that gave birth to the movement are still there and growing. The movement may not be the vehicle the population will opt to use going forward. Perhaps there will be a search for a new vehicle, perhaps the population will move back en masse towards the movement’s bottom line – the desire for democratization has not weakened, even if the Green Movement has suffered some defeats.
RA: Since the presidential elections, we have been witnessing a wholesale transformation of political rivalries in Iran. They have transformed from an “us vs. them” stage, characterized by the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad camp (us) and that of Mousavi—Karrubi (them) into a stage of “us vs. us” characterized by a widening gap between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. The latter resembles increasingly a tug-of-war between Ahmadinejad and the clerical leadership. What do you make of this new phase in rivalries and what ramifications do you think it could hold for the regime?
TP: I think it was predictable that the conservatives would at some point turn on each other. The marriage between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei was never that strong. But Khamenei needed Ahmadinejad for several reasons. Now when his utility has reached its end, we are seeing a very well orchestrated campaign to sideline Ahmadinejad. I don’t believe there are any good guys in this fight. Neither side is presenting nor are they motivated by a new and higher vision for Iran. Rather this is purely a clash of power ambitions. But even though there aren’t any good guys, there can be a good outcome if these clashes help expand the political spectrum in Iran. In the past few years, we have seen that spectrum shift markedly to the right while shrinking. The fight within the conservatives can arguably reverse that trend.
RA: What are the dynamics shaping the next presidential elections in Iran and where does Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei fit in? Do you think Mashaei’s reliance on Persian nationalism and Iranian “uniqueness” has garnered him support among the Iranian public, the young in particular?
TP: The Ahmadinejad crowd have clearly been aware that the conservative masses were never with him, they were with Khamenei. And Khamenei could easily call on them to take back their support for Ahmadinejad or even turn against him. So Ahmadinejad has systematically tried to create his own constituency, utilizing various narratives. That includes the use of Persian nationalism and some of the efforts of Mashaei to woo the Iranian diaspora. Though Persian nationalism is an extremely strong force, and though Ahmadinejad may have some success, I don’t believe his gamble will work.
RA: Has Ahmadinejad set a new course in Iran’s foreign policy over the past two years? What have been the key changes in tone, language, and direction, if any, in Iran’s foreign policy over this period?
TP: Ahmadinejad has certainly used a much harsher tone than the government of his predecessor, President Khatami. Ahamadinejad has hardened Iran’s position on the nuclear issue. He has also tried to walk back on that a few times in order to present himself as a worthy negotiating partner with the West. But in essence, I think we can see continuity in Iranian foreign policy, with the change being primarily in tone and presentation rather than substance.
RA: How would you summarize Iran’s approach vis-à-vis the current turmoil in the Arab world, otherwise known as Arab Spring? Do you think the Iranian leadership views Bahrain differently from Syria?
TP: I think Iran has been taken off guard. It did not expect it to move this fast, nor that it would reach Syria and that the spring would so clearly lack an anti-American component. In the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Reza Marashi and I argue that the developments in the Arab world present a major challenge to Iran’s soft power source in the region, and in its extension, Iran’s ability to seek a leadership position in the Middle East.
RA: Give us your assessment of Iranian-Israeli ties. Has there been a change in Iran’s language toward Israel and what factors in your opinion could contribute to lessening or even diffusing of tensions between Tehran and Tel-Aviv?
TP: The stalemate between Israel and Iran continues. The most interesting development here is probably the increasingly loud voices in Israel starting to question the wisdom of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. I think it is becoming increasingly clear that Israeli threats to bomb Iran were primarily aimed at pushing the US to use its military option. But you cannot make threats of this kind and then not act without losing credibility. Israel has in many ways painted itself in a corner with its repeated threats. We are now seeing former politicians and intelligence officials questioning the wisdom of attacking, in what I suspect is an attempt to find a way out the corner.
RA: Turkey’s recent geopolitical rise and its ability to exert greater regional influence have been topics of much debate. This rise in geopolitics has been vis-à-vis wide-ranging economic reforms that have thrust the country onto the world stage as a key emerging market. In light of these developments in Turkey and Iran’s worsening economic woes, do you think Iran is being overshadowed by Turkey’s rise and on the way to becoming a second-tier regional player?
TP: Turkey has in many ways acted to counter Iran’s influence in the region and attempted to ensure that Iran does not alone fill the power vacuum left in the region by a declining United States. At the same time, both the Turks and the Iranians are proceeding cautiously, going to great lengths to find a good balance between the competition and collaboration that their relationship inevitably will entail. They are looking for a normative framework for their relations that will ensure the competition will be constructive rather than destructive. Turkey and Iran are doing this because they know that if they don’t find ways to tame their competition, it can turn very ugly and be detrimental to both sides. Their ability to walk this fine balance remains to be seen. Challenges such as the uprising in Syria, as well as pressure from Washington on Turkey to take on a tougher stance against Iran, might compromise the balance and result in the two ancient rivals clashing with each other.
RA: Let’s turn our attention to U.S.-Iranian relations. What are the chief dynamics in Tehran-Washington relations both positive and negative, and where does NIAC stand with regard to these dynamics?
TP: In both Washington and Tehran, when it comes to US-Iran relations, strategic imperatives have been sacrificed for domestic political expediency. Though the Obama administration made a strong attempt at diplomacy, neither side showed the persistence and political will to ensure the success of diplomacy. In the remaining 18 months of the Obama administration, there will likely be no constructive initiatives to revive diplomacy since such a move does not have any domestic political benefits. Instead, we will likely see an increase of the sanctions, but also some positive measures targeting the Iranian people. The State Department has already revised the single entry visa policy, and we are hoping to see a few more positive measures, including easing of sanctions on communications software and hardware, as well as permitting the sale of airline spare parts. After 2012, however, things can become critical if the Iranian nuclear program has continued to advance. The danger lies in the crystallization of the current narrative, which states that diplomacy failed and was exhausted, sanctions are insufficient, and as a result, only some variation of a military strike remains. This is an erroneous narrative, which I will show in my forthcoming book by Yale University Press. But it may nevertheless stick and by that eliminate the non-confrontational policy options.
RA: Do you think Iranian-Americans are active enough in American public life? Is NIAC’s goal to build a unified Iranian-American voice in American public and political life and is it possible?
TP: Iranian Americans are not sufficiently involved, but we have seen an amazing rise in civic engagement in the last decade. It is thanks to the existing Iranian American voice that the visa issue was resolved, for instance, so clearly our community can have a very influential and constructive voice if we invest in it.
RA: You on a personal basis as well as NIAC have been targets of continuous criticism in certain corners of the Iranian-American community. The overarching theme of these criticisms is the allegation that NIAC pursues the policies of the Islamic Republic and interests of the Iranian leadership. Who are NIAC’s chief opponents and what is your response to these criticisms and allegations?
TP: In an open political system, one cannot be effective without attracting critics. What is unfortunate in our specific case is that the accusations some of our political opponents throw out are complete falsehoods. NIAC’s agenda in opposing war, opposing broad sanctions that hurt the population while supporting targeted sanctions that hit the government, as well as supporting more pressure on the human rights issue in Iran, is hardly an agenda that benefits the current regime. But our opponents, who are a very small but loud minority and who have allied themselves with the key supporters of confrontation with Iran in Washington, that is, the neo-conservatives, have chosen to engage in slander and defamation rather than democratic discourse. The bulk of these attacks appear to be coming from the Mujahedin-e Khalq, a violent cult that is on the United States government’s terrorist list. The MKO favour war with Iran and sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war. In spite of their massive efforts to silence any independent Iranian American voice in Washington, they have failed and NIAC has continued to grow. As our community becomes more involved in the political processes of the US and learns more about how a democracy should work, my prediction is that the tactics of defamation and slander will grow increasingly ineffective.
