After nearly seven years of negotiations, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, formed ironically in response to India’s diversion of civilian nuclear technology to nuclear weapons production, issued more stringent guidelines for transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. The new guidelines, approved during its June 23-24 meeting in the Netherlands, strengthens the conditions under which a country can receive these technologies. While ENR technologies are commonly used to produce civilian nuclear fuel, they can easily be modified to produce weapons-grade material.
The new language amends paragraphs 6 and 7 of the NSG guidelines by adding “objective criteria.” With thanks to the Arms Control Association, the revised guidelines state that, in order to receive ENR technologies, a country:
– must be a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty;
– has not been identified in a report to the IAEA Secretariat which is under consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the subject of Board of Governors decisions calling on it to take additional steps to comply with its safeguards obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its program….;
– is adhering to NSG guidelines and has reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it is implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540; and
– …has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol, or pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA Board of Governors.”
In addition, the changes stipulate that suppliers of ENR technologies receive assurances on non-explosive use, that recipient countries have in place effective safeguards in perpetuity, and re-transfer, a commitment to international standards of physical protection, and a commitment to IAEA safety standards and international safety conventions. The new guidelines also allow suppliers of ENR to consider “any relevant factors as may be applicable” to ensure that the transfer is used for peaceful purposes only.
This change, which plugs an important gap in transfers of civilian nuclear technologies, also issues a firm rebuke to India. The new objective criteria prevents India from from receiving any “sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies” under the terms of the 2008 India-specific waiver the U.S. was granted by the NSG. India strikes out from square one because it isn’t a party to the NPT and won’t put its facilities under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (except the Tarapur nuclear power plant, which really won’t tell you much about the Indian nuclear weapons program). No grandfathering here, which had been a question in the run-up to the final language.
The change I find most intriguing is that transfers must now be conducted under so-called “black box” conditions which “seek to prevent the ENR technology from being replicated.” I have written before about concerns that many in the nonpro community have with the commercialization of GE-Hitachi’s Silex laser enrichment technology. That technology has the potential to make covert enrichment even easier than does centrifuge technology by, inter alia, reducing the footprint and energy use of the facility. In the hypothetical case that Silex is commercialized, and GE-Hitachi decides it wants to export it, and for some reason, the USG approves such a transfer, it would potentially be done under these conditions. This scenario doesn’t give me the warm and fuzzies, but it does make things a wee bit better than the old NSG guidelines language which simply urges suppliers to exercise restraint in the export of sensitive technologies.
