Two recent reports that touched upon the controversial topic of further arming local groups in Afghanistan were released recently, the first is CSIS’ “The War in Afghanistan: A Race Against Time, Resources, And The Enemy“, and the second is Refugees International’s (RI) “Afghanistan: Responsible U.S. Transition Must Address Displacement Crisis.” In the below text, I discuss the major points of both reports and my assertion that the arming of Afghanistan will only harm US counter-terrorism goals, humanitarian access, and long-term moderation and stability for Afghanistan.
The reports take two divergent tracks, with CSIS’ Adam Mausner and Anthony Cordesman opining that the Afghan Local Police (ALP, the new bandwagon militia program) “do seem to be making progress, and thus far show no signs of becoming local power bases independent of the central government.” Not to be overlooked, they emphasize that the importance of the program is its role in providing intelligence and assessment information. They further argue that it is a definite plus that “the ALP program is tied to local governance and development,” as well that the “ALP program is part of an extensive local-level counterinsurgency system called Village Stability Operations (VSO) and is not, as many fear, just setting up soon-to-be militias.” Notably, the report expounds upon ISAF’s past failures to incorporate local armed groups to fight the armed opposition. To assuage concerns about the ALP program, however, Mausner and Cordesman assert that the ALP is a different story: it “starts with local governance” in the form of a supported shura – one that is responsible for selecting ALP members once given approval from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and US special operations forces (SOF) – and the ALP are trained and supervised by a 12 man team of US SOF.
They additionally maintain that concerns the program will only result in further instability are ill-founded because the US SOF serves as a check on the local shuras, ensuring the shuras operate in keeping with locals’ desires, and the US SOF “teams carefully track the Shura members and local ALP commanders, to make sure that they are not siding with any local power brokers.” For brevity’s sake, Mausner and Cordesman argue that US SOF micro-manage the ALP through their presence and knowledge of the area and people. In the end, though, Cordesman does highlight concerns about the program’s sustainability due to the scarcity of US SOF, and he notes that there is not a clear plan on what ultimately to do with the ALP, such as integrate them into the Afghan National Police (ANP). Nonetheless, he expresses hope in the program, citing recent efforts to have conventional US and Afghan special forces assume control and training.
Shifting gears, contrast Mausner and Cordesman’s outlook with that of RI’s Lynn Yoshikawa and Matt Pennington. Yoshikawa and Pennington argue that “the proliferation of militias is increasing insecurity, especially in the north” and that “[m]any new militias operate under the guise of the U.S./ISAF-backed Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative.” According to RI, “Internally Displaced People (IDPs), government officials, security analysts and humanitarian actors” all asserted “that the expansion of poorly vetted, ill-trained and unsupervised ALP units and irregular militias are a major threat to civilians and stability.” Furthermore, “[t]hese armed groups have allegedly committed abuses including murder, theft, extortion, bribery and intimidation.” RI raises additional alarm by citing that ISAF and the Afghan government’s plan is “to recruit, train and mobilize as many as 30,000” total ALP, whereas current numbers are around 6,200.
While they are unclear whether the ALP or another of the many acronym militias bears responsibility, RI cites IDP reports that militias in Jawzjan Province looted, harassed, and forcibly taxed locals. Yoshikawa and Pennington also highlight a UN report that cited “the ALP’s ‘weak oversight, recruitment, vetting and command and control mechanisms, [and] limited training for recruits.” RI’s report goes on to note concerns about inadequacies in training – said to sometimes be as little as a couple of days. RI claims that “local leaders are circumventing the ALP vetting process due to pressure to expedite recruitment.” Moreover, there have been instances “where powerful warlords pressure[d] local leaders to formalize pre-existing militias into the ALP – often around tribal, ethnic or political lines – so they can use these units to avenge personal disputes or strengthen their influence.” In another example, the report asserts that “a Taliban ‘reintegree’ in Uruzgan province was even recruited with the support of international forces to serve as an ALP commander. He is notorious for using his position for personal gain and ordering night raid operations against those who get in his way.” Of further note, Yoshikawa and Pennington assert that “[w]ithout proper vetting and training, the rapid expansion of the ALP could even become a catalyst for the insurgency.” In light of these allegations, RI impresses that “the U.S. must pressure the Afghan government to halt the further expansion of this program and address its shortfalls immediately.”
With the above two reports, we witness two opinions: one that says the ALP are a promising tool for ISAF, with some shortcomings that will need to be addressed eventually; and another that says the arming of locals, albeit under a new name, continues to fracture Afghanistan, raise humanitarian concerns, and only further long-term insecurity.
Evaluating the two arguments, I find Mausner and Cordesman’s analysis to be based upon either hope, a lack of information, naivety, or a strong belief in American exceptionalism, and RI’s is in keeping with my experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere. For Mausner and Cordesman, the assumption that US SOF possess a good understanding of the people they are housing or working with is ill-founded. Time and again, we see examples of how ‘simple Afghans’ (a hint of the orientalist) have manipulated SOF, US intelligence, or others to do their bidding, resulting in the torture, detention, and death of rivals. I find it hard to believe that a US SOF unit could even operate out of Washington, DC in a similar conflict environment and have such an ‘understanding’, let alone in such a foreign land as Afghanistan. Since we’re so reliant on US SOF for oversight of the ALP, I’m also guessing that Mausner and Cordesman aren’t aware of how SOF operates. To quote a US service member, “Just look at how many bags of gravel SF is procuring, along with its absence”. (This alludes to the ‘can do’ attitude, manifest in shortcuts, that SOF are known for; i.e., misuse of funds/fraud). From my experience, once you have the power of the gun, your perspective and actions change drastically.
Even accepting the assumption that US SOF can have such an understanding to oversee the ALP (doubtful), that support and oversight will be sound and lasting (really?), and that the ALP will be integrated into the ANP (sure, why not?), we’ve failed from the outset because there has been no examination of why communities are supposedly seeking the ALP. To keep things short, I doubt it is so much about opposition to the Taliban than it is opposition to rivals, whom the Taliban may presently be. For instance, who wouldn’t welcome pay, logistical support, arms, training, organization, etc., so that they could protect themselves or seek an advantage over rivals? Moreover, it’s not like opposition to the Taliban is a static thing.
Why is this important? One can easily perceive how the arming of Afghanistan is further fracturing it: you may have pockets of stability, but they will only be pockets in which you will not be aware of what’s inside them, al-Qa’eda, Taliban, HQN, TTP, etc. Additionally, the pockets will hinder overall peace and governance. From a counter-terrorism and humanitarian perspective, in conclusion, losing transparency and fracturing a state is a really negligent way to win a war. And I’m not even going to discuss the old argument about how undermining existing power balances is equally stupid if you want long-term moderation and stability. Really.