Two Afghanistan items in the media grabbed my attention today for two different but related reasons. First, a Reuter’s article on the first Afghan women to qualify as pilots arriving in the U.S. for training reminded me of the continuing progress that has been made by NATO as part of their training mission of the Afghan security forces. Second, an article by Stephen L.Carter, a Yale Law Professor with The Daily Beast, was not only one of the best and most well thought out pieces I’ve read, but it also reminded me of how nuanced the Afghanistan situation is and why it’s important to not let the progress made slip away as coalition forces stand down and withdraw.
Before I go on I’d like to review our goals and objectives in Afghanistan as stated by the Obama administration.
Goal:
Objectives to meet that goal:
Looking at the stated goals and objectives, it’s clear to me much progress has been made against Al Qaeda. In a recent statement reported in the New York Times, the new Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said the U.S. was “‘within reach of strategically defeating Al Qaeda, and that the American focus had narrowed to capturing or killing 10 to 20 crucial leaders of the terrorist group in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.” In that same article, the New York Times said General Petraeus, the departing U.S. commander in Afghanistan “told reporters… ‘enormous damage’ had been done to Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s northwest frontier but that elements of the organization would exist for some time. ‘The brand will be out there’… General Petraeus said that 50 to 100 Al Qaeda insurgents remained in the remote Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, on the rugged border with Pakistan. A senior Pentagon official said that intelligence showed that before his death, Bin Laden had been examining the possibility of using those provinces as havens for even more Al Qaeda fighters.”
The Obama administration’s policies have reversed the Taliban’s momentum, but to me that is only a partial success. As mentioned in previous blogs, I’m still concerned that these gains can be reversed if we pull out NATO forces too soon. Additionally, part of “winning” a conflict is making sure the other guy recognizes he is losing or is defeated. If you don’t do that, there is a risk that the conflict will have to be faced again. A good example is Iraq. Most forget that the first Gulf War did not end; primarily because Saddam Hussein refused to abide by the UN sanctions. I’ve blogged about this before and discussed how extensive our military operations were in support of UN sanctions through the ’90’s and right up to the 2003 conflict.
In today’s world, conflicts are not just fought on traditional battle fields but also in the media and in the perceptions of people. In the Stephen Carter article he states:
“One has the sense that the Taliban, while awaiting the promised American withdrawal, is fighting mainly to burnish its reputation with the Afghan people. So, for example, when the last Canadian combat forces departed Afghanistan recently, the Taliban cited its much-ballyhooed policy of targeting Canadians specially—an approach that Taliban leaders imagined would strengthen the hand of antiwar activists back home. Never mind that experts by and large dismiss the campaign against Canada as a military failure. Never mind that Canadian forces, despite their small numbers, were crucial in holding onto large chunks of Southern Afghanistan until President Obama’s surge helped roll back the Taliban forces there. The point is that lots of ordinary Afghans likely believe that the Taliban chased the Canadians out. Similarly, although the Taliban’s annual spring offensive failed spectacularly this year, the group’s propaganda arm insisted that great victories had been won. As the Obama administration prepares to withdraw most American forces, the Taliban is telling all who will listen that the coalition is losing the war.”
The Obama administration has also made tremendous strides in strengthening and training the Afghan security forces, but the jury is still out on how well these forces will perform once NATO departs. NATO has done a tremendous job in training the forces and has come up with a plan where they gradually transfer security responsibilities to them; but there are still problems. What if the training and transfer takes longer? Will the administration keep to its force pull out schedule as recently stated in spite of political fall out at home?
Some might say, “Look we’ve achieved most of our goals and objectives so let’s get out of Afghanistan. We can no longer afford the cost.” As to the cost, if we are serious about making cuts in the defense budget, Afghanistan and Iraq are not the only show in town. What about the 47,000 troops in Japan or the thousands still in Germany? There are many other costly items in the Defense budget besides our current conflicts. Will there not be a bigger cost if the Taliban once again gains the upper hand?
Some might say it’s no longer our responsibility what happens in Afghanistan. They have a new government; as long as they don’t let Al Qaeda back in, if it fails it’s on them. This is where that nuance thing comes into play. I had not given much thought to the responsibility of an occupying power versus liberating power. In his article Stephen Carter states: “The responsibility of an occupying power to restore and then keep order is well established in international law. Many scholars have also argued for a corollary: that an occupying power, having overthrown a regime, must not withdraw until a government capable of keeping order is in place.”
In an excellent paper written by Colonel Lyle W. Cayce, United States Army, in 2004 he makes an argument that:
“Prior to and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Government asserted that coalition forces would be liberating rather than occupying forces to justify military intervention on humanitarian grounds, to reassure domestic and foreign audiences that the United States had no imperialistic ambitions in Iraq, and to avoid actions that might cause the Iraqi people to view invading forces as conquerors. As U.S. forces advanced into Iraq and other nations called upon the United States to act as an occupying power under international law, the United States refused and maintained that forces were liberating Iraq. When the United States displaced the Iraqi regime in Baghdad, U.S. forces did not immediately assume control of the city and restore order. The lawless period that followed cost U.S. forces the support of many Iraqis, complicated post-combat governance, and endangered the U.S. strategic goal of the creation of a democratic government. This paper argues that if the United States had planned and used occupation authority effectively, the United States could have prevented many of the problems that plague post-war Iraq. It recommends that the United States incorporate occupation law into future operations.”
Think I’ll end here. I will continue in the next few days. What I’d like to look at is how we will know if our Afghan strategy starts to fall apart and what are the consequences if that happens. As always my views are my own.
