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Judging Success in the “War on Terror”

Judging Success in the "War on Terror"This past week, Umar Patek, the Jemaah Islamiyah militant responsible for assembling the explosives used in the 2002 bombings in Bali, was extradited to Indonesia after being captured in Pakistan in late March. Patek is also believed to have been behind the attacks on Christian churches in cities across Indonesia on Christmas Eve, 2000. His arrest in Abbottabad, Pakistan – the same city in which al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special Forces earlier this year – brought to an end a decade-long manhunt which catapulted the world’s largest Muslim nation to the forefront of the U.S.-led “War on Terror.”

Patek’s arrest and anticipated trial should finally be able to bring closure to families and friends of the 202 victims killed in the blasts. But the significance of his capture transcends simply bringing one more terrorist to justice. Additionally, it shatters the perception that the Indonesian government has appeared “soft” with respect to prosecuting terror suspects and, moreover, it once again elucidates how a successful counterterrorism strategy can be engineered: by utilizing sound intelligence gathering techniques and legal criminal procedures such as arrests and prosecutions. That is to say, individual countries and the broader international community can develop effective counterterrorism policies without resorting to invading the sovereignty of states and deploying military personnel there.

The first point was the subject of a 2005 report produced by the Council on Foreign Relations. After several attacks by myriad separatist groups in the early parts of the 2000s, the CFR postulated that Indonesia was the base from which al Qaeda could launch its Southeast Asian operations from.

“Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim county, is a vast archipelago with porous maritime borders, a weak central government, separatist movements, corrupt officials, a floundering economy, and a loosely regulated financial system—all characteristics which make it fertile ground for terrorist groups. While Indonesia is known as a secular, tolerant society that practices a moderate form of Islam, radical Islamists have gained momentum.”

Despite its recent successes, Indonesia’s top counterterrorism official told lawmakers in April that the country’s laws were still too lenient for those found guilty. Ansyaad Mbai, the country’s counterterrorism chief argued for stricter sentences and the authority to preemptively engage known terror cells. For many of these reasons, observers have been quick to suggest that Indonesia is a haven for terrorists. But after the much publicized conviction and execution in 2009 of Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, one of the bombers implicated in the Bali attacks, and the imprisonment of Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah in June of this year, that label is slowly but surely being shed.

The second point is sure to vindicate progressive and antiwar advocates who have loudly espoused the failure of interventionist policy to curtail terrorist activities. The administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush was well-known for their proclivity to disregard international legal processes whilst waging its “War on Terror” across several fronts. Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, once infamously wrote that the Geneva Conventions were “quaint, obsolete, and irrelevant.” The administration prioritized an inundation of military troops in areas of conflict, approved the implementation of “enhanced interrogation techniques” on captured militants, and promoted such nefarious legislation such as the Patriot Act in order to hack emails and tap cell phones of would-be terrorists. As a result, the Bush administration secured very few victories in the “War on Terror.”

President Barack Obama has largely maintained the two U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – although plans to begin a phased troop withdrawal in both countries are scheduled to begin in 2012 – but his counterterrorism policy has been one of the few triumphs the beleaguered U.S. President can tout. Headlined by the spectacular killing of bin Laden in May of this year, the Pentagon also announced the arrests and deaths of several of the more notable players in al Qaeda’s global network of killers.

The benefit of this more refined strategy is that intelligence officials can question individuals whom are captured and arrested. No intelligence can be extracted from anyone when an unmanned drone shoots a missile at an alleged terrorist hideout which consequently causes untold amounts of collateral damage as well. Nor is popular opinion in the Muslim world likely to condone more foreign military operations and occupations of Muslim countries. Indonesian officials are already hopeful that Patek’s arrest will lead to the disclosure of important intelligence on al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and other affiliated terror networks which would otherwise have gone unnoticed. Such disclosures serve to reinforce the idea that a nuanced approach is more effective in fighting terror as opposed to military invasion and occupation.

 

Author

Tim LaRocco

Tim LaRocco is an adjunct professor of political science at St. Joseph's College in New York. He was previously a Southeast Asia based journalist and his articles have appeared in a variety of political affairs publications. He is also the author of "Hegemony 101: Great Power Behavior in the Regional Domain" (Lambert, 2013). Tim splits his time between Long Island, New York and Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Twitter: @TheRealMrTim.