Credit: AFP
Lots of moving parts in the Afghanistan situation. I’ll cover them in a series of blogs. Last week the Department of Defense released its quarterly report: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. If you’ve read any of my previous blogs, you’ll remember I always like to begin topics like this with reiterating the mission. I find it useful to sometimes step back and look at what we’re actually trying to do. The U.S. mission as stated in the report is:
“The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The specific objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. To support these objectives, U.S. and coalition forces will continue to degrade the Taliban insurgency in order to provide time and space to increase the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF) and the Afghan Government so they can assume the lead for Afghanistan’s security by the end of 2014”.
The NATO and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) strategy and objectives according to the document are:
“The NATO strategy remained unchanged during the reporting period. It is based on the NATO Comprehensive Strategic and Political-Military Plan and is implemented through the Supreme Allied Commander – Europe Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302 (Revision 2), Joint Forces Command Brunssum OPLAN 30302, and ISAF OPLAN 38302.5 The mission in the current ISAF OPLAN states:
ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government and the international
community, conducts comprehensive, population-centric counterinsurgency
operations in order to: protect the Afghan people; neutralize insurgent networks;
develop Afghan National Security Forces; and support the establishment of
legitimate governance and sustainable socio-economic institutions.”
As to how the strategy is executed, the document goes on to state:
“The execution of ISAF OPLAN 38302 focuses on a “clear-hold-build” strategy, which is focused on key terrain districts and area of interest districts where the majority of the population lives, that will create the conditions necessary to complete a responsible transition to Afghan lead for security throughout the country by the end of 2014.”
The report is 147 pages long but here are some things that jumped out at me:
“…the Afghan Government approved an increase in ANSF endstrength figures from 305,600 personnel to 352,000 personnel (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) by October 2012. This increase in forces will be critical to supporting the transition process and ensuring that the ANSF is well-positioned to assume responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Final ANSF end-strength post-2014, however, remains to be determined. As of this reporting period, the ANA reached 170,781 soldiers and the ANP reached 136,122 policemen; both the ANA and ANP remain on track to achieve their respective growth goals for October 2012.”
As to how things are going overall, the report said:
“Although security continues to improve, the insurgency’s safe havens in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, remain the biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable, stable Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefiting from safe havens inside Pakistan, with a notable operational capacity, as reflected in isolated high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, sustained progress has provided increased security and stability for the Afghan population and enabled the beginning of transition in July of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas, comprising 25 percent of the Afghan population.”
The report did talk about problem areas:
“…the growth and development of the ANSF continues to face challenges,
including attrition above target levels, leadership deficits, and capability limitations in the areas of staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. The ANSF continues to require enabling support, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR4, and medical, from coalition resources to perform at the level necessary to produce the security effects required for transition. The influence of criminal patronage networks on the ANSF also continues to pose a threat to stability and the transition process. Further, the drawdown of U.S. and international forces increases the risk of a shortfall of operational partnering resources, which could reduce ANSF-ISAF operational partnerships and may impede ANSF development.”
The report did not shrink from discussing problems with the Afghan government stating:
“…the capacity of the Afghan Government has been limited by a number of issues,
including the political dispute in the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament, the continued absence of an International Monetary Fund program, widespread corruption, and the lack of political progress in enacting key reforms announced at the July 2010 Kabul Conference. Setbacks in governance and development continue to slow the reinforcement of security gains and threaten the legitimacy and long-term viability of the Afghan Government. The United States and the international community continue to work closely with their Afghan partners to address these challenges.”
The report concluded the executive summary part of the report by saying:
“…the insurgency remains resilient and, enabled by Pakistani safe havens, continues to contest ANSF and ISAF progress throughout the country, particularly in eastern Afghanistan. Although the security situation continues to improve, the Afghan Government must continue to make progress toward key governance and development initiatives in order for security gains to become sustainable.”
I did notice one other interesting thing as I read through the report instead of saying “COIN”, the report used the phrase civil-military counterinsurgency (COIN). In my experience from my time working in the government, there’s usually some political reason for changing terms. I have no idea what’s behind the change but suspect it may be to emphasize that the COIN campaign is not just a military thing but also includes things like perhaps negotiations with the Taliban and other terrorist groups like the Haqqani Terrorist network. I don’t know, just speculation on my part.
I like to include details like excerpts from documents in my blogs because I feel its good background to have. Also a lot of the topics addressed when reported in the media give the impression the people working these issues are not aware of them or are being caught by surprise by the continuing resistance to ISAF and ANSF efforts in the region. Think I’ll end here. As always, my views are my own.
