EU NAVFOR Atalanta in action (source: German Navy)
The last two years were a bumpy ride for the European security policy. One may claim that the Europeans once again failed not only to convey a clear message about their security goals to the foreign partners, but also to take concrete actions in order to stave off the creeping erosion of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Do we really face a European strategic decay in that domain? Indeed, some serious doubts about this statement may be raised. Therefore, it is high time to debunk three prophecies about European security in 2012.
1. Do worry, do not be happy. The Polish Presidency did a good job. The last six months have been the most fruitful and substantial for CSDP since the French Presidency in 2008. The joint conclusions of the Council of the European Union of December 2011 gave a vivid signal that the EU Member States are still willing to further develop the CSDP concept and necessary capabilities (personnel, assets, intelligence analytical support.) It was not easy to reach a consensus as there are multiple visions of European security and the pace in which it should evolve. Despite that fact the current message is a bit more optimistic than a year ago: Be of good cheer! After two years of stagnation there is a light of hope for CSDP. However, there are still a lot of obstacles on the European way toward ultimate success. One of them are financial constraints.
2. Crisis will impede everything. Against the backdrop of current financial constraints, the challenge for Europe is to do better with less while making good on its responsibilities. The crisis has inevitably made it more difficult for politicians to sell the benefits of the ongoing defense integration to the wary public. The crisis has blunted the importance of Europe in the world, exposed the Old Continent to numerous risks and threats, but also put it to the critical test that it cannot fail. The biggest challenge for Europeans remains the weakening of mutual trust between the Member States. The Weimar initiative from December 2010 – which sought to strengthen CSDP – has to some extent filled the gap. Poland, France and Germany were able to build a coalition of the willing and able (e.g. Finland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Romania) to spark a new wave of trust that may empower CSDP. However, crisis can only be overcome by concrete actions. Therefore, without a visible sign of progress in the implementation of the pooling and sharing initiative in 2012 it will be hard to revamp CSDP. In fact, an agreement on at least basic issues (e.g. support structures required for education, training and exercises) is a must.
3. The EU will diminish its external security policy engagement. To be fair, a glance at the number and locations of the past and current EU missions around the world reveals the union’s clear desire to live up to its ambitions in terms of crisis management policy. Since 2003, the EU has launched 25 civilian and military missions, in such far-flung countries as Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008-2009 and Guinea-Bissau from 2008-2010. Currently, the EU’s engagement in the world stretches from the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo; through Eastern Europe, in Georgia and Moldova; to the Middle East, in the Palestinian territories; up to Africa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa and Uganda. In 2011, as a result of budget cutbacks, the EU has struggled at least to maintain the status quo of its foreign operational engagements. Some experts even thought that the EU was likely to adopt an even less expeditionary posture in the future. On the contrary, the 2012 agenda looks both ambitious and promising. Besides, the ongoing operations the EU will remain committed to addressing the security challenges in the Sahel with a view to start a CSDP mission to reinforce regional security capabilities, in close cooperation with the African Union. A second operation, in South Sudan (with a focus on airport security), is also being prepared. Finally, the Polish Presidency has facilitated the amendment process of the Athena mechanism which administers the financing of common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications. Therefore, it will be now easier than before to set up a mission.
On paper it all seems doable and easy. But, as diplomats say: Paper is patient. After the Libyan crisis there is a growing sense of ambiguity about the real outcome of the EU’s crisis management policy. Therefore, it is more than certain that the development of CSDP will be a long process. But Europeans should not forget that they are approaching a “do or die” moment for Common Security and Defense Policy.
Dominik P. Jankowski serves as Expert Analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland and is pursuing a doctorate at the Warsaw School of Economics.
The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland.
