What are the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the simmering dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, now threatening to boil over?
On the positive side of the ledger, as Peter Crail spelled out in an Arms Control Association issue brief on Jan. 25, the P5 + 1 group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) – is not insisting that Iran permanently forgo uranium enrichment -only that it agree to tighter safeguards that would guarantee its nuclear activities are purely peaceful. The stance represents a welcome improvement on the Bush Administration’s pre-2006 position, which was that Iran had to give up enrichment for good.
Crail does a nice job of laying out ideas about how Iran might be persuaded to limit dubious activities in the near term, including a Russian “step by step” proposal, the elements of the proposed 2009 fuel swap agreement, and the 2006 and 2008 P5 + 1 proposals. At the same time, he says with some emphasis that, “it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement [with Iran] might be.”
Another somewhat positive element is Iran’s declared willingness to enter into talks about stopping 20 percent of its enrichment activities, though it still declines to discuss an agreed-upon mechanism that would allow it to resume enrichment following a suspension. Serious concerns linger about whether Iran is still just trying to “run out the clock”–obtain relief from international pressure in the near term, leaving it free to build nuclear weapons when it is ready in the longer term.
Then too there is intelligence chief James Clapper’s recent congressional testimony, in which he declared that while Iran is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, there’s no evidence it has taken a final decision to actually build nuclear weapons as yet. That finding, as fellow blogger Jodi Lieberman pointed out this week, is sharply at variance with Israel’s assessment.
On the negative side of the ledger is Israel’s alleged readiness to take military action soon, having found that all conditions for such action are met, as reported in a lengthy New York Times magazine article by Ronen Bergman on Sunday. What is curious about the article, let it be said, is that though Ronen claims conditions for action exist, he ends his article with a rather impressive list–albeit by no means an exhaustive one– of grave consequences that might result from a raid.
What seems singularly disturbing about the Ronen article is that it appears to have been planted, as though Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak summoned Ronen for a lengthy conversation in order to ensure the stance of the article. Might the Israeli government be trying to push the U.S. into taking action, or at least acquiescing in an Israeli strike, calculating that a pre-election Obama will be easier to influence than a re-elected Obama?
Amplifying the message of the Ronen article, the Times also carried a lengthy news report two days before it appeared, on Friday, Jan. 27, which stated that Israeli leaders minimize the gravity of what Iranian retaliation would involve. “Israeli intelligence estimates, backed by academic studies, have cast doubt on the widespread assumption that a military strike on Iranian facilities would set off a catastrophic chain of events like a regional conflagration, widespread acts of terrorism and sky-high oil prices,” said the lead. And further on: Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu “have embraced those analyses.”
One can only hope that the Obama Administration is impressing on Israel just how badly a raid could go wrong. Many influential Israeli defense and intelligence officials concede that military action at best will slow Iran’s nuclear program, not end it for good. Retaliation by Hamas and Hezbollah is almost taken for granted. But what if Iran struck back at Iraq, which Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly over to reach Iran and return? What if Saudi Arabia, more heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry than ever before, somehow got involved? Or Egypt, where the military is vying with the Muslim Brotherhood for control of the country? Or the beleaguered Syrian government?
All such considerations argue for continuing diplomatic efforts at reaching both interim agreements and a final comprehensive settlement, in which many highly loaded issues will likely come into play: not just lifting of sanctions but diplomatic recognition of Iran; diplomatic recognition of Israel and acknowledgment of its right to exist; understandings about contending influences in Iraq and Lebanon; Israel’s nuclear status and prospects for a Middle East nuclear free zone.
Admittedly, it would take diplomacy of the very highest order to somehow bundle a settlement of Iran’s nuclear status with resolution of just some of those other major issues. But it would be a mistake to imagine that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions if the rest of the world just agrees to stop inflicting pain on it. “Given that Iranian pride and nationalism exist across the domestic political spectrum,” as ACA’s Greg Thielmann observed in a recent blog, “it would be foolish to conclude that Tehran will capitulate only in response to increased costs for defying the international community. If a negotiated agreement is possible, it will also have to include something that Tehran perceives as a benefit.”
To put it a little differently, Iran has already incurred very high costs in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and that capability has become a major point of national pride. No Iranian government will give up that ambition without being able to boast of having obtained substantial tangible benefits in return.
