Armed security . . . or pirate? Will it always be easy to tell?
Over the course of the past decade, thousands of civilian contractors, including armed security personnel, have passed through Iraq and Afghanistan. Even though the United States has pulled it troops out of Iraq and is in the process of drawing down in Afghanistan, large numbers of contractors remain in those countries. Still, the number of contractors will fall as well. Plans regarding the number of civilians to be deployed in Iraq have already been reduced considerably. A good number of these people (although far from all) are themselves highly trained former U.S. military specialists lured into the private sector by higher wages. Where are they going to go? One option open to them is the sea.
Piracy on the open seas has grown exponentially in recent years. The most famous instances occur off the coast of Somalia (although Somali pirates are now venturing so far out to sea that “off the coast” no longer adequately describes it). Somali pirates—who generally take a ship and crew hostage and demand ransom—account for about half the instances in the world. The waters off Nigeria and Benin constitute another growing piracy center. There, enterprising buccaneers using empty hijacked oil tankers seize commercial tankers, off-load the oil onto their own ships, and then let them go. More conventional practices, such as boarding ships and stealing property, still carry the day in some of the waters of Southeast Asia.
Dealing with pirates is a complicated affair. Dozens of naval vessels from many countries now patrol the waters east of Somalia, awaiting the day when someone actually addresses the sources of piracy there. This, however, is not a perfect solution. It is expensive and is currently practiced only in one part of the world. Even there, in the vast open spaces of the Indian Ocean, a naval vessel is rarely in the vicinity when a pirate attack occurs. Once the pirates have taken the crew hostage, there is little a warship can do without endangering the people they’ve set out to rescue. (On the other hand, the prospects for rescue are greatly enhanced if the crew can lock themselves into a secure area of the ship—known as a citadel—before they are taken hostage.) This has led to calls for alternative solutions, including arming the merchant ships.
There are basically three ways a merchant ship could be armed. One is simply to hand out weapons to the crew. This approach has very little support among the world’s shipping fleets. Although it may seem natural to many Americans, many people are skeptical of the notion that a well-armed society is a safe society. Many ports ban weapons on ships. (Technically, when transiting the Suez Canal, a ship is supposed to turn in any weapons when entering the canal and collect them again at the other end.) Even U.S. law is ambiguous on the subject of guns on ships.
A second approach, followed by some countries, is to deploy small teams of military or police personnel on ships passing through pirate waters. This may be the approach most acceptable to port countries. Not all follow it, however. Germany, a country that hosts a large commercial fleet, has refused requests by shippers to provide police personnel, arguing that it is unconstitutional; Belgium will “rent” military personnel to Belgian-flagged ships; Yemen will “rent” military personnel to just about anyone. The United States military provides security teams to U.S.-flagged ships carrying military cargoes.
The third approach is to hire professional civilian security teams. To date, no ship with armed security has been successfully hijacked. The shipping world’s attitude toward this is ambiguous but evolving. It is clearly seen as preferable to arming the crew. The UN-affiliated International Maritime Organization (which refers to such teams as Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel, or PCASP) actively discouraged their use until just last year. Even now, the IMO’s approval is tentative and partial, taking the form of an “interim guidance” that is “not intended to endorse or institutionalize” their use. Since November 2011, U.S. policy encourages countries to allow ships with armed security teams on board. Many fear that armed resistance of any sort will lead to an escalation of violence. (So far, Somali pirates, seeking ransom for their hostages, have rarely harmed them.) Others are concerned about liability issues if armed guards shoot the wrong people; about the possibility of professional standards declining as the demand for security teams expands; or about the general issues of effectiveness, accountability, and norms that have been attached to private armed teams in other circumstances. Finally, there is the question of distinguishing armed civilians from pirates. How do you tell a ship that protecting itself from one that’s already been hijacked? Either way, they’ll say it’s the former.
Want to read more? Try:
Scott C. Monje, “Citadels: Passive Defence against Pirate Attacks,” Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 3:2 (June 2011): 43–56.
Leslie Anne Warner, “Pieces of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa,” Naval War College Review 63:2 (Spring 2010): 61–87.
