While receiving surprisingly little attention despite its historical significance, Ukraine’s Armed Forces recently took to assaulting over the border with Russia into the Kursk region of the Russian Federation. While the battles in the Kursk region of Russia are currently in play, it looks as if Ukraine has been fairly successful in entering Russia and securing territory over the border.
The historical weight of Kursk in military terms ties into storied invasions in Russian history, the most notable being Napoleon’s invasion of Russia as well as the German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. During the Second World War, Kursk was stitched into world history as being the largest tank battle to ever take place between two armies, brutal in nature as it was massive. Both invasions would have determined the future existence of Russia and the Soviet Union in their respective eras, but what is notable is that the loss of both invasions would have had severe consequences on the future of the Russian people themselves.
Military actions by Russia to push back into the neighbouring Kharkiv region has put the citizens in Kharkiv back into danger after being liberated by Ukrainian Forces. With losses in Kharkiv and attrition of forces being a detriment to Ukraine, it looks like the risky decision to enter Russian territory was taken as the stalemates in the Kharkiv region could have eventually reversed the fortunes of Ukraine in the medium term.
Since Ukraine has not made their intent public, there is no definitive consensus on the reasons behind Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region of Russia. Theories on Ukraine’s motives surround a possible plan to trade land for land, a simple morale boost, or a tactical move to flank hardened Russian lines in Ukraine and limit support structures for Russian Forces. While all of these variables will contribute to Ukraine’s war effort, a cultural explanation might tie all of these factors in together in ending the larger conflict.
A few months ago, Russia’s Wagner Forces took a similar approach and essentially invaded Russia as the rogue armies of old often did in the region. Material losses to Russian Forces and Wagner Brigades were less of a cost as opposed to the attempt to make Russia look unstable and its Government weak. What can be misunderstood in conflicts by Ukraine’s allies is that often the impression of weakness in a Government can be as powerful as the military itself. As stability, power and strength solidify a Government’s support, weakness is a signal of its imminent downfall. The reason why Napoleon’s Invasion and the Battle of Kursk are monumental is because it ties directly into the culture of a strong nation prevailing under difficult circumstances. The idea of strength and the warrior hero is so powerful that leaders who are unable to meet those expectations are as good as finished, and Ukraine or any Russian adversary taking over Kursk will be more than a notable point in the region’s history.
Russia’s big gamble in Ukraine never really considered Russia being invaded itself, even though Russian support for their Government’s actions is born out of the historical reality of every single Soviet citizen being personally affected by the German invasion only a few short generations ago. Generations of Soviet and Russian military doctrine were built around preventing another Nazi genocide of their people, and entire systems of protection (especially the anti-aircraft system networks) were created to repel such an attack. Since the Russia-Ukraine War began, Russia has been losing much of their modern and old Soviet stock, has taken to using drones from a country that designs weapons to commit acts like the Majdal Shams massacre, has been relegated to using dangerous old North Korean artillery stock, and is now having to purchase missile systems from abroad that are a poorer copy of technology invented by Russian scientists. With all of these actions, Russia was unable to prevent a massive terror attack on their own soil and have slowly become the junior partner with China, a country it has a territorial dispute with and have fought a war over previously. What Russia lacks in conventional military capability in 2024, they make up for in nuclear deterrence, but even the TOPOL missile fleet is under the control of a Government that would only look weaker if unhinged.
It should be noted that support for certain regimes is a curious one, as while severe elements in Western countries seemed to ignore the massacre of Majdal Shams on a football field in the middle of the Olympic games, ignore the targeted massacres in Bangladesh, treat the freedom movement in Venezuela like they are the Iranian Women’s movement they gave up on, and generally encourage more strife, people in places like China and Iran are very unlikely to support their young men dying in a war in support of a few old men running their Government. Russia is different as it had popular support for its actions, seen as a projection of strength tied with its historical lessons of protecting Russians at all costs against enemies from abroad. A possible loss of Kursk can change the narrative, and as with many of these current global wars, weakness and anarchy will never be in the public interest. It is so crucial to understand this concept in foreign relations that is should be considered the determining factor for the future existence of a regime, and possibly election victories in the West.